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International Law and the Struggle Against
Government Impunity in Africa
BY JOHN MUKUM MBAKU
ABSTRACT
In recent years, impunity has become pervasive throughout most
African countries. In some African countries, impunity is due to the
inability of national governments to bring perpetrators of human rights
violations to account for their crimes. In others, impunity arises from the
unwillingness of government to utilize the existing legal system to bring
criminals, whether they are state- or non-state actors, to justice. Effectively
combatting impunity in Africa must begin with the reconstruction of
African States to provide democratic institutions, which are capable of
adequately constraining the government and preventing civil servants and
political elites from acting with impunity; and which make possible the
bringing of all perpetrators of human rights violations, whether they are
members of the government or not, to account for their crimes. While
making certain that all African countries have legal and judicial systems
that are capable of bringing to justice all individuals who commit
international crimes in their jurisdictions is the first line of the fight against
impunity in Africa, it is important to acknowledge the important role that
international law can play in the anti-impunity effort. The international
criminal justice system, as embodied in the International Criminal Court, is
seen as an important and critical tool to fight threats to international peace
and security. In addition, international programs, such as the
Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and the Set of Principles for the Protection
and Promotion of Human Rights Through Action to Combat Impunity, add
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to the repertoire of tools available to those engaged in the fight against
impunity in the African countries.

I. INTRODUCTION
During the decolonization period, Africans blamed policies
promulgated by European colonialists for the high rates of poverty among
the various ethnocultural groups that inhabited each colony.1 Many Africans
viewed colonialism as “an exploitative, repressive, and cruel system,
established primarily to enhance the ability of Europeans to extract resources
from Africa for the benefit of the metropolitan economies,”2 as well as
Europeans located in the colony.3 Thus, the continent’s freedom fighters, that
is, those who led the struggle against continued European colonialization and
for independence, believed that independence would allow citizens to govern
themselves and have full and effective control of their economic processes.
Most importantly, it was generally believed that in the post-independence
period, Africans would be able to produce their own laws and institutions
and provide themselves with a governing process that minimized impunity
and significantly enhanced the recognition and protection of human rights,
including especially those of women, children, and religious and ethnic
minorities.4
As argued by Mbaku and Ihonvbere,5
[m]any Africans, especially the historically marginalized and
deprived (e.g., women, rural inhabitants, ethnic minorities, and those
forced to live on the urban periphery), believed that independence
was an opportunity to rid themselves of not only the Europeans, but
also of their laws and institutions and then, develop and adopt,
through a democratic process (i.e., a people-driven, bottom-up,
participatory, and transparent institutional reform process),
1. John Mukum Mbaku & Julius O. Ihonvbere, Introduction: Issues in Africa’s
Political Adjustment in the “New” Global Era, in THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRATIC
GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA: THE CONTINUING STRUGGLE 1–32 (John M. Mbaku & Julius O.
Ihonvbere eds., 2003).
2. Id. at 1.
3. See JOHN M. MBAKU, PROTECTING MINORITY RIGHTS IN AFRICAN COUNTRIES: A
CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY APPROACH 16–18 (2018).
4. See, e.g., Mbaku & Ihonvbere, supra note 1, at 1–2.
5. Mbaku & Ihonvbere, supra note 1.
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institutional arrangements based on their own values, aspirations,
traditions, and customs.6
This new set of institutional arrangements, developed exclusively by
Africans and designed to reflect their values and interests, would enhance the
ability of the government to pursue only public policies that enhance and
promote the peaceful coexistence of each country’s population groups. In
addition, the new governance architecture would also effectively constrain
state custodians (i.e., civil servants and political elites) and prevent them
from acting with impunity and engaging in such activities as corruption and
the abuse of the fundamental and human rights of citizens. There was hope
that in the post-independence period, the various ethnocultural groups within
each African country would be granted “a significant level of autonomy so
that [each one of them] could pursue its values and interests but do so within
the legal and political boundaries or constraints agreed to in an earlier period
and elaborated in the constitution.”7 Independence, then, was seen by many
Africans as bringing to an end, impunity by the Europeans—the latter
included, not only the civil servants and political elites who ruled the
colonies, but also European settlers, traders, entrepreneurs, miners, planters,
and others who exploited, degraded, and infantilized Africans with
impunity.8
Unfortunately for many Africans, the decolonization process did not
provide them with the opportunities to participate fully and effectively in
constitutional discourse and design. The process, as argued by many scholars
of decolonization in Africa,9 was undertaken reluctantly and
opportunistically. In addition to the fact that European colonizers only
reluctantly gave up their hegemonic control of the colonial territories, the
6. Id. at 2.
7. JOHN M. MBAKU, PROTECTING MINORITY RIGHTS IN AFRICAN COUNTRIES: A
CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY APPROACH 8 (2018).
8. Consider, for example, the mistreatment of African groups by European settlers in
the four British colonies that united in 1910 to form the Union of South Africa. That system
of degradation, which was formalized into law in 1948 and given the name “apartheid” or
“separate development,” was finally abolished when South Africa gained independence in
1994 and established a non-racial democracy. See, e.g., DAVID DOWNING, WITNESS TO
HISTORY: APARTHEID IN SOUTH AFRICA (2004) (examining, inter alia, the forces
contributing to the development of the system of apartheid, as well as the nature of life
under the apartheid system for the country’s African citizens).
9. See, e.g., Robert Fatton, Jr., Liberal Democracy in Africa, 105 POL. SC. Q. 455
(1990). See also JOHN M. MBAKU, INSTITUTIONS AND REFORM IN AFRICA: THE PUBLIC
CHOICE PERSPECTIVE (1997) (examining, inter alia, the failure of African countries to
provide themselves with institutional arrangements that adequately constrain the state and
minimize government impunity).
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indigenous African elites were so eager to gain independence and seize
control of the institutions of governance that their approach to the
decolonization process was quite opportunistic. Fatton10 argues that “[i]t was
only in the last decade of colonialism, when independence became a
certainty, that the imperialist powers gradually began to institute democratic
reforms in what had hitherto been structures of exploitation, despotism, and
degradation.”11 Fatton12 argues further that:
The transition from colonial despotism to liberal democracy was
expedited in a few years without any fundamental transformation in
the economic, cultural, or bureaucratic domains. The transition was
in fact reluctant, repressive, and opportunistic. In addition, African
leaders never fully accepted the precepts of the European political
model, few were enthusiastic about it, and most tolerated it as a
means to a different end. The African commitment to liberal
democracy was shaky, hesitant, and ultimately short-lived.13
The desire of many African elites to attain independence without fully
and effectively transforming the critical domains—that is, the political,
administrative, and judicial foundations of the state, in order to render them
more suitable for governance in the post-independence society, was
illustrated quite well by the nature of constitutional discourse in the U.N.
Trust Territory of Cameroons under French administration (“French
Cameroons”). As French Cameroons prepared for independence, a group
called the Constitutional Consultative Committee (“CCC”) was constituted
and charged with designing the new country’s constitution. Questioned later
about why the CCC chose to ignore nation-wide dialogue on constitutionmaking and instead, adopt de Gaulle’s constitution14 as a blue print for their
post-independence laws and institutions, members of the CCC stated that
adopting the French constitutional model was due to the wishes of then
leader of government, Ahmadou Ahidjo, whose “government was more
interested in producing almost any document and having it adopted as soon
as possible than in encouraging wider discussion of its basic provisions—

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Fatton, supra note 9.
Id. at 357.
Fatton, supra note 9.
Id. at 357.
That is, the FRENCH CONSTITUTION OF OCTOBER 4, 1958, also referred to as the
CONSTITUTION OF THE FRENCH FIFTH REPUBLIC.
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thus, according to these critics, accounting largely for following the French
model so closely.”15
In fact, throughout Africa, many indigenous elites believed that the
most important consideration was independence and that issues of
constitutional discourse and design would be given a more robust hearing
later, that is, in the post-independence period. Given the fact that the
constitution is the basic law for every country and the foundation for all of
the country’s governance institutions, the failure to engage all of each
country’s relevant stakeholders in participatory, inclusive, and people-driven
constitutional design did not augur well for effective governance in the postindependence period.16
French Cameroons gained independence on January 1, 1960, and took
the name République du Cameroun.17 In 1961, the République du Cameroun
united with the U.N. Trust Territory of Southern Cameroons to form a
federation called the Federal Republic of Cameroon. Unfortunately, the
process through which the constitution of the Federal Republic of Cameroon
was designed and adopted was just as opportunistic and non-participatory as
that of the République du Cameroun. As a consequence, the resulting Federal
Constitution created a governing process characterized by an imperial
presidency and virtually no mechanisms for citizens to check the exercise of
government power.18 As a result of the failure of Cameroonians to provide
themselves with institutional arrangements that adequately and effectively
constrain the state, political economy in the country, since unification in
1961, has been pervaded with government impunity, including high levels of
corruption, the rampant abuse of human and peoples’ rights, notably those of
women, children, and the country’s Anglophone minority.19
15. VICTOR T. LEVINE, THE CAMEROONS: FROM MANDATE TO INDEPENDENCE 227
(1964).
16. Id. See also Victor T. LeVine, The Fall and Rise of Constitutionalism in West
Africa, 35 J. MOD. AFRI. STUD. 181 (1997).
17. LEVINE, supra note 15.
18. See also John M. Mbaku, Judicial Independence, Constitutionalism and
Governance in Cameroon: Lessons from French Constitutional Practice, 1 EUROPEAN J.
COMP. L & GOV. 357 (2014) (examining, inter alia, the weaknesses of Cameroon’sgovern
ance institutions and how they have failed to minimize government impunity).
19. In fact, it was the continued exploitation and abuse of the minority Anglophones by
the Francophone-dominated central government that forced some Anglophones to opt for
violent mobilization, which has plunged the country into its worst constitutional crisis since
unification in 1961. See, e.g., S. Eban Ebai, The Right to Self-Determination and the
Anglophone Cameroon Situation, 13 INT’L J. HUM. RTS. 631 (2009) (arguing, inter alia, that
Anglophones in Cameroon have a right to self-determination); Piet Konings, The
Anglophone Struggle for Federalism in Cameroon, in FEDERALISM AND DECENTRALIZATION
IN AFRICA 289 (L. R. Basta & J. Ibrahim eds., 1999). See also INTERNATIONAL CRISIS
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A. The Evolution of Impunity as a Global Problem
Shortly after independence, many African political elites soon
abandoned even these poorly-designed and relatively weak constitutions and
opted, instead, to rule without any legal constraints. As argued by LeVine,20
“[i]n West Africa such documents were soon abrogated by the new
governments, which generally preferred to rule without the constraints that
they embodied.”21 Throughout many of these newly-independent countries,
“a constitution more often than not became simply another instrument of rule
if not discarded altogether. Many a replacement was simply octroyé, ‘handed
down from on high,’ or cobbled together by a compliant constitution-writing
conference or convention, and then adopted by a ‘controlled’ plebiscite.”22
Although LeVine’s article was published in 1997 and it is now 2018,
constitution making in many African countries remains as dysfunctional as it
was then.23
In countries, such as Kenya, Malawi, Zambia, Cameroon, and Côte
d’Ivoire, the single political party soon emerged as the only legal means
through which citizens could participate in the political life of their
countries.24 Despite the fact that the one-party state was promoted by its
GROUP, REPORT NO. 250: CAMEROON’S ANGLOPHONE CRISIS AT THE CROSSROADS,
https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/cameroon/250-cameroons-anglophone-cris
is-crossroads.
20. Victor T. LeVine, The Fall and Rise of Constitutionalism in West Africa, 35 J.
MOD. AFRI. STUD. 181 (1997).
21. LeVine, supra note 20, at 188.
22. Id.
23. While there are a few exceptions, including for example, constitutional exercises in
South Africa and Kenya, most African countries continue to engage in top-down, elitedriven, non-participatory and non-inclusive constitutional exercises. For example, in 2016,
Côte d’Ivoire produced a new constitution for the Third Republic. In addition to the fact that
the committee chosen to design the constitution was handpicked by the president and not the
people (e.g., through nation-wide, fair, free, and credible elections), ratification of the
constitution was undertaken through a highly controlled referendum, with the opposition
virtually shut out of participation. See, e.g., John M. Mbaku, Citizenship and Political and
Economic Participation in Africa, 43 N.C. J. INT’L L. 110, 165 (2018).
24. Kenya gained independence from Great Britain on December 12, 1963 under the
leadership of the Kenya African National Union (KANU) in what was essentially a de factor
one-party system. In 1982, Kenya became a de jure one-party state (see, e.g., CHARLES
HORNSBY, KENYA: A HISTORY SINCE INDEPENDENCE (2013) (providing, inter alia, an
overview of post-colonial developments in Kenya). Malawi gained independence from
Great Britain on July 6, 1964, with the Malawi Congress Party (MCP) as the only legal
political party until 1993 when the state adopted a multi-party system (see, e.g., JOHN
LLYOD LWANDA, KAMUZU BANDA OF MALAWI: A STUDY IN PROMISE, POWER AND
PARALYSIS (MALAWI UNDER DR. BANDA) (1961 TO 1993) (2009) (providing, inter alia, an
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proponents as a political mechanism to unite the country and enhance nation
building, it actually exacerbated inter-ethnic conflicts and created many
problems for governance. The domination of government by some
ethnocultural groups, to the exclusion of others, caused the type of
resentment that produced significant levels of sectarian violence, some of
which deteriorated into civil war, as occurred in Liberia, Nigeria,
Cameroon,25 and most recently, South Sudan.26 The single-party approach to
governance significantly increased the power of the executive, and seriously
overview of Malawi under Banda’s one-party system). Zambia gained independence from
Great Britain in October 1964 under a multiparty system that was dominated by three
political parties, United National Independence Party (UNIP), the ruling party; the Northern
Rhodesian African National Congress (NRANC), and the United Progressive Party (UPP).
However, in February 1972, Zambia became a one-party state—all political parties, except
for the UNIP, were banned (THE DYNAMICS OF THE ONE-PARTY STATE IN ZAMBIA (Cherry J.
Gertzel, Carolyn Louise Baylies & Morris Szeftel eds., 1984) (providing a series of essays
that examines the impact of the one-party political system on political economy in postindependence Zambia). On January 1, 1960, the U.N. Trust Territory of Cameroons under
French administration gained independence and took the name République du Cameroun.
On February 11, 1961, the U.N. Trust Territory of Southern Cameroons under British
administration voted in a U.N.-controlled and administered plebiscite to unite with the
République du Cameroun to form the Federal Republic of Cameroon. At unification in
1961, the new Federal Republic was a multiparty state with several political parties.
Nevertheless, in 1966, then Federal President, Ahamdou Ahidjo, cajoled all the political
parties, except the Union des Populations du Cameroun, to join his Cameroon Union
(Union camerounaise) to form the Cameroon National Union (CNU). From 1966 until
1990, Cameroon was a single-party state with the CNU as the only legal political party (see,
e.g., RICHARD A. JOSEPH, GAULLIST AFRIA: CAMEROON UNDER AHMADU AHIDJO (1978)
(examining the evolution of political economy in Cameroon under its first president,
Ahmadu Ahidjo). Côte d’Ivoire gained independence from France in 1960 under the
leadership of the Democratic Party of Côte d’Ivoire—African Democratic Rally (Parti
démocratique de la Côte d’Ivoire—Rassemblement démocratique Africain (PDCI-RDA)).
Côte d’Ivoire introduced multiparty politics in 1990 but the PDCI remained in power,
having won elections decisively. However, the party lost its control of the government when
Henri Konan Bédïé, who had replaced independence president, Félix Houphouët-Boigny,
who died in office in 1993, was ousted by military coup in December 1999 (see, e.g., ABOU
B. BAMBA, AFRICAN MIRACLE, AFRICAN MIRAGE: TRANSNATIONAL POLITICS AND THE
PARADOX OF MODERNIZATION IN IVORY COAST (2016) (examining, inter alia, political
developments in Côte d’Ivoire since independence).
25. For example, the ruling Cameroon National Union, which was renamed in 1985 as
the Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement (CPDM), was dominated, since its
emergence in 1966, by Francophones to the exclusion of Anglophones. See MARK D.
DELANCEY, REBECCA N. MBUH & MARK W. DELANCEY, HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF
CAMEROON (6th ed. 2010).
26. See James Verini, How the World’s Youngest Nation Descended into Bloody Civil
War, NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC, Sept. 30, 2014, https://news.nationalgeographic.com/
news/special-features/2014/10/141001-south-sudan-dinka-nuer-ethiopia-juba-khartoum/;
Endalcachew Bayeh, Republic of South Sudan: From North-South to Nuer-Dinka Conflict, 1
INT’L J. RESEARCH 288 (2014).
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weakened the judiciary and the legislature. Perhaps, more important is the
fact that in all of these countries, governance was characterized by significant
levels of impunity, including corruption and the abuse of the fundamental
and human rights of citizens, especially those of historically marginalized
groups, such as women, children, and ethnic and religious minorities.27
In a significant number of African countries, military elites intervened
and took control over the structures of governance.28 Contrary to the
pronouncements of these military elites in the immediate aftermath of the
coups, which included claims that they had intervened to save the country
from corrupt and opportunistic civilian-led regimes, the military regimes
were, more often than not, characterized by levels of corruption and other
forms of impunity that were actually higher than those obtaining in the
civilian regimes that the military had overthrown.29 As argued by LeVine,30
the intervention by military elites in African politics “epitomized the low
estate to which constitutionalism had fallen during [the] 1963-89”31 period in
Africa. Like their civilian counterparts, Africa’s military rulers “rejected
constitutions and constitutionalism as the basis for organizing their societies
and resolving conflict.”32 In virtually all countries that were ruled by military
regimes, the governors totally rejected participation and inclusiveness and
27. See JOHN M. MBAKU, PROTECTING MINORITY RIGHTS IN AFRICAN COUNTRIES: A
CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY APPROACH 99 (2018).
28. Africa’s first post-independence coup took place in Egypt on July 23, 1952, when
the government of King Farouk was overthrown by members of the Free Officers
Movement. Colonel Gamal Abdul Nasser was considered the brains behind the coup
operation. Nevertheless, General Muhammad Naguib was chosen as the post-coup leader
because of Naser’s fear that he and his fellow soldiers might not be taken seriously because
of their youth—all the young officers were under 35 years of age and hailed from peasant
lower-middle-class backgrounds. Two years later, on February 27, 1954, Nasser overthrew
Muhammad Naguib and took over control of the presidency of Egypt. Although military
coups d’état have become less popular as a method of unconstitutional change of
government in Africa, they remain a threat to each country’s constitutional order. For more
on Nasser and the Free Officers Movement, see JOEL GORDON, NASSER’S BLESSED
MOVEMENT: EGYPT’S FREE OFFICERS AND THE JULY REVOLUTION (1992) (examining, inter
alia, the 1952 military coup in Egypt and the role played by Nasser’s Free Officers
Movement). For a history of coups in Africa, see, e.g., A. B. ASSENSOH & YVETTE M. ALEXASSENSOH, AFRICAN MILITARY HISTORY AND POLITICS: COUPS AND IDEOLOGICAL
INCURSIONS, 1900–PRESENT (2001) (providing a historical overview of military coups d’état
in Africa).
29. See, e.g., JOHN M. MBAKU, INSTITUTIONS AND REFORM IN AFRICA: THE PUBLIC
CHOICE PERSPECTIVE 91–110 (1997).
30. LeVine, supra note 20.
31. Id. at 190.
32. John M. Mbaku, What Should Africans Expect from Their Constitutions, 41 DENV.
J. INT’L L & POL’Y 149, 149 (2013).
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instead opted to rely on ad hoc decrees and other forms of coercion, all of
which enhanced the government’s ability to act with impunity—the result
was the massive abuse of the rights of citizens.33
In virtually all the African countries in which the military had taken
control of the apparatus of government, supposedly to rid their fellow
citizens of corrupt and opportunistic civilian leaders,34 the military elites’
“own vision [of governance] tended to the strictly utilitarian; that is, seeing
constitutions as conditional charters to ‘clean’ or ‘sanitize’ civilian
régimes.”35 Although most of the military elites who had intervened in the
politics of their countries claimed they did so to “rid their countries of
corruption and other forms of impunity and deepen and institutionalize
democracy, military rulers instead immediately switched to authoritarian
forms of governance, all of which were characterized by the absence of
avenues for popular participation”36 and significantly high levels of
government impunity.
By the early-1990s, when many grassroots movements emerged to push
for transition to democratic governance in Africa,37 impunity had become
quite pervasive throughout the continent. In many of these countries, stateand non-state actors who were perpetrators of human rights violations
routinely escaped prosecution and punishment because of governments that
were unwilling or unable to bring these culprits to justice. In many
situations, such as the apartheid regime in South Africa, military and/or
33. See, e.g., SAMUEL DECALO, COUPS & ARMY RULE IN AFRICA: MOTIVATIONS &
CONSTRAINTS 1–33 (1990) (examining, inter alia, the role played by the military in
governance in Africa).
34 Actually, these were the same sentiments expressed by Major Chukwuma Kaduna
Nzeogwu and his fellow coup plotters in Nigeria in 1966. As part of his speech delivered to
the nation on January 15, 1966, Major Nzeogwu stated that they had organized the coup to
rid the country of “the political profiteers, the swindlers, the men in high and low places that
seek bribes and demand 10 percent; those that seek to keep the country divided permanently
so that they can remain in office as ministers or VIPs at least, the tribalists, the nepotists,
those that make the country look big for nothing before international circles, those that have
corrupted our society and put the Nigerian political calendar back by their words and
deeds.” Chukwuma K. Nzeogwu, Announcing Nigeria’s First Military Coup on Radio
Nigeria (Sept. 30, 2010) (transcript available at https://www.vanguardngr.com/
2010/09/radio-broadcast-by-major-chukwuma-kaduna-nzeogwu-%E2%80%93-announcingnigeria%E2%80%99s-first-military-coup-on-radio-nigeria-kaduna-on-january-15-1966).
35. LeVine, supra note 20, at 190.
36. Mbaku, supra note 23, at 166.
37. Mbaku and Ihonvbere provide an overview of the transition to democracy that
began in the early-1990s in Africa, See THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IN
AFRICA: THE CONTINUING STRUGGLE (John M. Mbaku & Julius O. Ihonvbere eds., 2003);
see also POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN AFRICA: LESSONS FROM
COUNTRY EXPERIENCES (Julius O. Ihonvbere & John M. Mbaku eds., 2003).
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civilian dictatorships in countries such as Nigeria, Democratic Republic of
Congo, Central African Republic, Sierra Leone, and Ethiopia, the
perpetrators were actually state actors, who had no incentives to prosecute
themselves for their complicity in human rights abuses.38
In some countries, impunity either directly by state actors or sponsored
by them produced genocides and civil wars. In Rwanda, for example, it was
members of the Hutu-dominated government, who masterminded and carried
out the genocide and ethnic cleansing that killed more than 800,000 Tutsi
and their Hutu sympathizers in just 100 days during the period, April 7 to
mid-July 1994.39 The genocide was finally brought to an end through the
intervention of the Tutsi-backed Rwandan Patriotic Front (“RPF”), led by
Paul Kagame, Rwanda’s present (2018) president. During the apartheid
regime, which operated officially in South Africa, from 1948 to 1994, the
white minority government used the law and state institutions to brutalize the
African majority, including imprisoning the latter’s leaders and forcing
various African groups into economically unsustainable settlements called
“homelands.”40
In the Democratic Republic of Congo, the abuse of human rights by
state- and non-state actors has continued unabated since the colonial period.41
The Belgian colonial government, like colonialists in other parts of Africa,
acted with impunity and routinely abused the fundamental rights of the
Congolese people. Belgian Congo gained independence on June 30, 1960
under the leadership of prime minister, Patrice Lumumba, and took the name
38. For more on the abuse of human rights in Africa, especially in the period leading to
the 1990s, see BRIAN BAUGHAN, HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA (2014).
39. For more on the Rwandan genocide, see, e.g., SCOTT STRAUS, THE ORDER OF
GENOCIDE: RACE, POWER, AND WAR IN RWANDA (2006) (providing an overview of the
events leading to the genocide in Rwanda, as well as the genocide itself); LINDA MELVERN,
A PEOPLE BETRAYED: THE ROLE OF THE WEST IN RWANDA’S GENOCIDE (2009) (examining,
inter alia, the failure of the Western countries to act to stop the mass slaughter of Rwandans
in 1994); GÉRARD PRUNIER, THE RWANDA CRISIS: HISTORY OF A GENOCIDE (1997)
(examining, inter alia, events that contributed to the genocide in Rwanda).
40. For more on apartheid in South Africa, see SEAN CONNOLLY, APARTHEID IN SOUTH
AFRICA (2003) (providing an overview of evolution and collapse of apartheid in South
Africa); PATTI WALDMEIR, ANATOMY OF A MIRACLE: THE END OF APARTHEID AND THE
BIRTH OF THE NEW SOUTH AFRICA (1997) (examining events leading to the demise of South
African apartheid and the emergence of a democratic, non-racial, post-apartheid South
African state).
41. For impunity in colonial Congo, see, e.g., ADAM HOCSHCHILD, KING LEOPOLD’S
GHOST: A STORY OF GREED, TERROR, AND HEROISM IN COLONIA AFRICA (detailing King
Leopold, II of Belgium’s exploits in Congo); CH. DIDIER GONDOLA, THE HISTORY OF CONGO
(2002) (providing a detailed history of Congo, including pre-colonial, colonial and postindependence periods).
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Republic of Congo (République du Congo) but shortly afterwards, the new
country was plunged into chaos—in addition to mutinies staged by soldiers,
two provinces, Katanga and South Kasai, began efforts to secede and form
their own sovereign and independent states. On September 5, 1960, then
president of the Republic of Congo, Joseph Kasavubu, sacked prime minister
Lumumba from office and created a constitutional crisis. On November 25,
1965, Joseph Mobutu, who had been appointed by Lumumba as chief of the
new country’s army—the Armée Nationale Congolaise (Congolese National
Army), overthrew the government and eventually declared himself head of
state. Mobutu ruled the country from 1965 until 1997 when he was forced
out of office by Laurent-Désiré Kabila and his Alliance of Democratic
Forces for the Liberation of Congo. Mobutu’s reign was characterized by a
significant level of government impunity.42
Laurent-Désiré Kabila ruled Congo from 1997 until his assassination by
one of his bodyguards in 2001.43 A few days after his death, he was
succeeded as president of Congo by his son, Joseph Kabila, who remains the
president of the country to this day (2018). The governments of both Kabilas,
like those of their predecessors, have been characterized by significant levels
of impunity—both by state- and non-state actors.44 Of course, these are only a
few examples of the situations in which African governments have engaged in
impunity during the last several decades. There are, of course, many more. It
is only necessary, for purposes of this article, that we list just a few
situations.45
In the early-1990s, as many African countries were engaged in efforts to
transition to democratic governance, the international community was
becoming fully aware of the need to take action, at the global level, to deal
42. For impunity in Mobutu’s Congo, see, e.g., MICHELA WRONG, IN THE FOOTSTEPS OF
MR. KURTZ: LIVING ON THE BRINK OF DISASTER IN MOBUTU’S CONGO (2009) (examining the
pauperization of the Congolese peoples during the reign of Mobutu); David J. Gould & T.
B. Mukendi, Bureaucratic Corruption in Africa: Causes, Consequences and Remedies, 12
INT’L J. PUB. ADMIN. 427 (1989) (examining corruption and kleptocracy in Mobutu’s
Congo/Zaire).
43. For more on Kabia’s government, see FRANÇOIS NGOLET, CRISIS IN THE CONGO:
THE RISE AND FALL OF LAURENT KABILA (2011) (providing an overview of Laurent-Désiré
Kabila’s rise and fall in Congo).
44. For more on impunity in Congo under the Kabilas, see HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
WHAT KABILA IS HIDING: CIVILIAN KILLINGS AND IMPUNITY IN CONGO, HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH (1997) (a report from Human Rights Watch on impunity in the senior Kabila’s
government); FRANK HALDEMANN & THOMAS UNGER, THE UNITED NATIONS PRINCIPLES TO
COMBAT IMPUNITY: A COMMENTARY (2018) (indicating that the fight against impunity has
become an important concern for the international community).
45. For impunity in Africa writ large, see generally PROSECUTING INTERNATIONAL
CRIMES IN AFRICA (Chacha Murungu & Japhet Biegon eds., 2011) (providing an overview
of efforts to deal with impunity in Africa).
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with impunity and other threats to international peace and security. For
example, in June 1992, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, then U.N. Secretary-General,
authored a report titled An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy,
Peacemaking and Peace-keeping.46 In his report, Boutros-Ghali attempted to
provide a framework, which he believed could be used by intergovernmental
organizations, to deal with impunity and other threats to international peace
and security. The report focused on four critical areas, as requested by the
U.N. Security Council: (1) preventive diplomacy; (2) peacemaking; (3)
peace-keeping; and (4) post-conflict peace-building.47
Despite the U.N. Secretary-General’s report, the U.N. Security
Council,48 remained reluctant to “issue . . . resolutions that [could be]
perceived as infringing the sovereignty of Member States.”49 The failure of
the United Nations to actively engage in dealing with threats to international
peace, which included impunity by state- and non-state actors, contributed
significantly to the failure of the international community to deal with violent
sectarian conflict in many countries. Especially at risk during this period
were citizens of many African countries, as evidenced by the extraordinary
level of violence, some of it emanating from the state, in countries such as
Angola,50 Democratic Republic of Congo,51 Liberia,52 Sierra Leone,53

46. See U.N. Secretary-General, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy,
Peacemaking and Peace-keeping, U.N. Co. A/47/277 (June 17, 1992). Boutros-Ghali was
an Egyptian diplomat and politician who served as the 6th U.N. Secretary-General from
January 1, 1992 to December 31, 1996. For more on Boutros-Ghali and his term at the
United Nations, see Stephen FRANKLIN BURGESS, THE UNITED NATIONS UNDER BOUTROS
BOUTROS-GHALI, 1992-97 (2001).
47. See U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 46, ¶ 5.
48. This is the U.N. organ that is legally empowered, through the U.N. Charter, to
maintain international peace and security. U.N. Charter art. 39–51.
49. Tim Murithi, The African Union’s Transition from Non-Intervention to NonIndifference: An Ad Hoc Approach to the Responsibility to Protect, INDEPENDENT
PUBLISHERS GROUP (IPG), Jan. 2009, at 91.
50. For Angola, see PHIL Y. NANGOLOH, ANGOLA: THE POLITICO-MILITARY CONFLICT
AND HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS: INTERNATIONAL CONSPIRACY AND COMPLICITY (2002)
(examining, inter alia, the complicity of international groups in government impunity in
Angola).
51. The literature on impunity in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is quite
extensive. See, e.g., THE AFRICAN STAKES OF THE CONGO WAR (John F. Clarke ed., 2002)
(presenting a series of essays that examines sectarian violence in the DRC, which has
contributed significantly to the abuse of human rights in the country); G. NZONGOLANTALAJA, THE CONGO: FROM LEOPOLD TO KABILA: A PEOPLE’S HISTORY (2002) (providing a
rigorous overview of the DRC’s tortured history, including impunity by its various
governmental regimes, from the colonial to the post-independence periods); SÉVERINE
AUTESSERRE, THE TROUBLE WITH THE CONGO: LOCAL VIOLENCE AND THE FAILURE OF
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Burundi,54 South Africa,55 and Rwanda.56 Since 2003, the government of
Sudan, aided by various non-state militias, has massacred more than 300,000
Darfuri men, women, and children in the Darfur region of western Sudan.
The Darfur Genocide is often referred to as the first genocide of the 21st
century. In 2009, the International Criminal Court (“ICC”) issued an arrest
warrant for Sudan’s president, Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir;57 another
warrant was issued on July 12, 2010—these warrants charged al-Bashir with
“five counts of crimes against humanity: murder, extermination, forcible
transfer, torture, and rape; two counts of war crimes: Intentionally directing
attacks against a civilian population as such or against individual civilians
not taking part in hostilities, and pillaging; three counts of genocide: by
killing, by causing serious bodily or mental harm, and by deliberately
inflicting on each target group conditions of life calculated to bring about the
group’s physical destruction, allegedly committed at least between 2003 and
2008 in Darfur, Sudan.”58
As the 21st century was being ushered in, the issue of how to deal with
impunity and threats against international peace and security had gained
INTERNATIONAL PEACEBUILDING (2010) (providing a detailed examination of impunity by
local groups).
52. For Liberia and Sierra Leone, see generally AMADU SESSAY, CHARLES UKEJE,
OSMAN GBLA & OLAWALE ISMAIL, POST-WAR REGIMES AND STATE RECONSTRUCTION IN
LIBERIA AND SIERRA LEONE (2009) (examining regime impunity in modern-day Liberia and
Sierra Leone); YVES BEIGBEDER, INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE AGAINST IMPUNITY: PROGRESS
AND NEW CHALLENGES (2005) (providing evidence to show that the international struggle
against impunity has been slow; reviews the International Tribunals for the former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda and the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Cambodia Court).
53. For Sierra Leone, see SESSAY ET AL., supra note 52; BEIGBEDER, supra note 52.
54. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, MOB JUSTICE IN BURUNDI: OFFICIAL COMPLICITY AND
IMPUNITY (2010) (examining official impunity in Burundi, with particular emphasis on
events that occurred in 2009). “L’Association burundaise pour la Protection des Droits
Humains et des Personnes détenues” means the Burundian Association for the Protection of
Human Rights and Detained Persons.
55. The literature on the apartheid system in South Africa and the atrocities that it
committed against Africans and other non-white groups, is very extensive. We mention only
a few: JOHN ALLEN, APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA: AN INSIDER’S OVERVIEW OF THE ORIGIN AND
EFFECTS OF SEPARATE DEVELOPMENT (2005) (examining apartheid in South Africa and its
atrocities); NANCY L. CLARK & WILLIAM H. WORGER, SOUTH AFRICA: THE RISE AND FALL
OF APARTHEID (2016) (examining apartheid from its imposition in 1948 to its demise in
1994 and the regime’s atrocities against Africans and other non-white groups).
56. GODFREY MWAKIKAGILE, IDENTITY POLITICS AND ETHNIC CONFLICTS IN RWANDA
AND BURUNDI: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (2012) (examining the conflict between the Hutu
and Tutsi that has been characterized by significant abuses of human rights and genocide).
57. Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, ICC–02/05–01/09-74, Opinion of Judge Steiner.
58. International Criminal Court (ICC), Al Bashir Case: The Prosecutor v. Omar
Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, ICC–02/05–01/09, https://www.icc-cpi.int/darfur/albashir.
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currency in many global forums. For example, U.N. Secretary-General, Kofi
Annan, who served the world body from January 1, 1997 to December 31,
2006, made presentations to the U.N. General Assembly asking the latter to
find ways to confront impunity and other threats to international peace and
security. In 1999 and again in 2000, Kofi Annan “made compelling pleas to
the international community to try to find, once and for all, a new consensus
on how to approach these issues, to ‘forge unity’ around the basic questions
of a principle and process involved.”59 Annan challenged the international
community with an important question, one that implicated the failure of the
international community, in general, and the United Nations, in particular, to
fully and effectively respond to situations of government impunity in various
countries around the world: “. . . if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an
unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to
a Srebrenica—to gross and systematic violations of human rights that affect
every precept of our common humanity?”60
In response to this challenge to the international community, the
Government of Canada established the International Commission on
Intervention and State Sovereignty (“ICISS”) and tasked it with dealing with
a “whole range of questions”61 and these included “legal, moral, operational
and political”62 questions and that the ICISS would consult with as many
stakeholders as possible in an effort to seek solutions to these issues. The
Government of Canada told the U.N. General Assembly that the completed
report would be presented to the U.N. Secretary-General for further
transmission to the General Assembly, with the hope that the international
community could reach some common ground on how to deal with impunity
and other threats to international peace and security.63 The ICISS established
a new approach to dealing with threats to international peace and security,
which was named the Responsibility to Protect (“R2P”).
R2P incorporates and embraces three important elements or
responsibilities that speak directly to impunity and other threats to
international peace and security:

59. Int’l Comm’n on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) (Dec. 2001), The
Responsibility to Protect, at VII, http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ ICISS%20Report.pdf.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 81.
63. Id.
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A. The responsibility to prevent: to address both the root causes and
direct causes of internal conflict and other man-made crises putting
populations at risk.
B. The responsibility to react: to respond to situations of compelling
human need with appropriate measures, which may include
coercive measures like sanctions and international prosecution, and
in extreme cases military intervention.
C. The responsibility to rebuild: to provide, particularly after a military
intervention, full assistance with recovery, reconstruction and
reconciliation, addressing the causes of the harm the intervention
was designed to halt or avert.64
B. The African Union and Impunity
During the last several decades, many African countries have been
pervaded by the gross abuse of human rights.65 Violent sectarian conflict,
some of which has evolved into genocide, war crimes, and crimes against
humanity, have emerged in Africa during the last few decades as the most
important threats to international security and peace. In the early-to-mid1990s, it was the failure of regional, continental, and international actors to
fight impunity and protect vulnerable populations against these international
crimes, including especially during the Rwandan Genocide, that provided the
impetus to the adoption by the United Nations, of the principle of
responsibility to protect.66
The commitment by the United Nations to the R2P specifically provides
that (1) States have the responsibility to protect their populations from
international crimes;67 and (2) States should cooperate with each other in
their efforts to fulfill their obligations regarding the protection of their
populations from international crimes. The U.N. went on to state that if,
however, a State is either unwilling or does not have the capacity to fulfill its
obligations under R2P, the international community will take action, either
through peaceful means or the use of force if the former fails to resolve the
64. Id. at XI.
65. For an overview of human rights abuses in Africa, see BRIAN BAUGHAN, HUMAN
RIGHTS IN AFRICA (2014) (discussing, inter alia, the history of human rights abuses in
Africa).
66. Int’l Comm’n on Intervention and State Sovereignty, supra note 59.
67. These international crimes include genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity,
and ethnic cleansing. See, e.g., U.N. General Assembly, Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court (last amended in 2010), July 17, 1998, http://www.refworld.org/docid/
3ae6b3a84.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2018) (providing a definition of international crimes in
art. 5).

88

Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 42:1

problem.68 As stated in the ICISS Report, “[w]hen preventive measures fail
to resolve or contain the situation and when a state is unable or unwilling to
redress the situation, then interventionary measures by other members of the
broader community of states may be required. These coercive measures may
include political, economic or judicial measures, and in extreme cases—but
only extreme cases—they may also include military action.”69
Within time, Africans began to warm up to the principle of R2P. While
it existed, the Organization of African Unity (“OAU”) did not have any legal
power to intervene in the internal affairs of Member States to deal with
impunity and other threats to international crimes. Thus, the continent
remained essentially unresponsive to impunity by state and non-state actors
in many countries, including, the Rwandan Genocide.70 However, the
African Union, the successor organization to the OAU, has been empowered
to intervene in the internal affairs of Member States in respect of “war
crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.”71 These provisions are
contained in Article 4 of the Constitutive Act of the African Union and have
been collectively referred to as Africa’s principle of “non-indifference” and
the continent’s equivalent of the global R2P.
The Chairperson of the African Union Commission from September 16,
2003, to April 28, 2008, Alpha Oumar Konaré, advocated a policy that
would take the AU from a culture of “non-intervention” to one of “nonindifference.”72 In Africa, the responsibility for implementing the R2P
principle is in the hands of the Peace and Security Council (“PSC”), which
was established in 2014 through the Protocol Relating to the Establishment
of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (“AU Protocol”).73
According to Article 2(1) of the AU Protocol, “There is hereby established,
pursuant to Article 5(2) of the Constitutive Act, a Peace and Security Council
68. Int’l Comm’n on Intervention and State Sovereignty, supra note 59, at 29.
69. Id.
70. In fact, the OAU’s Charter specifically had a policy of non-interference in the
internal affairs of its Member States. See Organization for African Unity (OAU), Charter of
the Organization of African Unity, May 23, 1963, https://au.int/sites/default/files/
treaties/7759-file-oau_charter_1963.pdf
71. African Union (AU), Constitutive Act of the African Union (July 11, 2000),
http://www.achpr.org/files/instruments/au-constitutive-act/au_act_2000_eng.pdf.
72. For an in depth discussion of the continent’s policy of “non-indifference,” see
Ndubuisi C. Ani, The African Union Non-Indifference Stance: Lessons from Sudan and
Libya, 6 AFRICAN CONFLICT & PEACEBLDG. REV. 1 (2016).
73. African Union (AU), Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and
Security Council of the African Union (July 9, 2002), https://au.int/sites/default
/files/treaties/7781-treaty-0024_-_protocol_relating_to_the_establishment_of_the_peace_a
nd_security_ council_of_the_af rican_union_e.pdf.
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within the Union, as a standing decision-making organ for the prevention,
management and resolution of conflicts. The Peace and Security Council
shall be a collective security and early-warning arrangement to facilitate
timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa.”74
The PSC’s objectives and responsibilities are listed in Article 3 of the
African Union Protocol—the PSC was established to:
a. promote peace, security and stability in Africa, in order to
guarantee the protection and preservation of life and property,
the well-being of the African people and their environment, as
well as the creation of conditions conducive to sustainable
development;
b. anticipate and prevent conflicts. In circumstances where
conflicts have occurred, the Peace and Security Council shall
have the responsibility to undertake peace-making and peacebuilding functions for the resolution of these conflicts;
c. promote and implement peace-building and post-conflict
reconstruction activities to consolidate peace and prevent the
resurgence of violence;
d. co-ordinate and harmonize continental efforts in the prevention
and combating of international terrorism in all its aspects;
e. develop a common defense policy for the Union, in accordance
with article 4(d) of the Constitutive Act;
f. promote and encourage democratic practices, good governance
and the rule of law, protect human rights and fundamental
freedoms, respect for the sanctity of human life and international
humanitarian law, as part of efforts for preventing conflicts.75
In undertaking these responsibilities, the PSC is to be assisted and
supported by the AU Commission, as well as three dedicated bodies: The
Panel of the Wise;76 the Continental Early Warning System;77 and the

74. Id. art. 2(1).
75. Id. art. 3(1)(a–f).
76. The Panel of the Wise is “one of the critical pillars of the Peace and Security
Architecture of the African Union (APSA). Article 11 of the Protocol establishing the PSC
sets up a five-person panel of ‘highly respected African personalities from various segments
of society who have made outstanding contributions to the cause of peace, security and
development on the continent’ with a task ‘to support the efforts of the PSC and those of the
Chairperson of the Commission, particularly in the area of conflict prevention.’” See Panel
of the Wise (PoW), AFRICAN UNION PEACE AND SECURITY, http://www.peaceau.org/en/
page/29-panel-of-the-wise-pow.
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African Standby Force.78 The PSC is also expected to be supported in its
activities by the U.N.’s Military Staff Committee.79 The New Partnership for
Africa’s Development (“NEPAD”) is also expected to provide assistance to
the Peace and Security Council.80 In addition, the AU’s various human rights
institutions, including the African Commission on Human and Peoples’
Rights (“ACHPR”)81 and the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights
(“ACHPR”),82 are also expected to actively participate in the fight against
impunity in the continent.
It has been argued that there may be a conflict between the right of the
African Union to intervene in the internal affairs of Member States to deal
77. The Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) is one of the five pillars of the
African Peace and Security architecture (APSA). The CEWS collects data and analyzes and
provides advice to the PSC and other institutions with interest in peace and security in
Africa. See The Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), AFRICAN UNION PEACE AND
SECURITY, http://www.peaceau.org/en/page/28-continental-early-warning.
78. The African Standby Force (ASF) is an important tool for dealing with impunity
and other threats to international peace and security in the continent. It is a multidisciplinary
peacekeeping force, consisting of military, police and civilian contingents. The ASF
operates under the direction of the African Union and supports the latter’s right to intervene
in a member state in grave circumstances, as prescribed in Article 4h of the Constitutive Act
of the African Union. For more information on the ASF, see The African Standby Force
(ASF), AFRICAN UNION PEACE AND SECURITY, http://www.peaceau.org/en/page/82-africanstandby-force-asf-amani-africa-1.
79. The Military Staff Committee is a U.N. Security Council subsidiary body, whose
main function is “to advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the
Security Council’s military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and
security, the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, the regulation of
armaments, and possible disarmament.” United Nations Security Council Subsidiary
Organs, United Nations Military Staff Committee, UNITED NATIONS (U.N.) (July 20, 2018),
https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/ subsidiary/msc & International Refugee Rights Initiative
(IRRI), From Non-Interference to Non-Indifference: The African Union and the
Responsibility to Protect, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/AU%20
R2P%20-%20final.pdf.
80. For more on NEPAD, see, e.g., AFRICA & DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGES IN THE NEW
MILLENNIUM: THE NEPAD DEBATE (J. O. Adésinà, Yao Ghraham & A. Olukoshi eds.,
2006) (presenting a series of essays that examines the founding of the NEPAD and
evaluating its performance).
81. For more on the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, see RACHEL
MURRAY, THE AFRICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW (2000) (analyzing, inter alia, the applicability of international law to African
situations).
82. For the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, see LUIS G. FRANCESCHI,
THE AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS JUDICIAL SYSTEM: STREAMLINING STRUCTURES AND
DOMESTICATION MECHANISMS VIEWED FROM THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS POWER PERSPECTIVE
(2014) (examining the international judicial function in Africa with specific emphasis on the
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights).

2019]

International Law and the Struggle Against Government Impunity in Africa

91

with impunity and other threats to international peace and the requirement
that prior authorization be obtained from the U.N. Security Council before
force is used in any Member State of the African Union. This issue is
clarified by the A.U. in the Ezulwini Consensus.83 In the Ezulwini
Consensus, the African Union argued that it was important for regional
organizations to act quickly in the case of threats to international peace and
then secure approval from the U.N. Security Council after the fact.84
Since 2005, the Responsibility to Protect (“R2P”) has been recognized
as the unanimous commitment of the U.N. and other global actors to prevent
and deal with impunity and other threats to international peace and security.
The global society’s commitment to the fight against threats to international
peace and security was expressed, formally, in the U.N.’s 2005 World
Summit Outcome Document (“2005WSOD”).85 In paragraph 138 of the
2005WSOD, the U.N. states that “[e]ach individual State has the
responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic
cleansing and crimes against humanity.”86 If States do not perform their
responsibilities to protect their citizens as prescribed in the 2005WSOD, the
international community, through the United Nations and specifically, the
U.N. Security Council, “has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic,
humanitarian and other peaceful means . . . to help to protect populations
from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.”87
Additionally, if the peaceful approach fails to successfully and fully resolve
the situation, the international community is “prepared to take collective
action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the [U.N.] Security Council,
in accordance with the [U.N.] Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-bycase basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as
appropriate.”88

83. The Ezulwini Consensus represents the common African position on the proper
reform of the United Nations system. The Consensus was adopted at the Extraordinary
Session of the Executive Council of the African Union in March 2005 in Addis Ababa,
Ethiopia. See African Union (AU), The Common African Position on the Proper Reform of
the United Nations: The Ezulwini Consensus, EXT/EX.CL/2(VII) (Mar. 4-5, 2005).
84. For more on the Ezulwini Consensus, see HANDBOOK OF AFRICA’S INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS (Tim Murithi ed., 2013) (examining, inter alia, Africa’s international relations in
the post-Cold War world).
85. G.A. Res. 60/1, 2005 World Summit Outcome Document (Oct. 24, 2005).
86. Id. ¶ 138.
87. Id. ¶ 139. The international community is supposed to act in accordance with
Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter of the United Nations. See U.N. Charter Chapters VI &
VIII.
88. G.A. Res. 60/1, supra note 85, ¶ 139.
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It is important to note that R2P is a political commitment and does not
constitute a legally-binding obligation on the part of the U.N.’s Member
States. However, some level of legal legitimacy is granted R2P given the
fact that it flows directly from binding international norms (e.g., norms
assumed under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide and various emerging norms of customary international
law).
Formal and official recognition was granted to R2P by the U.N.
Security Council (“UNSC”) in 2006 through Resolution 167489 and in doing
so, the UNSC reaffirmed “the provisions of paragraphs 138 and 139 of the
2005 World Summit Document regarding the responsibility of each country
to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and
crimes against humanity.”90
When Ban Ki-moon became U.N. Secretary-General on January 1,
2007, he gave his full support to R2P and, in 2008, he appointed Edward C.
Luck as the U.N.’s first Special Adviser on the responsibility to protect.91 In
announcing the appointment of Edward C. Luck as Special Adviser on R2P,
Ban Ki-moon made the following statement:
United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon is pleased to
announce the appointment of Edward C. Luck as Special Adviser at
the Assistant Secretary-General level. Mr. Luck’s work will
include the responsibility to protect, as set out by the SecretaryGeneral in paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit
Outcome Document.92
Ban Ki-moon then produced several reports in which he articulated a
three-pillar strategy for the implementation of R2P.93 The first of Ban’s
pillars addresses the responsibility of each Member State with respect to the
implementation of R2P.94 The Secretary-General went on to argue that the
State is “critical to effective and timely prevention strategies.”95 The second
89. S.C. Res. 1674, Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflicts (Apr. 28, 2006).
90. S.C. Res. 1674, supra note 89, ¶ 4.
91. U.N. Secretary-General, Secretary-General Appoints Edward C. Luck of United
States Special Adviser, U.N. Press Release SG/A/1120-BIO/3963 (Feb. 21, 2008), https://
www.un.org/press/en/2008/sga1120.doc.htm.
92. Id.
93. U.N. Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Report of the
Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/63/677 (Jan. 12, 2009).
94. U.N. Secretary-General, Responsibility to Protect, supra note 93, ¶ 11(a).
95. Id.

2019]

International Law and the Struggle Against Government Impunity in Africa

93

pillar deals specifically with the need for the international community to help
States in carrying out and meeting their obligations. Stating that prevention is
“a key ingredient for a successful strategy for the responsibility to protect,”96
the second pillar “seeks to draw on the cooperation of Member States,
regional and subregional arrangements, civil society and the private sector, as
well as the institutional strengths and comparative advantages of the United
Nations system”97 to prevent threats to international peace. The third pillar
deals with “the responsibility of Member States to respond collectively in a
timely and decisive manner when a State is manifestly failing to provide such
protection.”98
In 2009, the U.N. General Assembly (“UNGA”) granted formal
recognition to R2P through its Resolution 63/308 of October 7, 2009.99 In
doing so, the UNGA made reference to the World Summit Outcome
Document100 and made known that it would “continue its consideration of
the responsibility to protect.”101 The UNGA then undertook several
interactive dialogues to deal with different aspects of R2P and its
implementation. For example, the 2012 dialogue was dedicated exclusively
to “timely and decisive responses and the 2013 dialogue was devoted to state
responsibility and prevention.”102
In 2011, then U.N. Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, presented a report
to the U.N. General Assembly and the Security Council103 in which he
addressed the regional and sub-regional dimensions of the responsibility to
protect in anticipation of the dialogue on the topic that was scheduled for
July 2011 in the General Assembly.104 Ban went on to state that “[o]ver the
last three years, [the U.N.] had applied responsibility to protect principles in
[its] strategies for addressing threats to populations in about a dozen specific
situations” and that “[i]n every case, regional and/or sub-regional

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id. ¶ 11(b).
Id.
Id. ¶ 11(c).
G.A. Res. 63/308, The Responsibility to Protect (Oct. 7, 2009).
G.A. Res. 60/1, supra note 85.
G.A. Res. 63/308, supra note 99, ¶ 2.
INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE INITIATIVE, FROM NON-INTERFERENCE TO NONINDIFERENCE: THE AFRICAN UNION AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 8 (2017), https://
reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/AU%20R2P%20-%20final.pdf.
103. U.N. Secretary-General, The Role of Regional and Sub-Regional Arrangements in
Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, U.N. Doc. A/65/877-S/2011/393 (June 27,
2011).
104. Id. ¶ 1.
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arrangements have made important contributions, often as full partners with
the United Nations.”105
C. The Responsibility to Protect and Impunity
The Responsibility to Protect is a commitment by the international
community, working through the United Nations and its organs, such as the
Security Council, to prevent genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and
crimes against humanity. But, how is R2P related to impunity? Impunity
usually arises from the failure by relevant public authorities, either through
lack of capacity or political will, to bring perpetrators of crimes to account
for those crimes.106 In many cases, impunity can arise when either stateor/and non-state-actors, who engage in various criminal activities are
exempted from prosecution and punishment or allowed to escape the
payment of fines assessed by a recognized tribunal. In international law,
generally, and in international human rights law, in particular, impunity may
involve the failure of responsible parties107 to bring individuals engaged in
the abuse of human rights to justice. The failure to fully and effectively
prosecute those engaged in the violation of human rights can constitute a
major infringement of the right of victims of such crimes to justice and
redress of the wrongs done to them. In countries where the government or its
agents or proxies are the perpetrators of human rights violations, it is often
the case that those responsible for committing the various atrocities are not
likely to be brought to justice. Of course, in countries, such as Somalia and
the Democratic Republic of Congo, where the central government no longer
has control over most of the national territory, it may be quite difficult for the
forces of law and order to bring perpetrators of international crimes to
justice.108
105. Id. ¶ 4.
106. See, e.g., U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights, Promotion and Protection of Human
Rights, Impunity: Report of the Independent Expert to Update the Set of Principles to
Combat Impunity, Diane Orentlicher, Addendum: Updated Set of Principles for the
Protection and Promotion of Human Rights Through Action to Combat Impunity of Its
Sixty-First Session, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1 (Feb. 8, 2005).
107. Such parties may include national governments, as well as, regional organizations,
such as the African Union and the European Union. See, e.g, PROSECUTING INTERNATIONAL
CRIMES IN AFRICA (Chacha Murungu & Japhet Biegon eds., 2011) (presenting a series of
essays that examines, inter alia, the failure of some African states to deal effectively with
international crimes).
108. ABDULLAH A. MOHAMOUD, STATE COLLAPSE AND POST-CONFLICT DEVELOPMENT IN
AFRICA: THE CASE OF SOMALIA, 1960-2001 (2006) (providing an overview of the collapse of
the Somalia state and its impact on governance); MICHAEL DEIBERT, THE DEMOCRATIC
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Impunity is quite common and pervasive in States that have weak
institutional arrangements.109 In such countries, state custodians (i.e., civil
servants and political elites) are not properly constrained by the law and as a
consequence, they are able to act with impunity. In a country, such as
Cameroon, it is the case that security forces are protected by the government
from being held accountable for human rights violations and other criminal
activities. For example, security forces in Cameroon routinely arrest and
torture individuals suspected of being homosexuals or engaging in same-sex
intimacy but are not prosecuted for such human rights abuses.110 In addition,
Cameroon’s security forces have been using laws against terrorism to torture
and violate the human rights of journalists and other citizens. In their efforts
to intimidate the media, Cameroon’s security forces arrest and detain
journalists without probable cause, fail to bring charges against them, and
beat and torture them with impunity.111
Impunity in Cameroon can also be seen in the brutal treatment, by the
country’s security forces, of Anglophones who are seeking relief from
oppression by the Francophone-dominated central government. When
Anglophone teachers and lawyers engaged in peaceful protests in late 2016
to bring to light what they argued was oppression by the central government,
the latter responded with brutal force—soldiers targeted civilians and killed
many of them; other demonstrators were arrested and taken to police stations
and tortured; and several villages were burned down and destroyed. Yet,

REPUBLIC OF CONGO: BETWEEN HOPE AND DESPAIR (2013) (describing, inter alia, the
challenges of governance in the Democratic Republic of Congo).
109. Such countries usually lack democratic institutions, as well as a tradition of fidelity
to the rule of law. They are pervaded by high levels of corruption, have extremely weak
judiciary systems, and political systems in which the state custodians (i.e., civil servants and
political elites) are not adequately constrained by the law. As a consequence, these public
servants routinely act with impunity. In the case of Africa, see generally JOHN M. MBAKU,
CORRUPTION IN AFRICA: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND CLEANUPS (2010) (showing that
corruption is quite pervasive in countries with weak institutional arrangements).
110. Human Rights Watch, Guilty by Association: Human Rights Violations in the
Enforcement of Cameroon’s Anti-Homosexuality Law, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Mar. 21,
2003, https://www.hrw.org/report/2013/03/21/guilty-association/human-rights-violationsenforcement-cameroons-anti.
111. See Cameroon Using “Anti-Terror” Law to Silence Media: CPJ, ALJAZEERA (Sept.
20, 2017), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/09/cameroon-anti-terror-law-silen cemedia-cpj-170920112612527.html. CPJ is Committee to Protect Journalists, a U.S.-based
independent non-governmental organization that promotes press freedom throughout the
world. Besides its headquarters in New York City, it has branches in many countries around
the world.
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none of the security forces were brought to justice for their criminal
activities.112
It is not surprising that Cameroon’s public sector is pervaded by
impunity. The culture of impunity that has become pervasive in Cameroon
starts from the top—the President of the Republic, Paul Biya, can be
considered the chief priest of this insidious culture of impunity. In fact, in
2008, Biya had the constitution changed to immunize himself from all crimes
committed while in office.113 According to Article 53(3) of the Constitution
of Cameroon, “[a]cts committed by the President of the Republic . . . shall be
covered by immunity and he shall not be accountable for them after the
exercise of his functions.”114 The immunity granted the president of
Cameroon by the constitution does not make an exemption in the case of
serious offenses, such as war crimes, crimes against humanity, ethnic
cleansing, and genocide. Hence, national law in Cameroon will not hold
President Paul Biya accountable for the atrocities that his security forces
have committed and continue to commit in the Anglophone Regions of the
country.115
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court entered into force
on July 1, 2002,116 around the same time that the R2P was being debated and
adopted by the international community. The Responsibility to Protect report
by the Canadian-based International Commission on Intervention and State
Sovereignty (“ICISS”)117 was released in December 2001 and was given
formal recognition by the United Nations in 2005.118 In the Rome Statute’s
Preamble, one can find the following reference to impunity: “The States
Parties to this Statute, [d]etermined to put an end to impunity for the
perpetrators of these crimes and thus to contribute to the prevention of such
112. Stephanie Busari, Cameroon Security Forces Torturing English Speakers, Amnesty
Says, CNN NEWS (June 11, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/06/11/africa/cameroonanglophone-torture-amnesty-intl/index.html.
113. Constitution of the Republic of Cameroon, 1972; 2008 Amendments to the
Constitution of the Republic of Cameroon, Law No. 2008/1 of 14 April 2008 to Amend and
Supplement some Provisions of Law No. 96/06 of 18 January 1996 to amend the
Constitution of 2 June 1972.
114. Law No. 2008/1, supra note 113, art. 53(3).
115. The Republic of Cameroon is currently divided into ten regions. Two of these
regions, the North West and South West Regions, comprise the former U.N. Trust Territory
of Southern Cameroons under British administration or Anglophone Cameroon.
116. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, A/CONF.183/9, July 17, 1998,
https://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/ea9aeff7-5752-4f84-be94-0a655eb30e16/0/rome_sta
tute_english.pdf.
117. See Responsibility to Protect, supra note 59.
118. See Outcome Document, supra note 85.
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crimes,”119 resolve to establish an International Criminal Court (“ICC”). The
Rome Statute limited the jurisdiction of the ICC to the “most serious crimes
of concern to the international community as a whole.”120 Specifically, the
ICC has jurisdiction over the following international crimes: crimes of
genocide; crimes against humanity; war crimes; and crimes of aggression.121
Impunity, especially on the part of African governments, has led to the
proliferation of these crimes in the continent. This has been the case, for
example, in Rwanda,122 where government operatives led a genocidal and
ethnic-cleansing campaign that resulted in the massacre of more than
1,000,000 citizens; South Sudan,123 where thousands of people have been
killed by government and opposition forces and yet, no one has been held
accountable for the killings; and the Republic of Cameroon,124 where
government forces have killed many Anglophones who are protesting
oppression at the hands of the central government.
II. THE GLOBAL CAMPAIGN AGAINST IMPUNITY
A. Defining and Explaining Impunity
Before we take a look at the global campaign against impunity, it is
necessary that we provide a formal definition for the concept. In the United
Nations Set of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights
Through Action to Combat Impunity,125 impunity is defined as, “[T]he

119.
120.
121.
122.

Rome Statute, supra note 116, preamble.
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., SCOTT STRAUS, THE ORDER OF GENOCIDE: RACE, POWER, AND WAR IN
RWANDA (2006) (providing an overview of the events leading to the genocide in Rwanda, as
well as the genocide itself).
123. See, e.g., HILDE E. JOHNSON, SOUTH SUDAN: THE UNTOLD STORY, FROM
INDEPENDENCE TO CIVIL WAR (2016) (providing an overview of sectarian violence and the
mass violations of human rights in South Sudan).
124. Denis Foretia, Cameroon Continues Its Oppression of English Speakers, WASH.
POST (Mar. 21, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/global-opinions/wp/2017
/03/21/cameroon-continues-its-oppression-of-english-speakers/?utm_term=.be46db43f959;
Ruth Maclean, Deaths and Detentions as Cameroon Cracks Down on Anglophone Activists
–Dozens Die and Hundreds Jailed in Unrest after Calls for English to be Used in Regions’
Schools and Courtrooms, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 3, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2018/jan/03/deaths-and-detentions-as-cameroon-cracks-down-on-anglophoneactivists.
125. Comm’n on Human Rights, The Administration of Justice and the Human Rights of
Detainees, Question of Impunity of Perpetrators of Human Rights Violations (Civil and
Political), Revised Final Report Prepared by Mr. Joinet Pursuant to Sub-Committee
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impossibility, de jure or de facto, of bringing the perpetrators of human rights
violations to account—whether in criminal, civil, administrative or
disciplinary proceedings—since they are not subject to any inquiry that
might lead to their being accused, arrested, tried and, if found guilty,
sentenced to appropriate penalties, and to making reparations to their
victims.”
On April 17, 1998, the U.N. Commission on Human Rights
(“UNCHR”) issued its Resolution 1998/53126 in which it emphasized “the
importance of combating impunity to the prevention of violations of
international human rights and humanitarian law” and urged “States to give
necessary attention to the question of impunity for violations of international
human rights and humanitarian law, including those perpetrated against
women, and to take appropriate measures to address this important issue.”127
The resolution also noted that it is “the expectation of impunity for violations
of international human rights or humanitarian law”128 that encourages stateand non-state actors to engage in such violations and this is a major obstacle
to the ability of the international community to protect the fundamental and
human rights of individuals and minimize threats to international peace and
security.
In its resolution, the U.N. Commission on Human Rights also
recognized the fact that “public knowledge” of the atrocities committed
against victims of human rights violations and the nature of their suffering, as
well as information about the perpetrators, represent “essential steps towards
rehabilitation and reconciliation” and went on to urge “States to intensify
their efforts to provide victims of human rights violations with a fair and
equitable process through which these violations can be investigated and
made public and to encourage victims to participate in such a process.”129
These comments by the UNCHR speak directly to some of the principles
enunciated by the United Nations for combating impunity.130 As will be
discussed later, these principles speak to the importance of making certain
that knowledge of violations of human rights, information about perpetrators
of these violations, as well as the nature and the extent of the suffering
endured by victims, is made fully available to citizens. Perhaps, more
Decision 1996/119, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/20/Rev.1, at 17 (Oct. 2, 1997) (“Revised
Final Report”).
126. Comm’n on Human Rights, Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1998/53:
Impunity, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/1998/53 (Apr. 17, 1998).
127. Id. ¶ 1.
128. Id. preamble.
129. Id. ¶ 2.
130. See Revised Final Report, supra note 125, at 5.
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important, is that victims must be allowed to participate fully and effectively
in the design and implementation of public policies to deal with impunity.131
Major threats to international security and peace, such as serious crimes
under international law, which include war crimes, crimes against humanity,
including genocide, and grave breaches of international humanitarian law,
can be directly linked to impunity. Individuals and groups are likely to
engage in the commission of these international crimes if they are confident
that they can do so with impunity. That is, they can participate in these
criminal activities with virtually no risk that they would be held accountable
for them. Such an enabling institutional environment for impunity may exist
in a State if, (1) as in the case of the Republic of Cameroon, the president is
constitutionally immune from prosecution for all crimes committed while in
office;132 (2) the government lacks the capacity to fully bring to justice
violators of human rights; and (3) there does not exist the political will within
the State to hold accountable perpetrators of violations of international
human rights and humanitarian law within their territories. Of course, as has
been examined by several scholars, political will can be lacking where
governance institutions are pervaded by corruption and civil servants and
political elites are major beneficiaries of the various forms of corruption.133
Before we proceed, it is important that we take a look at the evolution of the
global campaign against impunity.
B. Origins of the Global Campaign Against Impunity
During its 43rd session in August 1991, the Sub-Commission on
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities of the U.N.
Commission on Human Rights, requested that Mr. Louis Joinet, then Special
Rapporteur on Impunity, carry out “a study on the impunity of perpetrators
of human rights violations”134 globally. As argued by Joinet, the process
through which the international community has gained awareness of the
“imperative need to combat impunity” has actually metamorphosed through
four stages.135
131. Id.
132. See Const. of the Republic of Cameroon, supra note 113, art. 53 §3.
133. See, e.g., JOHN MUKUM MBAKU, CORRUPTION IN AFRICA: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES,
AND CLEANUPS (2010) (detailing the pervasiveness of corruption in many countries in Africa
and how many political elites lack the will to deal with it).
134. Comm’n on Human Rights, The Administration of Justice and the Human Rights of
Detainees, Question of Impunity of Perpetrators of Human Rights Violations (Civil and
Political), Final Report Prepared by Mr. Joinet Pursuant to Sub-Committee Decision
1996/119, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/20, at 3 (June 26, 1997).
135. Id.
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The first stage came in the 1970s, when various civil society
organizations and legal experts, particularly in many of the dictatorships that
pervaded Latin America, “mobilized to argue for an amnesty for political
prisoners.”136 According to then U.N. Special Rapporteur on Impunity,
Louis Joinet, “[a]mnesty, as a symbol of freedom, would prove to be a topic
that could mobilize large sectors of public opinion, thus gradually making it
easier to amalgamate the many moves made during the period to offer
peaceful resistance to or resist dictatorial regimes.”137
The second stage occurred in the 1980s, when there was a proliferation
of “‘self-amnesty’ laws proclaimed by declining military dictatorships
anxious to arrange their own impunity while there was still time.”138 Victims
reacted to the perverse laws—that is, those that were promulgated by
opportunistic dictators—by organizing to develop the capacity to fight
government impunity in their communities. In Latin America, this rise in
anti-impunity organizations was evidenced by the “increasing prominence of
the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo and the Latin American Federation of
Relatives of Disappeared Detainees (FEDEFAM).139
The third stage coincided with the end of the Cold War, which in
Africa, was marked by the end of apartheid in South Africa and the collapse
of many military dictatorships.140 It was at this time, specifically in the early136. Id. at ¶ 2.
137. Id.
138. Id. at ¶ 3.
139. Id. ¶ 3.
140. The Cold War lasted from 1947 to 1991, with the collapse of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics (USSR) and the end of socialism in Eastern Europe. In Africa, these
changes in the geopolitical system resulted in the collapse of many dictatorships that had
been supported with regular financial subventions and other types of support from the Cold
War protagonists—the Western bloc under the leadership of the United States and the
Eastern bloc under the leadership of the USSR. One of the most important post-Cold War
changes in Africa was the collapse of the racially-based apartheid system in South Africa,
which was officially inaugurated in 1948. Negotiations to officially end the policy of
apartheid took place in South Africa during the period May 4, 1990 to April 27, 1994. On
May 31, 1910, four British colonies in southern Africa gained independence by coming
together to form the Union of South Africa. Although independent, the Union was a
Dominion of the British Empire, governed as a constitutional monarchy, with the British
monarch represented by a Governor-General. The Union Government was exclusively in the
hands of the white minority—Afrikaners and English. The African majority was completely
excluded from participating fully and effectively in governance. On October 5, 1960,
through referendum, whose participation was limited to whites, a majority of the latter voted
in favor of unilateral withdrawal from the British Commonwealth in order to establish the
Republic of South Africa. In 1948, the Nationalist Party formally introduced the system of
apartheid—a system of institutionalized racial segregation and discrimination—as the legal
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1990s, that many African countries began their transition to democratic
governance.141 Of great importance during this period was the conflict
between the desire by former perpetrators of international crimes to be
forgiven for all their crimes and the quest by victims for justice. This
conflict was fully in play in the struggle by South Africans to bring to justice
those people who had committed various atrocities during the apartheid
regime (1948-1994) and the desire by the perpetrators of apartheid-era
crimes for the past to be buried.142
Eventually, the international community began to recognize and
appreciate the fact that in many countries around the world, the expectation
of impunity for international crimes was enhancing engagement by both
state- and non-state actors in violations of international human rights or
international humanitarian law. Hence, there was urgent need to find ways to
confront and combat impunity. For example, on March 14, 2001, the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights (“IACtHR”) made a ground-breaking
ruling in which it found that granting “amnesty for perpetrators of serious
human rights violations was incompatible with the right of every individual
to a fair hearing before an impartial and independent court.”143 For example,

basis for the country’s governance institutions. Apartheid legislation was repealed in South
Africa on June 17, 1991, and fully democratic, multiracial elections were held in 1994, with
Nelson Mandela and the African National Congress winning the elections and taking control
of the apparatus of government. Despite the fact that South Africa gained its independence
from Great Britain on May 31, 1910, April 27, 1994, when the first democratic, non-racial
elections were held in the country, is recognized as the country’s true independence day.
See, e.g., GWYNETH WILLIAMS AND BRIAN HACKLAND, THE DICTIONARY OF CONTEMPORARY
POLITICS OF SOUTHERN AFRICA (2013) (providing an overview of important historical events
in South Africa).
141. For more information on Africa’s transition to democratic governance, see
generally THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE: THE CONTINUING STRUGGLE
(John Mukum Mbaku & Julius O. Ihonvbere eds., 2003) (providing a series of essays that
examines the transition to democratic governance in Africa); POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION
AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN AFRICA: LESSONS FROM COUNTRY EXPERIENCES (Julius O.
Ihonvbere & John M. Mbaku eds., 2003) (examining the transition to democratic
governance in selected countries in Africa).
142. See, e.g., RICHARD A. WILSON, THE POLITICS OF TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION IN
SOUTH AFRICA: LEGITIMIZING THE POST-APARTHEID STATE (2001) (arguing that South
Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (“TRC”), which was set up to deal with the
human rights violations of apartheid, may not have met the needs of communities at the
local level); TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION IN SOUTH AFRICA: DID THE TRC DELIVER?
(Audrey R. Chapman & Hugo van der Merwe eds., 2008) (arguing that the TRC was quite
effective in offering victims of apartheid-era human rights violations the opportunity to tell
their own stories and to provide policymakers with suggestions on how to prevent future
human rights violations).
143. See also Final Report on Impunity, supra note 134, at 3-4.
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in the case of Barrios Altos v. Peru,144 the IACtHR found that amnesty laws
were incompatible with the American Convention on Human Rights (“Pact
of San José”).145 The IACtHR ruled as follows, “This Court considers that all
amnesty provisions, provisions on prescription and the establishment of
measures designed to eliminate responsibility are inadmissible, because they
are intended to prevent the investigation and punishment of those responsible
for serious human rights violations such as torture, extrajudicial, summary or
arbitrary execution and forced disappearance, all of them prohibited because
they violate non-derogable rights recognized by international human rights
law.”146
At the June 14-25, 1993 World Conference on Human Rights,
representatives of 171 States adopted by consensus what was referred to as
the Vienna Declaration and Program of Action (“Vienna Declaration”),147 in
which these States agreed on a common plan to strengthen the work to fight
human rights violations around the world.148 In the Declaration, the States
supported, albeit implicitly, the thinking of the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights in Barrios Altos v. Peru149 and other cases.150 Specifically, the
States stated that “[t]he World Conference on Human Rights views with
concern the issue of impunity of perpetrators of human rights violations, and
supports the efforts of the Commission on Human Rights and the SubCommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities to
examine all aspects of the issue.”151
The Vienna Declaration also made several recommendations regarding
impunity. For example, it recommended that “States should abrogate
legislation leading to impunity for those responsible for grave violations of

144. Barrios Altos v. Peru, Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser C) No. 83, p. 17
(Mar. 14, 2001).
145. Inter-American Specialized Conference on Human Rights (San José, Costa Rica),
American Convention on Human Rights, Inter-Am. Comm. H.R. (Nov. 22, 1969).
146. Barrios Altos v. Peru, supra note 144, ¶ 41.
147. World Conference on Human Rights (Vienna), Vienna Declaration and Program of
Action, Comm. H.R., U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (June 25, 1993).
148. Press Release, Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, World
Conference on Human Rights (June 14–15, 1993, Vienna, Austria), https://www.ohchr.org/
en/aboutus/pages/viennawc.aspx.
149. Barrios Altos v. Peru, supra note 144, at 14.
150. See also: Human Rights and the Fight Against Impunity and Corruption, Inter-Am.
Comm’n H.R., Res. 1/7 (Sept. 12, 2017) (linking the fight against corruption to the exercise
and enjoyment of human rights and arguing that impunity fosters and perpetuates acts of
corruption).
151. Vienna Declaration, supra note 147, ¶ 91.
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human rights such as torture and prosecute such violations, thereby providing
a firm basis for the rule of law.”152
In August 1992, the U.N. Commission on Human Rights’ SubCommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities
(“Sub-Committee”) asked Mr. El Hadji Guissé153 and Mr. Louis Joinet154 to
study the impunity of perpetrators of violations of human rights and present
their report to the Sub-Committee. The preliminary report prepared by Mr.
Guissé and Mr. Joinet was presented to the Sub-Committee in August 1993.
The Sub-Committee then decided to split the work into two main categories
and entrusted Mr. Joinet with the study of the impunity of perpetrators of the
violations of civil and political rights and Mr. Guissé with the study of the
impunity of perpetrators of violations of economic, social and cultural
rights.155
Mr. Joinet presented his final report, which is dated June 26, 1997,156 to
the Sub-Committee at the latter’s 49th session in August 1997. A revised
final report is dated October 2, 1997.157 Mr. Guissé presented his own report
to the Sub-Committee at the 49th session of the Sub-Committee in August
1997 and it is dated June 27, 1997.158 The final principles appear in Annex II
of E/CH.4/Sub.2/1997/20/Rev.1 and are titled “Set of Principles for the
Protection and Promotion of Human Rights Through Action to Combat
Impunity” (“The Principles”).159

152. Vienna Declaration, supra note 147, ¶ 60.
153. Mr. El Hadji Guissé is a Senegalese judge who was elected as a Judge of the
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights in January 2006 and served until 2012. He
also served the United Nations in several capacities, including as Special Rapporteur on the
Right to Drinking Water in 1998. He was also a U.N. Special Rapporteur on the question of
perpetrators of human rights violations (economic, social and cultural rights). See U.N.
Comm’n on Human Rights, Sub-Comm’n on Prevention of Discrimination and Prot. of
Minorities, The Realization of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Final Report on the
Question of the Impunity of Perpetrators of Human Rights Violations (Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights), Prepared by Mr. El Hadji Guissé, Special Rapporteur, Pursuant to SubCommission Resolution 1996/24, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/8 (June 27, 1997).
154. Mr. Louis Joinet was a U.N. Special Rapporteur on Impunity.
155. Question of Impunity, supra note 153, ¶ ¶ 10–12.
156. See Final Report on Impunity, supra note 134, at 1.
157. Revised Final Report, supra note 125, at 1.
158. Question of Impunity, supra note 153, at 1.
159. See Final Report on Impunity, supra note 134, at 15.
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C. Overview of The Principles for the Protection of Human Rights
Through Action to Combat Impunity
In the Preamble to the Principles, the U.N. General Assembly recalls the
Preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, “which states that
disregard and contempt of human rights have resulted in barbarous acts
which have outraged the conscience of mankind,”160 considers that “the duty
of every State under international law to respect and to secure respect for
human rights requires that effective measures should be taken to control
impunity,”161 recalls the recommendation contained in paragraph 91 of Part
II of the Vienna Declaration and Program of Action,162 and “[d]ecides, . . .
solemnly to proclaim the following principles for the guidance of States
having to combat impunity.”163
The Principles begin with a definition of impunity, which is centered
around the existence, in each country, of the impossibility, de jure or de
facto, of bringing to justice those who are complicit in human rights
violations.164 In addition, a definition is given to “serious crimes under
international law”—the expression “covers war crimes, crimes against
humanity, including genocide, and grave breaches of and crimes against
international humanitarian law.”165 Principles 1-4 come under the category
named the “Right to Know”—every person has “the inalienable right to
know the truth about past events and about the circumstances and reasons
which led, through the consistent pattern of gross violations of human rights,
to perpetration of aberrant crimes.”166 This right is important and critical to
the minimization of future recurrence. Principles 2-4 impose a duty on the
State to remember and to preserve the collective memory and to guard
against the development of “revisionist and negationist arguments”;167
guarantees victims, their families and their loved ones, the right to know the
truth about the “circumstances in which violations took place and, in the
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Paragraph 91 of the Vienna Declaration and Program of Action states as follows:
“The World Conference on Human Rights views with concern the issue of impunity of
perpetrators of human rights violations, and supports the efforts of the Commission on
Human Rights and the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
Minorities to examine all aspects of the issue.”
163. See Final Report on Impunity, supra note 134, at 15.
164. Id. Annex II(A).
165. Id. Annex II(B).
166. Id. at 16.
167. Id.
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event of death or disappearance, the victim’s fate”;168 and demands that
States take appropriate action to give effect to the right to know, including
establishing extrajudicial commissions of inquiry and making certain that
information gathered is preserved for posterity, through, for example, the
establishment and maintenance of archives.169
Principles 5-12 fall under the category “Extrajudicial Commissions of
Inquiry” and provide information on the role of the extrajudicial
commissions of inquiry; how to guarantee their independence and
impartiality; their terms of reference; guarantees for persons implicated in the
crimes being investigated, as well as for victims and witnesses; operating
procedures for the commissions; and procedures for disseminating the
information collected by the commissions.170
Preservation of and access to archives is covered under Principles 1318. Generally, Principles 1-18 deal with the right to know, while Principles
19-35 deal with the right to justice. This part of the Principles starts by
reminding States that “[t]here can be no just and lasting reconciliation
without an effective response to the need for justice” and that “an important
element in reconciliation is forgiveness, a private act which implies that the
victim knows the perpetrator of the violations and that the latter has been
able to show repentance.”171
Principle 20 deals specifically with the duties of States with regard to
the administration of justice. Noting that “impunity is a failure of States to
meet their obligations to investigate violations, take appropriate measures in
respect of perpetrators, particularly in the area of justice, to ensure that they
are prosecuted, tried and duly punished,” as well as to “provide the victims
with effective remedies and reparation for the injuries suffered, and to take
steps to prevent any recurrence of such violations,”172 this principle argues
further that each State must make available to victims “supplementary
procedural rules,” which can enable a victim to “institute proceedings on his
or her own behalf where the authorities fail to do so, or become an associated
party.”173 This provision is especially important in Africa, where the State
and its agents/proxies are often the source of the threat to international
peace—that is, they are the perpetrators of human rights violations.
Principles 21-25 deal with the distribution of jurisdiction for impunity
and serious crimes under international law between national, foreign and
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 16–19.
Id. at 20.
Id. at 21.
Id.
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international courts. These principles state that in order to avoid the need to
refer situations to ad hoc international criminal courts, it is necessary for the
global community to establish a standing international criminal court with
jurisdiction binding on all Member States.174 Principles 22-25 deal with rules
of procedure applicable in international courts, jurisdiction of foreign courts,
measures to strengthen the effectiveness of treaty provisions on universal
jurisdiction, and measures to determine extraterritorial jurisdiction in internal
law.175 States are granted authority through Principle 25 “to establish
extraterritorial jurisdiction over serious crimes under international law
committed outside their territory which by their nature are within the
purview not only of internal criminal law but also of an international punitive
system to which the concept of frontiers is alien” and this power can be
exercised only in the case where it is not possible “to apply a universal
jurisdiction clause to the country where the crime was committed.”176
Articles 26-35 deal with restrictive measures justified by action to
combat impunity. Emphasis is placed on safeguards against the “misuse to
further impunity of prescriptions, amnesty, right to asylum, refusal to
extradite, absence of in absentia procedure, due obedience, legislation on
repentance, the jurisdiction of military courts and the irremovability of
judges.”177 The overall objective of these principles is to minimize any
attempts by perpetrators and their supporters, who may include national
governments, from avoiding prosecution and punishment, if found guilty.
The rest of the principles (36-50) deal with the right to reparation. It is
noted that any violation of human rights—whether by state- or non-state
actors—“gives rise to a right to reparation on the part of the victim or his or
her beneficiaries, implying a duty on the part of the State to make reparation
and the possibility for the victim to seek redress from the perpetrator.”178 The
State has an obligation under these principles to make certain that the
victim’s right to reparation is upheld and the victim allowed to exercise it and
if, necessary, with the help of the State. Where necessary, the State must
provide the victim protection from intimidation and reprisals, as well as
access to applicable international procedures, should he choose to exercise
his right to reparation.179

174. The Rome Statute created such a court in 2002 called the International Criminal
Court (ICC). See Rome Statute, supra note 116, at 8.
175. See Final Report on Impunity, supra note 134, at 21.
176. Id. at 22.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 24.
179. Id. at 25.
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These principles also impose a duty on the Member States to take
appropriate measures to make certain that there is no repeat of the
violations—that is, victims must not be victimized again. Thus, States must
take measures to (1) disband parastatal armed groups; (2) repeal emergency
provisions, which have enhanced or made possible violations; and (3)
administrative or other measures vis-à-vis State officials implicated in
serious human rights violations.180
Since the Principles were submitted to the U.N. Commission for Human
Rights in 1997, they have played “an influential role in strengthening
domestic efforts to combat impunity.”181 In addition, the Principles have
become very important references for the decision-making processes of, and
have been affirmed by, various international criminal tribunals and human
rights treaty bodies. For example, the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights (“IACHR”) held, in its review of the Supreme Court of
Justice of Chile’s decision in Carmelo Soria Espinoza v. Chile,182 that
although the Commission for Truth and Reconciliation, established by
Chile’s democratic government to investigate past violations of human
rights, as well as look into “the situation of the disappeared detainees,”183 had
covered a large number of cases and situations, it had, nevertheless, failed to
investigate “criminal acts committed by State agents,”184 nor had it identified
and punished those responsible and this was due to the Amnesty law. The
IACHR concluded that “the State did not comply with its obligation to
investigate and punish those responsible for violating the human rights of
Carmelo Soria Espinoza and that the dismissal resulting from the application
of amnesty, despite the incriminating evidence existing against them,
demonstrates that the State also failed to comply with its obligation to
punish.”185
The first eighteen Principles deal with the right to know the truth—this
right has garnered strong support and affirmation by many international
human rights bodies. For example, the various institutions and organizations
180. Id. at 26–27.
181. Comm’n on Human Rights, Promotion and Protection of Human Rights: Impunity:
Independent Study of Best Practices, Including Recommendations, to Assist States in
Strengthening Their Domestic Capacity to Combat all Aspects of Impunity, by Professor
Diane Orentlicher, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2004/88 (Feb. 27, 2004), https://documents-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G04/113/55/PDF/G0411355.pdf?OpenElement (“Independent
Study”).
182. Carmelo Soria Espinoza v. Chile, Case 11.725, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report
No. 133/99 (Nov. 19, 1999), http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/99eng/Merits/Chile11.725.htm.
183. Id. ¶ 102.
184. Id.
185. Id. ¶ 106.
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established under the American Convention on Human Rights, for example,
have “recognized that the anguish that individuals experience as a result of
uncertainty about the fate of close relatives who are direct victims of
enforced disappearance in itself constitutes cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment and thus is a distinct violation of the relevant treaty.”186 States,
then, are under obligation to investigate all situations involving violations of
human rights, including the disappearance of detainees, and inform their
relatives of their fate.187
In addition, the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights188 has recognized, consistent with Principle 36,189 the right “to
know the full, complete, and public truth as to the events that transpired, their
specific circumstances, and who participated in them” as “part of the right to
reparation for human rights violations.”190
Since the Principles were submitted to the U.N. Commission on Human
Rights in 1997, there have been significant advances in efforts by domestic,
regional and international actors to combat impunity through the arrest and
prosecution of those alleged to have committed serious international crimes.
For example, in 2002, the Rome Statute established the International
Criminal Court (“ICC”) with jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against
humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression.191 In addition, there have
been trials of senior Rwandan/Yugoslav officials before the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”)192 and the International Criminal
Tribunal for Yugoslavia (“ICTY”),193 respectively.194

186. Independent Study, supra note 181, ¶ 14.
187. Id. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ accumulated jurisprudence on this
subject is presented and affirmed in Bámaca-Velásquez v. Guatemala, Merits, Judgment,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 70 (Nov. 25, 2000), ¶ ¶ 159–66, http://www.corteidh.or.cr/
docs/casos/articulos/seriec_70_ing.pdf. See, specifically.
188. See, e.g., Monsignor Oscar Arnulfo Roméro y Galdåamez v. El Salvador, Case
11.481, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 37/00 (Apr. 3, 2000).
189. Principle 36 deals with the rights and duties arising out of the obligation to make
reparations. See Final Report on Impunity, supra note 134, at 25.
190. Monsignor Oscar Arnulfo Roméro y Galdåamez v. El Salvador, supra note 188, ¶
148. See also id. ¶ 147.
191. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 116, at 8.
192. For more on the ICTR and its work, see generally USTA KAITESI, GENOCIDAL
GENDER AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE: THE LEGACY OF THE ICTR, RWANDA’S ORDINARY COURTS
AND GACACA COURTS (2014) (examining, inter alia, the experiences of victims of genocidal
and sexual violence have been addressed on a theoretical and practical level).
193. For more on the ICTY, see generally INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CASE LAW OF THE ICTY (Gideon Boas & William A. Schabas eds.,
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D. Update and Revision of the Principles
On April 21, 2004, through its Resolution 2004/72,195 the U.N.
Commission on Human Rights requested the U.N. Secretary-General “to
appoint an independent expert, from within existing resources and for a
period of one year, to update the Set of Principles196 to reflect recent
developments in international law and practice, including international
jurisprudence and State practice.”197 The expert hired to update the Principles
was also required to take into consideration an independent study on
impunity that had been undertaken earlier at the request of the U.N.
Secretary-General (“Independent Study”).198
In updating the Principles, the expert, Professor Orentlicher, noted that a
central premise of the Principles is the need for the international community
to develop and adopt a comprehensive approach towards fighting or
combating impunity and in doing so, States have a very important and
critical role to play.199 In line with that premise, Principle 18(1) of the
original revised Principles,200 which recognizes various measures that States
are required to take in order to meet their obligations to fight impunity, was
made Principle 1. The new Principle 1 states as follows:

2003) (examining, inter alia, the experiences of the ICTY in prosecuting perpetrators of war
crimes and gross or systematic violations of human rights).
194. For more discussion of the Principles and how their existence has affected the
struggle against impunity, see generally Independent Study, supra note 181; THE UNITED
NATIONS PRINCIPLES TO COMBAT IMPUNITY: A COMMENTARY (Frank Haldemann & Thomas
Unger eds., 2018).
195. Office of the [U.N.] High Commissioner for Human Rights, Impunity: Commission
on Human Rights Resolution: 2004/72, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2004/127 (Apr. 21, 2004),
http://www.refworld.org/docid/43f313869.html.
196. That is, the Set of Principles for the protection and promotion of human rights
through action to combat impunity. See Revised Final Report, supra note 125, Annex II.
197. Id. ¶ 20.
198. Independent Study, supra note 181, at 1 (stating that the expert hired was Professor
Diane Orentlicher, Professor of International Law at American University, Washington,
D.C., who is also one of the world’s leading authorities on international human rights law,
war crimes tribunals, and transitional justice).
199. The updated principles are presented in: Promotion and Protection of Human
Rights: Report of the Independent Expert to Update the Set of Principles to Combat
Impunity, Diane Orentlicher, Addendum: Updated Set of Principles for the Protection and
Promotion of Human Rights Through Action to Combat Impunity (“Report of the
Independent Expert”), Comm’n on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/102/Add. 1
(Feb. 8, 2005), https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G05/109/00/PDF/G051
0900.pdf?OpenElement.
200. See Revised Final Report, supra note 125, at 22–23.
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Impunity arises from a failure by States to meet their obligations to
investigate violations; to take appropriate measures in respect of the
perpetrators, particularly in the area of justice, by ensuring that
those suspected of criminal responsibility are prosecuted, tried and
duly punished; to provide victims with effective remedies and to
ensure that they receive reparation for the injuries suffered; to
ensure the inalienable right to know the truth about violations; and
to take other necessary steps to prevent a recurrence of
violations.201
Another set of revisions targeted and reflected developments in State
practice that inform effective approaches to and strategies for combating
impunity. The updated Principles noted an important finding of the
Independent Study,202 which affirmed the critical importance of the “broad
participation of victims and other citizens”203 in the design and
implementation of policies to combat impunity. Note was made of the extent
to which South Africa’s post-apartheid government went in making certain
that victims of apartheid crimes were granted the facilities and wherewithal
to participate fully and effectively in promulgating the law establishing the
country’s truth and reconciliation commission. But, why is the participation
of victims in the design and implementation of anti-impunity policies
critical?
First, as the Independent Study204 determined, participation enhances
public support for the policy and ensures its likely success. Second, allowing
victims to participate in the design and implementation of policies to combat
impunity helps make certain that any such programs reflect and respond to
“victims’ actual needs.”205 Third, giving victims the power to participate can
provide them with a new sense of belonging—since victims are most likely
to be individuals who had previously been denied the protection of the law,
participation in the design and implementation of policies to combat
impunity can serve as a mechanism to finally bring them into the community
of citizens that are fully protected by the law.206 Fourth, participation in
public dialogue about how to fight impunity can provide the wherewithal for
victims to “reclaim control over their lives and may help restore their

201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

See Updated Set of Principles, supra note 199, at 7.
Independent Study, supra note 181 at 2.
Id. ¶ 11.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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confidence in government.”207 Fifth, public policies to fight impunity that
emerge from broad-based national consultation are more likely “to secure
sustainable justice for the future, in accordance with international standards,
domestic legal traditions and national aspirations”208 than those that are
developed through a top-down, elite-driven and non-participatory process.
Finally, public engagement, for example, through truth and reconciliation
commission, can allow victims “to engage in a cathartic denunciation” of
those who had committed mass atrocities against them.209
To enhance the effectiveness of public policies to fight impunity, it is
also important that the participation of women, especially in countries where
women have traditionally been excluded from public discourse, be
guaranteed—women must be allowed to participate at levels that are equal to
those of their fellow male citizens.
For example, in constituting
commissions of enquiry, including truth and reconciliation commissions,
concerted efforts must be made to ensure that women are adequately
represented. Of course, given the history of discrimination against and
marginalization of certain groups (e.g., religious and ethnic minorities) in the
African countries, it is important that they be granted the opportunity to
participate fully and effectively in the design and implementation of public
policies, particularly those to combat impunity.
Effective policies to combat impunity are those which are not based on
a “one-size-fits-all” approach. Instead, programs to fight impunity should
take into consideration the needs of victims, their desire for justice, as well as
local realities. That is why broad-based public consultation is very important.
Of course, these Principles, it is noted, “are not legal standards in the strict
sense, but guiding principles.”210 Nevertheless, while these Principles are not
legal standards, they “reflect and comport with pertinent legal standards.”211
The updated Principles introduced the phrase “truth commission”—the
latter is a special type of commission of inquiry, which since the early-1990s,
has increasingly become a major tool for dealing with the right to know. In
the aftermath of the demise of apartheid in South Africa, the truth and
reconciliation commission emerged as a major tool that was used to help the
people, particularly the victims, deal with the atrocities committed by the

207. Id.
208. Rep. of the S.C., The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and PostConflict Societies, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616 (Aug. 23, 2004).
209. John M. Mbaku, Transition to Democratic Governance in Africa: Learning from
Past Failures, in POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN AFRICA: LESSONS
FROM COUNTRY EXPERIENCES 17, 39 (Julius O. Ihonvbere & John M. Mbaku eds., 2003).
210. Revised Final Report, supra note 125, ¶ 49.
211. Independent Study, supra note 181, ¶ 11.

112

Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 42:1

apartheid regime.212 In addition, records about truth commissions, how they
are established and how they function, can help other countries that find
themselves in need of such commissions. For example, in establishing its
own truth commission in 2002, Timor-Leste was inspired by South Africa’s
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (“TRC”) but made modifications to
deal with what they argued were the TRC’s deficiencies. Accordingly,
Timor-Leste’s Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation
(“CAVR”), unlike South Africa’s TRC, did not permit immunity for serious
crimes, such as murder or rape, and grants immunity for other crimes only on
condition that the perpetrator agrees to and actually performs community
service or makes a symbolic financial payment in addition to the
confession.213
Professor Orentlicher concludes her report by stating that since the
Principles were submitted to the U.N. Commission on Human Rights in
1997, “seemingly impregnable barriers to prosecution have been dismantled
in countries that endured the depredations of dictatorship.”214 In addition,
many States have “cooperated to ensure prosecution of officials at the highest
levels of Government before international tribunals and national courts; a
new breed of court, combining national and international elements, has
entered the lexicon of institutions designed to render justice for atrocious
crimes; and Governments and civil society have benefited from an expanding
repertoire of tools for combating impunity and from a deepening reservoir of
expertise and insight concerning the design and implementation of effective
anti-impunity programs.”215
It is clear that since the Principles were submitted to the U.N.
Commission on Human Rights in 1997, there have been significant
advances, at both the international and national levels, in efforts to battle
impunity. Nevertheless, there is need for States, particularly those in Africa,
to engage in comprehensive institutional reforms in order to provide
themselves with strong democratic institutions—specifically, an independent
judiciary, a robust independent press, and a legislature that has enough
212. For more on South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, see generally
TRUTH & RECONCILIATION IN SOUTH AFRICA: 10 YEARS ON (Charles Villa-Vicencio & Fanie
du Toit eds., 2007).
213. For more on Timor-Leste’s truth and reconciliation work, see generally PostCAVR Technical Secretariat, CHEGAL: THE FINAL REPORT OF THE TIMOR-LESTE
COMMISSION FOR RECEPTION, TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION (CAVR): A PLAIN GUIDE (2013);
RECONCILIATION IN CONFLICT-AFFECTED COMMUNITIES: PRACTICES AND INSIGHTS FROM THE
ASIA-PACIFIC (Bert Jenkins, D. B. Subedi & Kathy Jenkins eds., 2018).
214. See Updated Set of Principles, supra note 199.
215. Id.
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independence to fully check on the exercise of government power. In
addition, and perhaps more important, is that each African country should
seek to enhance the development of a strong and politically active civil
society that can serve as an important check on the government. All these
democratic institutions can ensure that those who commit international
crimes are brought to justice. Often, impunity arises from the decision, by
political elites, not to prosecute certain individuals, many of whom are
members or agents of the incumbent government, for their involvement in
international crimes. Hence, as part of the effort to fight impunity, States
should provide themselves with governing processes that adequately
constrain the state and prevent civil servants and political elites from granting
themselves immunity from or amnesty for their criminal acts.
III. IMPUNITY IN AFRICA
A. Introduction
Africa has had a long tradition of impunity—from the colonialists who
brutalized defenseless villagers in as part of the effort to maximize the flow,
from the continent, of scarce resources to the European economies, to
modern-day dictators who continue to brutalize their fellow citizens in order
to maintain a monopoly on power. While there are many examples from
Africa’s history to illustrate the level of colonial brutality, we will mention
only two. First, is King Leopold II’s brutal treatment of the peoples of
Congo. During the colonial period in what was then the Congo Free State,216
the colonialists used significant levels of brutality to force Congolese people
to collect rubber. For example, an eyewitness account of this brutality from a
junior officer of the Force publique,217 is as follows:

216. The Congo Free State (l’État indépendant du Congo) was a large territory in central
Africa that was ruled personally by Belgian’s King Leopold II from 1885 to 1908. It was
operated separately from Belgium. In 1908, Belgium annexed the territory and converted it
into a colony, which was renamed Belgian Congo. For more on the Congo Free State, see,
e.g., MARTIN EWANS, EUROPEAN ATROCITY, AFRICAN CATASTROPHE: LEOPOLD II, THE
CONGO FREE STATE AND ITS AFTERMATH (2002); ADAM HOCHSCHILD, KING LEOPOLD’S
GHOST: A STORY OF GREED, TERROR, AND HEROISM IN COLONIAL AFRICA (1999); HENRY
WELLINGTON WACK, THE STORY OF THE CONGO FREE STATE: SOCIAL, POLITICAL, AND
ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE BELGIAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT IN CENTRAL AFRICA (G. P.
Putnam’s Sons 1905).
217. The Force publique was a military force in the Congo Free State, as well as in
Belgian Congo. At independence in 1960 the Force publique was converted into the
Congolese National Army (l’Armée nationale congolaise). For more on the Force publique,
see, e.g., BRYANT P. SHAW, FORCE PUBLIQUE, FORCE UNIQUE: THE MILITARY IN BELGIAN
CONGO, 1914–1939 (1984); LOUIS-FRANÇOIS VANDERSTRAETEN, DE LA FORCE PUBLIQUE À
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We were a party of thirty [which was sent] to a village to ascertain
if the natives were collecting rubber, and, if not, to murder all, men,
women, and children. We found the natives sitting peacefully. We
asked what they were doing. They were unable to reply, thereupon
we fell upon them and killed them all without mercy.218
Regardless of who the colonial power of record was, colonialism “was
an extremely brutal, inhuman, and heartless system designed to maximize
benefits accruing to Europeans in the colonies and the métropole.”219
Michael Crowder, an expert on European colonialism in Africa, argues that
during the colonial period, any efforts by Africans to resist their exploitation
and domination by the Europeans was “visited by punitive expeditions that
were often quite unrestrained by any of the norms of warfare in Europe.”220
Crowder then cites as an example of the extent to which brutality was critical
in the colonial enterprise, “the bloody suppression of the Maji Maji and
Herero uprisings in German East Africa and South West Africa,” as well as
various atrocities committed during the British-sponsored “suppression of the
Satiru revolt in [the colony of] Northern Nigeria.”221 Additional evidence is
found in the correspondences of Edward Lugard, brother of Lord Lugard—
the latter was, at the time, the British High Commissioner in the colony of
Northern Nigeria and the architect of the British policy of indirect rule in
West Africa. Edward Lugard, on a visit to the colony of Northern Nigeria
was taken aback by the level and nature of brutality visited upon defenseless
women by colonial forces. In a letter to his brother (Lord Lugard), which
was dated May 21, 1908, Edward Lugard wrote that “they [colonial soldiers,
military police, and regular police units] killed every living thing before
them”222 and that “[w]omen’s breasts had been cut off and the leader spitted
on a stake.”223
There is no evidence that any of the perpetrators of these atrocities
against defenseless Africans was ever held accountable for their deeds. In
fact, in many cases, as illustrated by the activities of the Force publique in
L’ARMÉE NATIONALE CONGOLAISE: HISTOIRE D’UNE MUTINERIE, JUILLET

1960 (Académie
Royale de Belgique 1993).
218. HENRY RICHARD FOX BOURNE, CIVILIZATION IN CONGOLAND: A STORY OF
INTERNATIONAL WRONG-DOING 253 (P. S. King & Son 1903).
219. MBAKU, supra note 7, at 21.
220. Michael Crowder, Whose Dream Was It Anyway? Twenty-Five Years of African
Independence, 86 AFRICAN AFFAIRS 7 (1987).
221. Id. at 12.
222. Id.
223. Id.
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the Congo Free State, as well as in Belgian Congo, such brutality was
actually a requirement of the job for soldiers and other paramilitary forces.
Perhaps, more importantly, is the fact that those who engaged in such
inhuman treatment of Africans were rewarded for their actions.224
Of course, there was South Africa’s system of institutionalized racial
segregation called apartheid.225 Officially established in 1948, apartheid was
based on white supremacy and permanent black (or African) inferiority. To
make it work, the white minority government enacted an extraordinary
number of laws, which ranged from the prohibition of marriages between
blacks and whites to those that forcefully removed Africans from their homes
and placed them in economically unsustainable “homelands.”226 That
apartheid was characterized by extremely high levels of impunity is not in
doubt. One need only read narratives provided through the post-apartheid
truth and reconciliation process to gauge the extent to which apartheid’s
security forces had killed, maimed, and generally brutalized Africans, with
impunity.227
Despite the significant improvements in governance that have taken
place in the continent since many countries began to transition their political
systems to democracy in the early 1990s, impunity still remains a major
concern. The genocidal massacre of Tutsi and their Hutu sympathizers by the
Hutu-majority government during a 100-day period in the summer of 1994,
is just one example of the atrocities that continue to pervade African societies
even into the 21st century and without the perpetrators being brought to
justice.228 Below, we take a brief look at how some African countries have
attempted to deal with impunity. Nevertheless, before we do so, we will first
224. See BOURNE, supra note 218. See also CAROLINE ELKINS, IMPERIAL RECKONING:
THE UNTOLD STORY OF BRITAIN’S GULAG IN KENYA (2006) (providing an overview of the
brutal treatment of Kenya’s Kikuyu people in the aftermath of World War II).
225. For an overview of apartheid, its origins and its impact on South Africa and its
peoples, see JOHN ALLEN, APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA: AN INSIDER’S VIEW OF THE ORIGIN
AND EFFECTS OF SEPARATE DEVELOPMENT (2005); SEAN CONNOLLY, APARTHEID IN SOUTH
AFRICA (2003).
226. For an insight into the homelands of apartheid South Africa, see JEFFREY BUTLER,
ROBERT I. ROTBERG & JOHN ADAMS, THE BLACK HOMELANDS OF SOUTH AFRICA: THE
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF BOPTHUTHATSWANA AND KWAZULU (1978);
NEW HISTORIES OF SOUTH AFRICA’S APARTHEID-ERA BANTUSTANS (Shireen Ally & Arianna
Lissoni eds., 2017).
227. See, e.g., RITA KESSELRING, BODIES OF TRUTH: LAW, MEMORY, AND EMANCIPATION
IN POST-APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA (2016); ATROCITIES, MASSACRES, AND WAR CRIMES: AN
ENCYCLOPEDIA, VOL. A–L 20 (Alexander Mikaberidze ed., 2013); HELENA COBBAN,
AMNESTY AFTER ATROCITY? HEALING NATIONS AFTER GENOCIDE AND WAR CRIMES 8
(2007).
228. For more on the Rwandan Genocide, see, e.g., LINDA MELVERN, CONSPIRACY TO
MURDER: THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE (2004).
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take a look at truth commissions, which have emerged as the most important
instrument for addressing the causes of conflict and providing
recommendations on how affected societies can deal with impunity.
B. The Truth Commission and Impunity in Africa
A truth commission is a mechanism that can be used to administer
justice, address the root causes of conflict, and provide policymakers with
recommendations on how to deal with impunity. The first truth commission
in post-independence Africa was one that was established in 1974 by then
president of Uganda, Idi Amin, to investigate “enforced disappearances”
under his regime.229 Since that time, the truth commission has emerged as “a
means to investigate past human rights violations, uncover the repressive
machinery of authoritarian regimes, and identity systemic socioeconomic
injustices.”230
Since the early 1990s, at least twenty-five truth commissions have been
established in Africa. The ability of each of these truth commissions to
uncover the truth has been affected significantly by their “institutional
design.”231 For example, if the truth commission is granted subpoena power,
as well as significant operating resources (e.g., money, skilled manpower), it
is more likely than not, to access information on the committed atrocities. In
addition, those commissions that are granted the power to publicly name
perpetrators are more likely to force accountability (even if only
symbolically) and in doing so, secure some level of justice for the victims.
But, what if the commission is empowered to grant amnesty to perpetrators?
It has been suggested that giving it the power to grant amnesty can actually
transform the commission, at least in the eyes of victims, into a supporter of
impunity.232 Although South Africa’s post-apartheid Truth and
Reconciliation Commission (“TRC”) was empowered to grant “conditional
amnesty in exchange for full disclosure of crimes,”233 most of the continent’s
truth commissions have usually not been granted such power.
Unfortunately, truth commissions, as they currently operate in Africa,
have many limitations. For one thing, in order for them to function

229. Intl’ Peace Institute IPI, African Union Panel of the Wise, Peace, Justice, and
Reconciliation in Africa: Opportunities and Challenges in the Fight Against Impunity
(February 2013), https://www.ipinst.org/2013/01/peace-justice-and-reconciliation-in-africa.
230. Id. at 21.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
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effectively as tools to unearth the truth about past atrocities, as well as deliver
some justice to victims, there must be political will—the government must
not only be willing to support the commission’s activities, but it must also
provide the necessary human and financial resources for the commission to
carry out its duties, as well as provide an environment in the country within
which truth-telling can easily be accomplished.234 As argued by the African
Union Panel of the Wise,235 “there is a real danger that [truth commissions]
are increasingly seen as a panacea, inserted into peace agreements in order to
provide options for leaders seeking to avoid criminal accountability.”236
Nevertheless, truth commissions remain a powerful tool to fight impunity.
However, they can do so only if they are provided enough resources to do
their jobs and there is necessary political support. At the very least, truth
commissions can provide the necessary forum for societies afflicted by
rampant human rights violations to investigate and uncover the truth about
past and on-going atrocities, as well as provide victims with some level of
justice, even if only symbolic.237 Of course, truth commissions can play an
important role in national peacebuilding efforts, help build a culture of
respect for human rights, and provide policymakers with important
recommendations on how to create institutions that generally improve
governance. As stated by the A.U. Panel of the Wise, “when properly
executed, truth commissions can be one among a host of mechanisms for
restoring the rule of law.”238
Principle 31239 represents an important tenet of international human
rights law, which is “the right to reparation on the part of the victim or his or
her beneficiaries, implying a duty on the part of the State to make reparation
and the possibility for the victim to seek redress from the perpetrator.”240
This principle is given practical effect by Article 75 of the Rome Statute “in
234. Id.
235. The A.U. Panel of the Wise is a critical pillar of the Peace and Security
Architecture of the African Union. The Panel of the Wise was set up by Article 11 of the
Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African
Union (PSC) as a five-person panel of “highly respected African personalities from various
segments of society who have made outstanding contributions to the cause of peace,
security and development on the continent” with the duty “to support the efforts of the PSC
and those of the Chairperson of the Commission, particularly in the area of conflict
prevention.” African Union, Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and
Security Council of the African Union (Dec. 26, 2003), https://au.int/en/treaties/protocolrelating-establish ment-peace-and-security-council-african-union.
236. Id. at 21.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 22.
239. See Updated Set of Principles, supra note 199.
240. Id. art. 31.
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the context of international criminal proceedings.”241 Reparations are
considered very important because they place emphasis on victims and, in
addition, represent “a critical transitional justice mechanism for repairing
relations between national actors and victims.”242 In addition to the fact that
the right to reparations can be found in many multilateral treaties, it is now
accepted as part of customary international law.243 In a resolution adopted on
December 16, 2005, the U.N. General Assembly outlined principles on the
right to remedy and reparations.244 In its resolution, the U.N. General
Assembly identified five components of the right to reparation: restitution
(the victim should be restored to the original situation before the gross
violations of international human rights law or serious violations of
international humanitarian law occurred), compensation (payment should be
made for any economically assessable damage), rehabilitation (which include
medical and psychological care, as well as legal and social services),
satisfaction (various measures, including cessation of continuing violations,
public apology, and judicial and administrative sanctions against persons
liable for the violations), and guarantees of non-repetition (these include
effective civilian control of military and security forces, strengthening the
independence of the judiciary, and promoting mechanisms for preventing
and monitoring social conflicts and their resolution).245
During the last several years, truth commissions or truth-seeking bodies
have risen to play an important role in reparation regimes. For example,
truth-seeking commissions in South Africa, Sierra Leone, and Liberia have
all made recommendations on reparations. Morocco and Malawi have
created dedicated institutions for reparations and Morocco granted its truth
commission the power to grant reparations directly to victims.246
241. See Independent Study, supra note 181, ¶ 57. Article 75 of the Rome Statute is
titled “Reparations to victims.” Article 75(1) states as follows: “The Court shall establish
principles relating to reparations to, or in respect of, victims, including restitution,
compensation and rehabilitation. On this basis, in its decision the Court may, either upon
request or on its motion in exceptional circumstances, determine the scope and extent of any
damage, loss and inquiry to, or in respect of, victims and will state the principles on which it
is acting.” See Rome Statute, supra note 116.
242. A.U. Panel of the Wise, supra note 229, at 22.
243. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Rule-of-Law
Tools for Post-Conflict States: Prosecution Initiatives, New York and Geneva (2006), 5–6,
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/RuleoflawProsecutionsen.pdf.
244. G.A Res. 60/147, Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and
Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious
Violations of International Law (Dec. 16, 2005).
245. Id. ¶ 18.
246. A.U. Panel of the Wise, supra note 229, at 23.
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i. South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission
Since the early-1990s, many African countries have become “a vast
testing ground for new policies to address impunity, seek truth and justice,
and enable reconciliation in fractured societies.”247 One of the most
instructive and informative transitions from a governmental regime pervaded
by impunity to a democratic one is South Africa’s post-apartheid political
system. In 1995, as South Africa was in the process of transitioning from the
apartheid system, the government enacted the Promotion of National Unity
and Reconciliation Act (“PNURA”).248 Chapter 2 of the PNURA creates a
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (“TRC”) as “a juristic person,” whose
objectives would be “to promote national unity and reconciliation in a spirit
of understanding which transcends the conflicts and divisions of the past.”249
Specifically, the TRC was tasked with “establishing as complete a picture as
possible of the causes, nature and extent of the gross violations of human
rights which were committed during the period from 1 March 1960 to the
cut-off date.”250
South Africans were eager to uncover the truth about the crimes and
atrocities committed during the apartheid era and hold the perpetrators
accountable for their actions.251 To ensure full disclosure, the TRC offered
amnesty to perpetrators so that they could come forward on their own and
testify.252 South Africa’s TRC released the report of its investigation in 1998,
with two important conclusions: (1) the apartheid government had committed
the majority of human rights abuses during the period 1960-1994; and (2) the
African National Congress and other anti-apartheid groups also committed
human rights violations.253
247. Id.
248. Government of South Africa, Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act
34 of 1995 (S. Afr.), http://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/acts/1995-034.pdf.
249. Id. art. 2(1).
250. Id. art. 3(1)(a). The cut-off date was 1994; that is, the TRC was to investigate
human rights violations committed during the period 1960–1994.
251. Perpetrators included, not just the people who actually committed the crimes, but
also those who ordered the crimes. See, e.g., ALETTE SMEULERS & FRED GRÜNFELD,
INTERNATIONAL CRIMES AND OTHER GROSS HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS: A MULTI- AND
INTERDISCIPLINARY TEXTBOOK 319 (2011) (arguing, inter alia, that during the apartheid
period in South Africa, some of the perpetrators of crimes were “lawyers and policymakers
drafting or implementing the discriminatory laws,” as well as “bureaucrats implementing
the rules or the legal profession and judiciary prosecuting people by implementing and
ruling on unfair and illegitimate legislation”).
252. Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation, supra note 248, preamble.
253. See Truth and Reconciliation Comm’n (of South Africa), The TRC Report, Vol.
One, http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/report/ (last visited July 27, 2018).
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Besides offering victims an opportunity to seek and secure justice,
South Africa’s truth and reconciliation process also involved more broader
objectives, which included, inter alia, the construction of a solid foundation
for democratic governance. It was critical for South Africans that there be
reconciliation and accountability at the national level and the TRC provided
the medium through which these important goals could be achieved or
actualized. Of course, there was fear, especially among vulnerable groups,
primarily those which had been abused and exploited during the apartheid
regime, that these atrocities could be visited upon them again. Hence, TRC
was expected to make recommendations on how post-apartheid society could
make certain that such crimes and atrocities were never committed again.
With respect to post-apartheid South Africa, the key to making certain that
apartheid-era crimes would never be repeated, lies in the country’s strong
democratic institutions—an independent judiciary, a strong, robust, and
politically-informed and active civil society, and an independent press. These
institutions provide a check on the exercise of government power and ensure
that anyone, including even high-ranking officials of the state, who engages
in behaviors that violate human rights, is brought to justice.
Despite the fact that the TRC succeeded in laying the foundation for a
strong and robust democracy in South Africa, it was criticized by many
citizens, especially those who had been severely impoverished by apartheid,
for not dealing fully and effectively with the socioeconomics impacts of
apartheid. Specifically, critics of the TRC argued that it had totally failed to
hold the beneficiaries of the apartheid system—who included individuals and
business enterprises—accountable for their complicity in this regime that had
committed numerous atrocities against millions of people.254 The TRC was
designed specifically to foster national and political reconciliation and not
individual reconciliation. Hence, victims took the TRC to task for “raising
expectations about its ability to foster individual reconciliation.”255 Critics
have argued that there were other problems that rendered the TRC less
effective as a tool for administering transitional justice. First, the TRC lacked
“comprehensive reparations and redress,”256 and as a consequence, many
victims of apartheid continue to wait for justice. Second, the threat to
prosecute those perpetrators who did not come forward to testify was limited
and ineffective. In 2005 and 2007, the ANC Government of South Africa

254. Id. at 31.
255. Id.
256. Id.
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implemented two policies,257 which paved the way for perpetrators of crimes
under apartheid to have a second chance at amnesty. However, local and
international civil society groups, working together, and in cooperation with
various victims’ groups in South Africa, “secured a legal victory that ruled
that the state should be compelled to fulfill its constitutional obligation to
investigate cases from the apartheid era, including compliance with the TRC
principle of victims’ participation in the granting of pardons.”258
ii. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”) was
established in November 1994 by the United Nations Security Council and
empowered to prosecute the perpetrators of the Rwandan Genocide and other
serious violations of international humanitarian law.259 According to Article
1 of the U.N. Security Council’s Resolution 995, which established the
ICTR,
The International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have the power to
proscute persons responsible for serious violations of international
humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda and
Rwadan citizens responsible for such violations committed in the
territory of neighboring States, between 1 January 1994 and 31
December 1994, in accordance with the provisions of the present
Statute.260
In December 2015, the ICTR delivered its 45th and final judgment and
then made preparations to formally close.261 Although the ICTR was not the
only institution set up to judge those who were responsible for killing over
800,000 Tutsi and their Hutu sympathizers, it was the first international court

257. In 2005 and 2007 ANC Government implemented a set of amendments to the
National Prosecuting Authority’s policy and the Pardons Reference Group, respectively. See
Id.
258. The TRC Report, supra note 253, at 32.
259. For more on the ICTR, see INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA
(ICTR), INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA (ICTR) SPECIAL BIBLIOGRAPHY
2015 (2015); YUSUF AKSAR, IMPLEMENTING INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: FROM
THE AD HOC TRIBUNALS TO A PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (2004). See
also U.N. Security Council, S.C. Res. 955 (Nov. 8, 1994).
260. S.C. Res. 955 (Nov. 8 1994), id. art. 1.
261. Alastair Leithead, Rwanda Genocide: International Criminal Tribunal Closes,
BBC NEWS (December 15, 2015) https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-35070220.
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to render judgment on the crime of genocide.262 Nearly four years after the
gruesome massacre took place, Jean-Paul Akayesu, a former teacher, school
inspector, and mayor of Taba, was convicted of nine counts of genocide and
crimes against humanity.263 The ICTR went on to convict many more
perpetrators of the Rwandan Genocide, including Jean Kambanda, who
became the first head of a government to be convicted of genocide by an
international court.264
Among the people who were indicted by the ICTR, were political elites,
businessmen, and high-ranking military leaders and civil servants. About
two-thirds of them were convicted and sentenced and, as much as, 3,000
witnesses appeared before the tribunal to give their personal testimony of
crimes against humanity. According to information provided on the official
ICTR website,265 by April 2018, the ICTR had indicted 93 individuals;
concluded proceedings for 80 accused individuals; transferred 30 convicted
individuals to a State266 to serve their sentence; 2 were awaiting transfer to a
State to serve their sentence; 22 had completed serving their sentence; 6 had
died while serving their sentence; 1 had died before being transferred to a
State to serve their sentence; 3 had died before judgment was passed; 14
were acquitted; and 2 had their indictments withdrawn.267
The ICTR’s work was a major tool against impunity in Africa. In
addition to the fact that the ICTR was the first international court to
recognize rape as “a means of perpetuating genocide,”268 it also made history
in Africa by convicting a head of government, former Rwandan prime
minister, Jean Kambanda, for crimes against humanity.269 Thus, the ICTR
can be viewed as an international legal institution that sent a powerful
message to African government officials and other actors that they would no
262. Leithead, supra note 261.
263. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment (June 1, 2001),
http://unictr.irmct.org/sites/unictr.org/files/case-documents/ictr-96-4/appeals-chamberjudgements/en/010601.pdf.
264. Kambanda v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-97-23-A, Judgment (October 2000),
http://unictr.irmct.org/sites/unictr.org/files/case-documents/ictr-97-23/appeals-chamberjudgements/en/001019.pdf.
265. See Key Figures of ICTR Cases, UNICTR, http://unictr.irmct.org/sites/
unictr.org/files/publications/ictr-key-figures-en-1804.pdf (last modified in April 2018).
266. The States to which convicted individuals were sent to serve their sentence include
Mali, Benin, and Senegal. See Margaret M. Penrose, Creating an International Prison,
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE INTERNATIONAL PENAL SYSTEM 423, 431 (Róisín Mulgrew &
Denis Abels eds., 2016).
267. Key Figures of ICTR Cases, supra note 265.
268. Leithead, supra note 261.
269. Id.
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long be able to commit serious international crimes or commit serious human
rights violations with impunity. Viewed positively then, one can argue that
the ICTR’s judgments sent a message to anyone who “commit[s] genocide or
other atrocities” that, regardless of their political, economic, or social
standing, they will no longer go unpunished; they will be brought to justice,
even if the national government is either unwilling or unable to do so.
However, the ICTR’s critics argue that this was a very expensive
experiment in transitional justice that provided only marginal benefits. For
example, they argue that the ICTR spent $2 billion and only managed to
produce a small number of convictions, especially given the scale of the
massacres—nearly one million Rwandans were brutally massacred in just
100 days. Perhaps, more important is the fact that many critics argue that the
ICTR delivered nothing to each victim’s family or the survivors of the
genocide.270 In addition, many ordinary Rwandans argue that as important as
the process was, there was a disconnect between them and what was taking
place in Arusha—they were not provided the opportunity to fully participate
in and witness the proceedings. Also, many of them believed that the
sentences handed out by the ICTR were not harsh enough, especially given
the brutal nature of the atrocities committed.271
Some critics have argued that the ICTR’s concentration on genocide
crimes committed against the Tutsi population by the Hutu-dominated
government forced it to neglect investigating atrocities committed by Tutsibacked groups throughout the country during the civil war. These critics
argue that the failure of the ICTR to investigate and prosecute crimes
committed by the Tutsi-dominated Rwanda Patriotic Front (“RPF”) during
the civil war was a major failing of the international tribunal.272 Despite these
alleged shortcomings, it is important to recognize the fact that the legal
precedents set by this international court will become important tools for
fighting impunity. These precedents have now become part of the
international community’s and Africa’s human rights jurisprudence.

270. Some critics have argued that the decision to locate the ICTR outside Rwanda (i.e.,
in Arusha, Tanzania) and undertake proceedings in three languages—English, French,
Kinyarwanda) made the process very expensive. As argued by Jalloh and Morgan, “the
decision to locate the Tribunal [ICTR] in Arusha created geographic distance between the
locus commisi delicti and the seat of the court. It is clear that this ultimately made the
process of gathering evidence and security witness testimony much more expensive as it
required arrangements, safe houses, and dedicated aircraft for witness travel.” See Charles
Jalloh & Andrew Morgan, International Criminal Justice Processes and Sierra Leone:
Lessons for Liberia, in SHIELDING HUMANITY: ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HONOUR
OF JUDGE ABDUL G. KOROMA 447, 476 (Charles Chernor Jalloh & Olufemi Elias eds., 2015).
271. Leithead, supra note 261.
272. Id.
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IV. RECENT DEVELOPMENT IN THE FIGHT AGAINST
IMPUNITY IN AFRICA
A. The International Criminal Court and Impunity in Africa
When the International Criminal Court (“ICC”)273 began criminal
proceedings against Congolese militia leader, Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, in
2009,274 it appeared that the international community had finally taken
concrete steps to fight impunity in Africa and other parts of the world.
Unlike the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”) and other
temporary and specially-created international courts, the ICC is the world’s
first permanent international criminal court. It is empowered to bring to
justice individuals who are alleged to have committed serious international
crimes, which include the violation of human rights.275
The ICC’s efforts to fight impunity have been praised by human rights
advocates, especially in Africa.276 Since it came into being in 2002, the ICC
has focused disproportionately on African situations and that has drawn
criticisms from many Africans, who see the international tribunal as an
instrument of modern imperialism.277 When the ICC attempted to prosecute
two sitting African heads of state—Sudan’s Omar Hassan al-Bashir and then
Libyan strong-man, Muammar al-Qaddafi—the African Union declined to
enforce arrest warrants against the two leaders. Since both countries were not
273. The International Criminal Court (ICC) was established by the Rome Statute of the
International Court. The Rome Statute was adopted at a diplomatic conference in Rome
(Italy) on July 17, 1998 and entered into force on July 1, 2002. In addition to establishing
the court and its functions, jurisdiction, and structure, the Rome Statute also established four
core international crimes—genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of
aggression—and granted jurisdiction over them to the ICC. Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court, supra note 116.
274. Prosecutor v. Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06, https://www.icc-cpi.int/drc/lubanga/Docu
ments/lubangaEng.pdf.
275. Crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC are listed in Article 5 of the Rome Statute.
See Rome Statute, supra note 116, art. 5.
276. See, e.g., Sarah Rayzl Lansky, Africans Speak Out Against ICC Withdrawal:
Governments Signal Continued Support for Court, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Nov. 2, 2016),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/11/02/africans-speak-out-against-icc-withdrawal.
277. See, e.g., Motsoko Pheko, The ICC is Now an Instrument of Imperialism,
PAMBAZUKA NEWS (June 25, 2015), https://www.pambazuka.org/governance/icc-nowinstrument-imperialism; Mwangi S. Kimenyi, Can the International Criminal Court Play
Fair in Africa, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (Oct. 17, 2013), https://www.brookings.edu/
blog/africa-in-focus/2013/10/17/can-the-international-criminal-court-play-fair-in-africa/;
Oumar Ba, International Justice and the Postcolonial Condition, 63 AFRICA TODAY 44, 46
(2017) (arguing that the ICC is essentially a tool of the West to fight impunity in Africa).
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signatories to the Rome Statute, jurisdiction was obtained through a
resolution from the U.N. Security Council.278 Within Africa, controversy also
arose over the ICC’s attempts to prosecute top Kenyan officials in
connection with the gross human rights abuses that occurred in the country in
the aftermath of the 2007 presidential elections. Although Kenya is a State
Party to the Rome Statute, Kenyan officials argued that dragging their
leaders to trial in The Hague could create a serious constitutional crisis and
seriously damage the country’s already fragile peace and security.279
In 2016, former U.N. Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, who was also a
former Ghanaian diplomat, granted an interview to the Financial Times280 in
which he rejected accusations by several Africans that the ICC is an antiAfrican international institution.281 He went on to say that he believed
strongly that most ordinary Africans want their leaders held accountable for
their actions. Specifically, he said that Africans “want justice” and “if they
can get it from their own courts,” that is good. Nevertheless, if they cannot
get justice from their own courts, then “an international court,” such as the
ICC, is, for them, a court of last resort.282
The truth of the matter is that, as long as African countries remain
unable to fully and effectively deal with impunity—that is, hold fully
accountable anyone who commits international crimes—the ICC will remain
relevant to the continent. Although both the ICC and the African Union are
interested in fighting impunity on the continent, the two institutions have,
nevertheless, “gradually developed a significant rift.”283 The AU has accused
the ICC of practicing or pursuing “selective justice” as it has, until recently,
only concentrated on African cases.284 Mbaku285 argues that “[w]hile the
ICC’s previous prosecutions are based on solid legal grounds, it would be

278. See S.C. Res. 1593 (Mar. 31, 2005), https://www.un.org/press/en/2005/sc8351.doc.htm.
279. See, e.g., Congressional Research Service (U.S.), International Criminal Court
Cases in Africa: Status and Policy Issues (July 22, 2011), https://www.everycrs
report.com/files/20110722_RL34665_adc91e5a4311fd813418c0457a57a83308357981.pdf.
280. David Pilling, Kofi Annan Defends International Criminal Court Despite Africa
Row, FINANCIAL TIMES (June 16, 2016) https://www.ft.com/content/204df924-32cd-11e6bda0-04585c31b153.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. John M. Mbaku, Africa and the International Criminal Court: Is There Room for
Cooperation? GEORGETOWN J. INT’L AFF., April 26, 2017, https://www.georgetown
journalofinternationalaffairs.org/online-edition/africa-and-the-international-criminal-courtis-there-room-for-cooperation.
284. Id.
285. Id.
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unwise for the Court to ignore the voices of those who argue that the ICC is a
tool of Western imperialism.”286
Given the fact that it is likely to take many years for African countries
to develop both the legal capacity and the political will to deal fully with
impunity, cooperation with the ICC and other international institutions,
including especially those which are dedicated to promoting the recognition
and protection of human rights, is critical to ensuring that victims of serious
and gross human rights violations receive justice.287 Regardless of its shortcomings, the ICC remains an important part of Africa’s legal architecture for
combating impunity in the continent.
The ICC, of course, is not the only institution dedicated to fighting
impunity. There are others, working at both the international, regional, and
national levels, to make certain that any individual who engages in the gross
violation of human rights is brought to justice. In other words, there are
other institutions, besides the ICC, that are fighting or have fought impunity
in Africa. Below, we take a look at some of them.
B. Charles Taylor and The Special Court for Sierra Leone
In 2000, the Government of Sierra Leone made a request to the United
Nations to provide the country with a “special court” to address serious
crimes that had been committed against civilians and U.N. peacekeepers
during the country’s civil war, which took place from 1991 to 2002.288 After
negotiations between the Government of Sierra Leone and the United
Nations, the world’s first “hybrid” international criminal tribunal289 was
created and granted power to hold accountable those individuals “bearing the
greatest responsibility” for serious crimes committed in Sierra Leone “after
30 November 1996, the date of the failed Abidjan Peace Accord.”290 The
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. See, e.g., Special Court for Sierra Leone/Residual Special Court for Sierra Leone,
Freetown (Sierra Leone) and The Hague (The Netherlands), The Special Court for Sierra
Leone: Its History and Jurisprudence, http://www.rscsl.org/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2018).
289. This court was officially known as “The Special Court for Sierra Leone.” After the
Special Court for Sierra Leone was closed in 2013, the U.N. established the Residual
Special Court for Sierra Leone through an agreement between the U.N. and the Government
of Sierra Leone “to oversee the continuing legal obligations of the Special Court for Sierra
Leone.” See The Special Court for Sierra Leone, supra note 288. The obligations that the
Residual Special Court was expected to oversee included the protection of witnesses,
supervision of prison sentences, and the management of the archives of the Special Court
for Sierra Leone.
290. The Special Court for Sierra Leone, supra note 288.
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Special Court for Sierra Leone (“SCSL”) was “the first modern international
tribunal to sit in the country where the crimes took place, and the first to have
an effective outreach program on the ground.”291
The Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone292 specifically
empowered the Prosecutor to bring charges for war crimes,293 crimes against
humanity, other serious violations of international humanitarian law, and
certain serious violations of Sierra Leonean law.294 In March 2003, the
Prosecutor brought 13 indictments against leaders of the Revolutionary
United Front (“RUF”),295 the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council
(“AFRC”), the Civil Defense Forces (“CDF”), and then-President of Liberia,
Charles Taylor.296
In June 2003, the Prosecutor to the Special Court for Sierra Leone,
unsealed the indictment against Charles Taylor, which charged the latter with
war crimes. Initially, the Prosecutor had indicted Taylor on 17 counts of war
crimes and crimes against humanity, which were committed during the
conflict in Sierra Leone. However, the indictment was later amended and
Taylor would stand trial for 11 counts of war crimes and crimes against
humanity. Taylor’s Indictment and Warrant of Arrest was formally unsealed
on June 12, 2003.297 On August 11, 2003, Taylor stepped down as President
of Liberia and went into exile in Nigeria and remained there until he was
arrested by Nigerian authorities on March 29, 2006 and subsequently
transferred to the Special Court for Sierra Leone that same day.298
291. Id.
292. U.N., Statute for the Special Court for Sierra Leone (Jan. 2002), http://legal.un.org
/avl/ha/scsl/scsl.html.
293. Violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional
Protocol II.
294. Specifically, the Malicious Damage Act (1861) and the Prevention of Cruelty to
Children Act (1926).
295. The Revolutionary United Front (RUF) was a rebel army that wedged a failed 11year war against the government of Sierra Leone. The RUF’s brutal war against the
government of Sierra Leone lasted from 1991 to 2002. Three of the RUF’s most senior
surviving leaders—Issa Sesay, Morris Kallon, and Augustine Gbao, were convicted of war
crimes and crimes against humanity in 2009. See MARINA AKSENOVA, COMPLICITY IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 217 (2016); CHARLES CHERNOR JALLOH & SIMON MEISENBERG, THE
LAW REPORTS OF THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE: VOLUME III: PROSECUTOR V.
CHARLES TAYLOR (THE TAYLOR CASE) xxxv (2015).
296. See JALLOH and MEISENBERG, supra note 295.
297. Prosecutor v. Taylor (Case No. SCSL-03-01-A), Judgment (Sept. 26, 2013),
http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/Decisions/Taylor/Appeal/1389/SCSL-03-01-A-1389.pdf.
298. Nigeria’s decision to arrest and handover Taylor to the SCSL was significant since
such cooperation, at the national level, is important for combating impunity in the continent.
This was a powerful message for other fleeing senior government officials accused of
complicity in human rights violations that they cannot hide in other African countries as a
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In Taylor’s indictment, five counts dealt with crimes against humanity
(murder, rape, sexual slavery, other inhumane acts, and enslavement); five
other counts charged violations of Common Article 3 and Additional
Protocol II (acts of terrorism; violence to life, health and physical or mental
well-being of persons, in particular murder; outrages upon personal dignity;
violence to life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons, in
particular cruel treatment; and pillage). One count charged other serious
violations of international humanitarian law (conscripting or enlisting
children under the age of 15 years into armed forces or groups, or using them
to participate actively in hostilities).299
The Trial Chamber convicted Charles Taylor on all eleven counts of the
Indictment and “found him individually criminally liable under Article 6(1)
of the Statute for aiding and abetting the commission of crimes, charged in
all eleven counts, between 3 November 1996 and 18 January 2002 in the
Districts of Bombali, Kailahun, Kenema, Kono, Port Loko and Freetown and
the Western Area.”300 The verdict in Taylor’s trial was announced on April
26, 2012—the SCSL unanimously ruled that he was guilty of 11 counts of
“aiding and abetting” war crimes and crimes against humanity.301 Taylor,
thus, became the first, albeit former, head of state to be convicted by an
international tribunal since Karl Döenitz302 was convicted at the Nuremberg
Trials.303
Charles Taylor was subsequently sentenced to 50 years in prison. He
appealed his sentence to the Appeals Chamber and the latter upheld the
verdict of the Trial Chamber.304 Reacting to the verdict, the Government of
Sierra Leone stated that “[i]t [i.e., the verdict] is a step forward as justice has
way to escape prosecution. See YVES BEIGBEDER, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS:
JUSTICE AND POLITICS 137 (2011) (stating, inter alia, that Charles Taylor was arrested by
Nigerian authorities on March 29, 2005 and transferred to Liberia where he was handed
over to the U.N. peacekeeping mission, who flew him to Sierra Leone).
299. Prosecutor v. Taylor, supra note 297.
300. Id. ¶ 13.
301. Id.
302. Karl Döenitz (1891–1980) was a German admiral who succeeded Adolf Hitler,
although only briefly, as the head of state of Germany. The name is also spelled “Dönitz.”
For more on Döenitz, see, e.g., BARRY TURNER, KARL DÖENITZ AND THE LAST DAYS OF THE
THIRD REICH (2015); PETER PADFIELD, DONITZ: THE LAST FUHRER (2013).
303. For more on the Nuremberg Trials, see generally HAROLD KEITH THOMPSON &
HENRY STRUTZ, DOENITZ AT NUREMBERG, A REAPPRAISAL: WAR CRIMES AND THE MILITARY
PROFESSIONAL (1976).
304. See Thomas Escritt, Liberia’s Charles Taylor Loses Appeal Against War Crimes
Conviction, REUTERS (Sep. 26, 2013), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-warcrimes-taylorappeal-idUSBRE98P0DP20130926.
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been done, though the magnitude of the sentence is not commensurate with
the atrocities committed.”305
When Charles Taylor was captured in Nigeria and handed over to the
SCSL, many Africans argued that this was a positive development for the
fight against impunity in the continent. Then U.N. Secretary-General, Kofi
Annan, stated that “the capture and trial of Mr. Taylor will send a powerful
message to the region and beyond that impunity will not be allowed to stand
and that the rule of law must prevail.”306 Dr. Alex Vines, Head of the Africa
Program at Chatham House (U.K.)307 and a former U.N. sanctions inspector
in West Africa during the 2001-2003 period, stated in 2012 that “[a] key
reason for almost a decade of peace in both countries [i.e., Liberia and Sierra
Leone] was the containment of Charles Taylor through U.N. sanctions,
military action, and the indictment by the Special Court.”308 The indictment
by the SCSL forced Taylor to resign as President of Liberia and seek refuge
in Nigeria, giving Liberia the opportunity to begin the rebuilding process.
His resignation and departure also significantly reduced his illegal activities,
not only in Liberia, but also in Sierra Leone. Of course, Nigeria later arrested
him and extradited him to the SCSL.
Among the non-governmental organizations that closely followed the
Taylor trial is Human Rights Watch (“HRW”).309 In July 2012, HRW
released its study of the Taylor trial titled “Even a ‘Big Man’ Must Face
Justice: Lessons from the Trial of Charles Taylor”310 in which it stated that
the Taylor trial sent a strong signal “that the world has become a less
305. Quoted in Liberia Ex-leader Charles Taylor get[s] 50 Years in Jail, BBC NEWS
(May 30, 2012), https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-18259596.
306. Michael Fleshman, Africa Ending Impunity for Rights Abuses, AFRICA RENEWAL
(January 2007), https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/january-2007/africa-endingimpunity-rights-abuses.
307. Chatham House is the common name for the Royal Institute of International
Affairs. It is a non-profit and non-governmental organization based in London. Chatham
House is one of the world’s top think tanks in the area of international affairs. In the Global
Go To Think Tanks Report, it is ranked only second to The Brookings Institution. For more
on the Chatham House’s founding and its purposes, see generally SIR STEPHEN KING-HALL,
CHATHAM HOUSE: A BRIEF ACCOUNT OF THE ORIGINS, PURPOSES, AND METHODS OF THE
ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (1937).
308. Alex Vines, The Importance of the Charles Taylor Verdict for Africa, CHATHAM
HOUSE—THE ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (Apr. 26, 2012), https://
www.chathamhouse.org/media/comment/view/182995.
309. Human Rights Watch is an international non-governmental organization that
conducts research on human rights and advocates for the recognition and protection of
human rights throughout the world.
310. Even a ‘Big Man’ Must Face Justice: Lessons from the Trial of Charles Taylor,
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (July 2012), https://www.hrw.org/report/2012/07/25/even-big-manmust-face-justice/lessons-trial-charles-taylor (last visited Oct. 25, 2018).
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hospitable place for the highest-level leaders accused of committing the most
serious crimes.”311 The report went on to say that “the Taylor trial reflects a
major departure from the impunity that heads of state traditionally enjoyed
when implicated in genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.”312
The Taylor trial was important for West Africa, a region in which, for
many years, a group of “powerful individuals who either [led] armed groups
or [wielded] significant political power,” had been able to commit various
atrocities without fear of being held accountable.313 When the SCSL brought
Taylor to trial, this represented the first time that a “big man” has “been
taken into custody and forced to answer for alleged international crimes at
trial.”314
As determined by HRW, despite the trial’s limitations, it did provide
some notable benefits for Sierra Leone and Liberia. First, outreach programs
conducted by the SCSL in affected areas, including the creation of audio and
video summaries of the trial in local languages, helped communities in
Liberia and Sierra Leone participate in and learn from the trial proceedings.
In addition, the SCSL made it possible for civil society members from
several affected communities to visit the SCSL in The Hague and then return
home to share their experiences with their fellow citizens.315
Second, the trial significantly enhanced the ability of the affected and
other communities in West Africa to understand and appreciate the
importance of accountability. In Sierra Leone and Liberia, HRW was told by
many people that Taylor’s trial helped them appreciate the “value of
justice.”316 While the trial has improved the people’s perception of
accountability, particularly by those in government, these countries have a
long way to go to provide themselves with institutions that force all civil
servants and political elites to be accountable to both the constitution and the
people. This is a problem that is not unique to Liberia and Sierra Leone.
Most countries in the continent are still burdened with laws and institutions
that do not adequately constrain the State and hence, impunity remains a
major governance problem.317
Finally, many human rights activists have argued that the Taylor trial
has contributed significantly to “promoting long-term respect for human
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.

Human Rights Watch, supra note 310, at 1.
Id.
Id. at 2.
Id.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 5–6.
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rights and the rule of law in the sub-region.”318 Specifically, according to one
human rights advocate, “[The trial has] helped . . . change the historical
concept that leaders are above the law and [challenge] the acceptance that
leaders and elected officials can use war and violence as way[s] to carry out
their personal agendas.”319 If there is one lesson that Africans should learn
from the trial, conviction and sentencing of Charles Taylor, it is that “[t]he
supremacy of law is the heart and foundation for a democracy; it is the mark
of a free society; it is the most important characteristic of a governance
system.”320
C. The Case of Hissène Habré Before the Extraordinary African
Chambers
i. The Case Against Hissène Habré
Hissène Habré is a Chadian politician who served as President of the
Republic of Chad from 1982 until he was ousted in 1990. Habré seized
power in 1982 with help from the United States and France—the two
Western countries saw Habré as important partner in their efforts to contain
the ambitions of Muammar al-Qaddafi in the sub-region. On May 30, 2016,
Habré was found guilty of crimes against humanity, summary execution,
torture and rape by the Extraordinary African Chambers.321
Habré served as President of the Republic of Chad from June 7, 1982 to
December 1, 1990, when he was ousted by the country’s current president,
Idriss Déby Itno. After he was deposed, Habré fled to Senegal where he was
granted asylum and lived there until he was brought to trial in 2015 for
international crimes he was alleged to have committed during his tenure as
President of Chad. The effort to bring Habré to justice for his crimes began in
1990 after he was ousted from power. During his tenure as president, it was
318. Id. at 6.
319. Id.
320. John M. Mbaku, Foresight Africa Viewpoint—Elections in Africa in 2018: Lessons
from Kenya’s 2017 Electoral Experiences, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (Feb. 1, 2018),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2018/02/01/foresight-africa-viewpoint-elect
ions-in-africa-in-2018-lessons-from-kenyas-2017-electoral-experiences/.
321. The Extraordinary African Chambers was a tribunal that was established under an
agreement between the Government of Senegal and the African Union. It was designed to
prosecute the “person or persons” most responsible for international crimes committed in
Chad from June 7, 1982 to December 1, 1990. See Roland Adjovi, Introductory Note to the
Agreement on the Establishment of the Extraordinary African Chambers within the
Senegalese Judicial System between the Government of the Republic of Senegal and the
African Union and the Statute of the Chambers, 52 INT’L L. MATERIALS 1020 (2013)
(providing an overview of the statute establishing the Extraordinary African Chambers).
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estimated that about 40,000 people were killed and another 200,000 people
tortured by Habré’s Directorate of Documentation and Security (“DDS”).322
After his ouster, the new government in Chad, under the leadership of Idriss
Déby, created a commission of inquiry to look into Habré’s alleged crimes.
After it finished its work, the commission recommended that the Chadian
government bring to trial any person or persons responsible for serious
violations of international human rights and international humanitarian law.
Unfortunately, Habré could not be brought to trial in Chad because he was
living in Senegal.323
In 1999, the British House of Lords ruled on “head of state immunity”
in the Pinochet case.324 Augusto Pinochet, former president of Chile, had
traveled to the U.K. to seek medical treatment and while in London, a
Spanish court had invoked universal jurisdiction to prosecute him for crimes,
which he was alleged to have committed while he was head of state in
Chile.325 Universal jurisdiction has been defined as “a form of jurisdiction in
international law which grants the court of any state, the ability to bring
proceedings with respect to certain (internationally defined) crimes, without
regard to the location of the crime, the nationality of the offender, or the
nationality of the victim.”326
Under the concept of universal jurisdiction, domestic courts can
prosecute “persons for specific treaty based international crimes that have
been committed outside of their territory.”327 However, before the Spanish
court invoked it against Pinochet, universal jurisdiction had never been

322. Commission of Inquiry into the Crimes and Misappropriations Committed by exPresident Habré, His Accomplices and/or Accessories, 1990–1992, http://www.icla.
up.ac.za/images/un/commissionsofinquiries/countries/Chad-Commission-of-Inquiries.pdf.
In French, DDS stands for “la Direction de la Documentation et de la Sécurité.”
323. Sofie A. E. Høgestøl, The Habré Judgment at the Extraordinary African
Chambers: A Singular Victory in the Fight Against Impunity, 34 NORDIC J. HUM. RTS. 147,
148 (2016).
324. Regina v. Evans and Another and the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis
and others (Appellant), Ex Parte Pinochet (Respondent) (On Appeal from a Divisional
Court of the Queen’s Bench Division) (No. 3), Judgment of 24 March 1999, reported as
Regina v. Bow Street Metropolitan Magistrate and Others, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3)
[2000] 1 AC 147, http://www.asser.nl/upload/documents/20120516T100228-Pinochet_
House_of_Lords_Opinion_25-11-1998.pdf.
325. For more on Spanish efforts to prosecute General Pinochet, see, e.g., Naomi RohtArriaza, The Pinochet Precedent and Universal Jurisdiction, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 311
(2001).
326. Roozbeh (Rudy) B. Baker, Universal Jurisdiction and the Case of Belgium: A
Critical Assessment, 16 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 141, 142 (2009).
327. Høgestøl, supra note 323, at 148.
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invoked against a former head of state before. The attempt to extradite
Pinochet to face charges before a Spanish court raised many questions,
particularly whether, as a former head of state, he was still protected by
immunity from the national courts of a foreign State, such as Spain.328 The
House of Lords rejected Pinochet’s claim to immunity from arrest and
subsequently asked that he remain in custody in the U.K. until Spain could
seek his extradition on charges of mass murder and terrorism.329 Many
observers considered the ruling by the House of Lords to be ground-breaking
for, it showed that former heads of state could be prosecuted for international
crimes in the courts of other States based on universal jurisdiction.330 Spain,
however, neverfiled an application to extradite Pinochet because the latter
was deemed too sick to stand trial.331
Although Pinochet was able to escape extradition to Spain to stand trial,
leaving his victims without the justice that they deserved, the victims of
Habré, however, were not willing to allow him to equally escape judgment.
Inspired by the ruling in the Pinochet case, Habré’s victims in Chad
contacted Human Rights Watch lawyers to see if the precedent set by the
House of Lords could be utilized to bring Habré to account for his criminal
activities while he was president.332
But, why did Habré’s victims not appeal to the International Criminal
Court (“ICC”) to intervene and take control of the case against him? The ICC
was authorized by the Rome Statute333 and became functional on July 1,
2002. However, Article 11 of the Rome Statute, which deals with the ICC’s
jurisdiction, states that “[t]he Court has jurisdiction only with respect to
crimes committed after the entry into force of this Statute.”334 Thus, it would
not have been possible for Habré to be brought to trial at the ICC since the

328. Although sitting heads of state have normally enjoyed full immunity from the
domestic courts of other States, the status of former heads of states was not clear in 1999.
See J. Craig Barker, Colin Warbrick and Dominic McGoldrick, The Future of Former Head
of State Immunity after ex parte Pinochet, 48 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 937, 938 (1999).
329. Regina v. Evans, supra note 324. See also Warren Hoge, The Pinochet Ruling: The
Overview; British Court Rules Against Pinochet; New Cabinet Must Weigh Extradition,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 26, 1998), https://www.nytimes.com/1998/11/26/world/pinochet-rulingoverview-british-court-rules-against-pinochet-now-cabinet-must.html.
330. Høgestøl, supra note 323, at 149.
331. Id.
332. Inbal Sansani, The Pinochet Precedent in Africa: Prosecution of Hissène Habré, 8
HUM. RTS. BRIEF 32 (2001); Reed Brody, The Prosecution of Hissène Habré —An “African
Pinochet,” 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 321 (2001).
333. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (July 17, 1998), supra note
116.
334. Rome Statute, supra note 116, art. 11(1).
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period covered by his alleged crimes was June 7, 1982 to December 1, 1990,
long before the Rome Statute entered into force.
At this time, Reed Brody, a lawyer with Human Rights Watch, decided
to begin the process of working with victim groups, primarily but not
exclusively, in Chad to prepare a case, which they believe, could be brought
against Habré in Senegalese courts by invoking the Pinochet precedent.
Working together with several non-governmental organizations, “Brody and
the victim groups travelled to Chad and collected vital victim testimony,
documentation from Habré’s torture centers and other evidence that could be
used in a trial against him.”335 In early 2000, Brody and the groups brought a
case before the Dakar Regional Court, backed up by the evidence and
documentation that they had collected in Chad.336 After all the evidence had
been presented, a Senegalese judge indicted Habré on February 3, 2000, with
acts of torture and barbarity.337 This indictment was significant in that it
marked the first time a former African head of state had been indicted in
another country for violations of human rights in his own country.338
Nevertheless, the victory delivered to Habré’s victims by the Dakar
Regional Court was short-lived. On July 4, 2000, the Indictments Chamber
of the Court of Appeal of Dakar ruled in favor of Habré and cancelled the
indictment against him and barred any legal proceedings against him on the
ground that “Senegalese law did not provide for jurisdiction over crimes
against humanity or acts of torture committed by foreign nationals outside
the territory of Senegal.”339 The ruling was later upheld on appeal by the
Supreme Court of Senegal in a decision on March 20, 2001.340

335. Høgestøl, supra note 323, at 149.
336. Brody, supra note 332.
337. See, e.g., Mark Tran, Human Rights Breakthrough as African Ex-Dictator Is
Indicted, THE GUARDIAN (UK) (Feb. 4, 2000), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2000/
feb/04/marktran.
338. Tran, supra note 337.
339. Habré v. Republic of Senegal, Judgment (Nov. 18, 2010), http://www.
internationalcrimesdatabase.org/Case/220.
340. Office of the U.N. Commissioner for Human Rights, Convention Against Torture
and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment of Punishment, Adopted and opened for
signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly Resolution 39/46 of December
10, 1984, entry into force June 26, 1987. Senegal ratified the treaty in 1986 and hence, is
subject to its provisions. See Association des Victimes des Crimes et Répressions politiques
au Tchad (AVCRP) et al. v. Hissène Habré, http://www.internationalcrimesdata
base.org/Case/751 (last visited July 30, 2018). Critics of the ruling argued that, not only was
it at odds with the Pinochet precedent, but it was also at odds with Senegal’s obligations
under Articles 5–7 of the Convention Against Torture, which mandate that States are
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Many observers believed that the decision, by Senegalese courts, to
prohibit the prosecution of Habré for the crimes that he was alleged to have
committed in Chad, was delivered under political pressure. It was argued that
former Senegalese president, Abdoulaye Wade, was not in favor of holding
Habré accountable for his crimes. For example, after Senegalese judge
Demba Kandji indicted Habré for torture and barbarous acts and crimes
against humanity on February 3, 2000, the Superior Council of the
Magistracy, presided over by President Abdoulaye Wade, transferred Judge
Kandji and effectively removed him from the Habré investigation. President
Wade also proceeded to promote the president of the Dakar Appeals Court—
the latter was, at the time, considering Habré’s appeal. As already mentioned,
later on July 4, 2000, the Dakar Appeals Court ruled in favor of Habré.341
After the case against Habré was dismissed, President Wade asked
Habré to leave Senegal. Nevertheless, before Habré could leave, Human
Rights Watch and Habré’s victims took their case to the U.N. Committee
against Torture (“UNCAT”), where they argued that Senegal was in breach
of its obligations under the 1984 Convention Against Torture by not
prosecuting him.342 The UCAT responded that Senegal should keep Habré
until the problem could be resolved. This represented the beginning of a tenyear stalemate in the case against Habré that was only broken when Macky
Sall became president of Senegal in 2012. At this time, the International
Court of Justice ordered Senegal to either prosecute Habré “without delay”
or extradite him for trial elsewhere.343
After the indictment against Habré was withdrawn by the Senegalese
courts, twenty-one of Habré’s victims344 brought a complaint against Habré
for genocide, crimes against humanity and torture under Belgium’s universal
obliged to either prosecute or extradite any person within their territory who is suspected of
having committed acts of torture.
341. See Office of the U.N. Commissioner for Human Rights, Convention Against
Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment of Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984,
U.N.T.S. 1465.
342. The Trial of Hissène Habré: Time is Running Out for the Victims: Background,
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Jan. 26, 2007, https://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/africa/
habre0107/2.htm#_Toc156364880.
343. Marlise Simons, Senegal Told to Prosecute Ex-President of Chad, N.Y. TIMES, July
20, 2012, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/21/world/africa/senegal-toprosecute-former-president-of-chad-hissene-habre.html (last visited July 30, 2018); World
Court: Important Victory for Habré Victims: Senegal Should Bring Chad’s Former Dictator
to Justice ‘Without Further Delay,’ HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, July 20, 2012, https://
www.hrw.org/news/2012/07/20/world-court-important-victory-habre-victims.
344. These included three Belgian nationals. See Laura Bingham, Trying for a Just
Result? The Hissène Habré Affair and Judicial Independence in Senegal, 23 TEMPLE INT’L
& COMP. L.J. 77 (2009).
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jurisdiction statute.345 On September 19, 2005, the Belgian judge who had
been assigned to the Habré case, Judge Daniel Fransen, issued an arrest
warrant against Habré.346 On the same day, the government of Belgium
formally requested that Habré be extradited from Senegal so that he could be
tried in Belgium.347
When Belgium’s extradition request reached Senegal, the Dakar
Appeals Court Indictment Chamber, on November 25, 2005, refused to hear
the matter, claiming that it did not have the jurisdiction to rule on an
extradition request involving a former head of state. Under Senegalese law,
the matter went directly to President Wade.348 On November 26, 2005,
Senegal’s interior minister issued an order, which placed Habré “at the
disposition of the President of the African Union.”349 On November 27,
2005, Senegal’s foreign minister, Cheikh Tidiane Gadio, issued a
communiqué, which stated that:
The State of Senegal, sensitive to the complaints of victims who are
seeking justice, will abstain from any act, which could permit
Hissène Habré to not face justice. It therefore considers that it is up
to the African Union summit to indicate the jurisdiction, which is
competent to try this matter.350
At the Assembly of the African Union Sixth Ordinary Session in
Khartoum in January 2006, the AU established a Committee of Eminent
African Jurists (“CEAJ”) and charged it with the duty of determining where
Habré should be tried for the alleged crimes that he committed while serving
as president of Chad. Senegal, of course, remained a possible venue for the
trial.351 The CEAJ issued its report on May 1, 2006.352 Specifically, the
345. Id. at 86.
346. Id. See also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 342.
347. Human Rights Watch, Belgique: Résolution 136urisdi par le Sénat belge, 15 juin
2006, available at https://www.hrw.org/legacy/french/docs/2006/06/15/belgiu13586.htm.
348. Bingham, supra note 344, at 86; Høgestøl, supra note 323, at 150.
349. The Trial of Hissène Habré: Time is Running Out for the Victims, HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, No. 2, January 2007, https://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/africa/habre0107/.
350. Quoted in HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 349, at 7. The foreign minister’s
communiqué was issued in French and here it is: “L’État du Sénégal, sensible aux plaintes
des victimes qui demandent justice, s’abstiendra de tout acte qui pourrait permettre à M.
Hissène Habré de ne pas comparaître devant la justice. Il considère, en consequence, qu’il
appartient au sommet de l’Union africaine d’indiquer la jurisdiction compétente pour juger
cette affaire.”
351. Assembly of the African Union Sixth Ordinary Session, Decision on the Hissène
Habré Case and the African Union, Doc. Assembly/AU/8(VI) Add.9, https://au.int/
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CEAJ was “mandated to consider all aspects and implications of the Hissène
Habré Case as well as the options available for his trial, taking into account
the following benchmarks:
(a) Adherence to the principles of total rejection of impunity;
(b) Adherence to international fair trial standards including the
independence of the judiciary and impartiality of proceedings;
(c) Jurisdiction over the alleged crimes for which Mr. Habré should
be tried;
(d) Efficiency in terms of cost and time trial
(e) Accessibility to the trial by alleged victims as well as witnesses;
(f) Priority of an African mechanism.353
Stating that the Assembly of the African Union Sixth Ordinary Session
had unanimously rejected impunity, the CEAJ went on to argue that Habré
could not hide behind “the immunity of a former Head of State to defeat the
principle of total rejection of impunity that was adopted by the Assembly.”354
With respect to jurisdiction over the Habré case, the CEAJ recommended
what it referred to as an “African option.”355 It stated as follows: “The
Committee within the framework of an African solution considered, in the
first instance, the two (2) African States, Senegal and Chad, which have the
necessary link to the Hissène Habré case. Both countries have ratified the
Convention Against Torture.”356 The CEAJ’s report recommended that
“Senegal is the country best suited to try Habré as it is bound by International
law to perform its obligations.”357 In addition, the report also imposed an
obligation on Chad, arguing that since Chad has the primary responsebility
“to try and punish Hissène Habré,” it should provide Senegal with all
necessary cooperation.358
Subsequently, the African Union Assembly took note of the CEAJ’s
recommendations and mandated “the Republic of Senegal to prosecute and
ensure that Hissène Habré is tried, on behalf of Africa, by a competent
sites/default/files/decisions/9554-assembly_en_23_24_january_2006_auc_sixth_ordinary_
session_decisions_declarations.pdf (last visited July 31, 2018).
352. African Union, Report of the Committee of Eminent African Jurists on the Case of
Hissène Habré, https://www.peacepalacelibrary.nl/ebooks/files/habreCEJA_Repor0506.pdf
(last visited Oct. 25, 2018).
353. Id. ¶ 1.
354. Id. ¶ 13.
355. Id. ¶ 27.
356. Id. ¶ 16.
357. Id. ¶ 29.
358. Id. ¶ 30.

138

Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 42:1

Senegalese court with guarantees of fair trial.”359 Despite the fact that he had
been reluctant to bring Habré to trial, President Wade appeared to be more
welcoming to the A.U.’s decision, when he proclaimed as follows: “We
thought Senegal was the country best placed to try [Habré] and I think we
must not flee from our responsibility.”360
However, it would take a few months before either the A.U. or Senegal
could take any decision on the Habré case. On November 2, 2006, the
Senegalese government reported that it had decided to establish a
commission within the Ministry of Justice to procure the necessary
legislative amendments to allow the trial of Habré to proceed.361 Then, on
January 31, 2007, Senegal’s National Assembly enacted legislation granting
the country’s courts, jurisdiction over Habré and his crimes.362 One year
later, a delegation from the European Union, which was headed by ICC
Registrar, Bruno Cathala, arrived the Senegalese capital, Dakar, on January
21, 2008, to provide assistance to the trial.363
On July 23, 2008, Senegal passed a constitutional amendment
permitting the retroactive application of certain crimes in the country’s Code
of Criminal Procedure. Specifically, the amendment states as follows:

359. Id.
360. Quoted in Senegal Trial for ex-Chad Leader, BBC NEWS, July 2, 2006,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/5139350.stm.
361. République du Sénégal, Présidence de la République, Communiqué: Le Sénégal
prépare activement le jugement de M. Hissène Habré, Dakar (Nov. 2, 2006),
https://www.hrw.org/legacy/french/themes/communiqueHabre110206.pdf (last visited Oct.
25, 2018).
362. Press Release, Human Rights Watch, Senegal: New Law Will Permit Habré’s Trial,
(Feb. 2, 2007), https://www.hrw.org/news/2007/02/02/senegal-new-law-will-permit-habrestrial. The target was Article 669 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which provides the
grounds for Senegal’s domestic courts to have and exercise jurisdiction over crimes
committed in other States (i.e., on foreign soil) by non-nationals of Senegal. The issue of
retroactivity was raised, but several human rights groups, including Human Rights Watch,
argued that the changes to Senegal’s Code of Criminal Procedure do not raise the issue of
retroactivity since Senegal had already criminalized torture and other forms of cruel and
inhumane treatment when it ratified the U.N. Convention Against Torture. See, e.g., Time is
Running Out, supra note 342.
363. See, e.g., Press Release, Human Rights Watch, EU to Aid Senegal in Preparing
Hissène Habré’s Trial (Jan. 19, 2008), https://www.hrw.org/news/2008/01/19/eu-aidsenegal-preparing-hissene-habres-trial; Press Release, Human Rights Watch, Senegal: EU
Parliament Calls for Support of Hissène Habré Trial: Senegal Should Present Reasonable
Plan to Prosecute Chad’s Ex-Dictator, https://www.hrw.org/news/2007/04/26/senegal-euparliament-calls-support-hissene-habre-trial (last visited July 31, 2018).
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No one may be condemned if it is not by virtue of law [which]
entered into force before the committed act.
However, the provisions of the preceding paragraph may not be
opposed to the prosecution, to the judgment and to the
condemnation of any individual for reason of acts or omissions
which, at the moment when they were committed, were held [to be]
criminal in terms of [après] rules of international law relating to
acts of genocide, of crimes against humanity and of crimes of
war.364
Thus, in order to try Habré, Senegal amended its Code of Criminal
Procedure in order to introduce provisions on genocide, war crimes and
crimes against humanity, as well as to introduce universal jurisdiction for
“international crimes in certain circumstances.”365 Habré challenged the
amendments before the Court of Justice of the Economic Community of
West African States (“ECOWAS Court”).366 The ECOWAS Court held that
Senegal could not try Habré without violating the nullum crimen sine lege
principle.367 The ECOWAS Court then ruled further that Habré should only
be tried by a tribunal with an international character.368 In January 2011, the

364. Constitution de la République du Sénégal art. 9, Jan. 22, 2001. The original French
version of the amendment states: “Toute atteinte aux libertés et toute entrave volontaire à
l’exercice d’une liberté sont punies par la loi. Nul ne peut être condamné si ce n’est en vertu
d’une loi entrée en vigueur avant l’acte commis. Toutefois, les dispositions de l’alinéa
précédent ne s’opposent pas à la poursuite, au jugement et à la condamnation de tout
individu en raison d’actes ou omissions qui, au moment où ils ont été commis, étaient tenus
pour criminels d’après les règles du droit international relatives aux faits de génocide, de
crimes contre l’humanité et de crimes de guerre. La défense est un droit absolu dans tous les
états et à tous les degrés de la procédure.”
365. Sarah Williams, The Extraordinary African Chambers in the Senegalese Courts, J.
INT’L CRIM. JUSTICE 1139 (2013). See also Mandiaye Niang, The Senegalese Legal
Framework for the Prosecution of International Crimes, 7 J. INT’L CRIM. JUSTICE 1047
(2009).
366. The court is actually called Community Court of Justice of the Economic
Community of West African States (Cour de Justice de la Communauté Économique des
États de l’Afrique de l’Ouest). The case is Hissein Habré v. Republic of Senegal,
ECW/CCJ/APP/07/08 (Nigeria, Nov. 18, 2010).
367. For more on nullum crimen sine lege principle, see, e.g., MACHTELD BOOT,
NULLUM CRIMEN SINE LEGE AND THE SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT: GENOCIDE, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY AND WAR CRIMES 117 (2002).
The principle states that a person cannot and should not be criminally liable except for an
act that was criminalized by law before that person performed the act.
368. Williams, supra note 365, at 1142–43; See also Human Rights Watch, Q&A: The
Case of Hissène Habré before the Extraordinary African Chambers in Senegal, HUMAN
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African Union responded to the ruling issued by the ECOWAS Court and
proposed a plan to establish such a special chambers within the legal system
of the Republic of Senegal to prosecute Habré.369 The African Union would
reserve the right to choose some of the judges who would undertake the
trial.370 Senegal, however, rejected the A.U.’s plan371 and, in May 2011, the
country withdrew from the negotiations to create the special tribunal.372 In
July 2011, the foreign minister of Senegal announced that Habré would not
be tried in Senegal.373 Subsequently, the government of Chad then
announced that it would support the extradition of Habré to Belgium to face
trial there for his alleged criminal activities while he was president in
Chad.374
On July 20, 2012, the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”),375 in
response to a case filed by Belgium,376 ruled that Senegal had failed to meet
its obligations under the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. The ICJ then asked
Senegal to proceed with the prosecution of Habré without further efforts to

RIGHTS WATCH, May 3, 2016, https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/05/03/qa-case-hissenehabre-extraordinary-african-chambers-senegal.
369. Senegal: Accept AU Plan for Hissène Habré Case: African Union Proposed
Special Court for Long-Awaited Trial of Chad’s Ex-Dictator, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Mar.
22, 2011, https://www.hrw.org/news/2011/03/22/senegal-accept-au-plan-hissene-habre-case.
370. Id.
371. Le president Wade refuse qu’Hissène Habré soit jugé au Sénégal et se dit
«dessaisi» du dossier, RFI AFRIQUE (Aug. 8, 2011), http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20110208affaire-habre-wade-dessaisi-proces-refuse-il-soit-juge-senegal (the headline says that
President Wade has refused to have Habré tried in Senegal and has divested himself of the
case).
372. Senegal: Habré Trial an ‘llusion’: After Senegalese Walkout, Victims Seek ExDictator’s Extradition to Belgium, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (June 9, 2011), https://
www.hrw.org/news/2011/06/09/senegal-habre-trial-illusion (last visited Aug. 1, 2018).
373. Dakar suspend l’expulsion de l’ex-président tchadien Hissène Habré, RFI AFRIQUE,
11 août 2011, http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20110710-dakar-suspend-expulsion-ex-presidenttchad ien-hissene-habre (the headline says “Dakar suspends expulsion of former Chadian
president Hissène Habré”).
374. Senegal: Chad asks for the Extradition of Hissène Habré to Belgium, HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, July 22, 2011, https://www.hrw.org/news/2011/07/22/senegal-chad-asksextradit ion-hissene-habre-belgium.
375. The International Court of Justice is the highest judicial organ of the United
Nations. See MOHAMED SAMEH M. AMR, THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF
JUSTICE AS THE PRINCIPAL JUDICIAL ORGAN OF THE UNITED NATIONS 42–45 (2003) (stating,
inter alia, that the International Court of Justice is “the principal judicial organ of the U.N.).
376. Belgium v. Senegal, 2012 ICJ 422 (July 20, 2012), http://www.world
courts.com/icj/eng/decisions/2012.07.20_Belgium_v_Senegal.pdf.
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delay the process.377 Macky Sall, who became president of the Republic of
Senegal on April 2, 2012, unlike his predecessor, Abdoulaye Wade, acted
positively and quickly to the ICJ decision and expressed regret that Senegal
had not brought Habré to trial sooner.378 Senegal’s Justice Minister, Aminata
Touré, expressed the views of the new government when she reminded the
international community that President Sall, who was elected in March 2012
and took office in April 2012, had stated publicly that his government would
proceed with the trial of Habré. She went on to state that Habré would be
tried under the law of Senegal and by a panel of Senegalese and African
judges under an agreement between Senegal and the African Union.379
Under the new government, led by President Sall, negotiations with the
African Union resumed and eventually led to an agreement to create the
Extraordinary African Chambers.380 On December 17, 2012, Senegal’s
National Assembly enacted legislation establishing the Extraordinary African
Chambers.381 The inauguration of the special court on February 8, 2013
brought to a conclusion more than two decades of efforts by Habré’s victims,
with the assistance of various civil society organizations, including Human
Rights Watch, to bring Habré to justice for the crimes that he was alleged to
have committed during his tenure as president of Chad.382
On July 2, 2013, the Extraordinary African Chambers (“EAC”) indicted
Habré for (1) crimes against humanity; (2) torture; and (3) war crimes. The
EAC’s four investigating judges then undertook a 19-month investigation,
which found sufficient evidence to charge Habré specifically with (1) the
practice of murder, summary executions, and kidnapping followed by
enforced disappearance and torture, amounting to crimes against humanity;
(2) torture; and (3) the war crimes of murder, torture, unlawful transfer and
unlawful confinement, and violence to life and physical well-being.383

377. Id.
378. Simons, supra note 343.
379. Id.
380. Senegal: New Court to Try Chad Ex-Dictator in Senegal, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
Aug. 22, 2012, https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/08/22/senegal-new-court-try-chad-ex-dicta
tor-senegal.
381. Senegal: Proceedings Against Hissène Habré Draw Near: National Assembly
Passes Laws for ‘Extraordinary African Chambers’, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Dec. 19,
2012,
https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/12/19/senegal-proceedings-against-hissene-habredraw-near.
382. Senegal: Hissène Habré Court Opens: Extraordinary African Chambers to Try
Former Chadian Dictator, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Feb. 8, 2013, https://www.hrw.
org/news/2013/02/08/senegal-hissene-habre-court-opens.
383. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 368.
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The long-awaited trial of Habré started on July 20, 2015. Subsequently,
the EAC sat for 56 days and heard evidence from 93 witnesses, two-thirds of
whom were survivors of Habré’s criminal activities and who had fought hard
to bring him to justice. These victims had an opportunity, not only to face
their oppressor, but also to tell the world about the atrocities committed
against them.384 On May 30, 2016, the EAC announced judgment before a
packed audience. The EAC found Habré guilty of “the commission of crimes
against humanity, for the underlying crimes of rape, sexual slavery, the
massive and systematic practice of summary executions, and kidnapping of
persons followed by their enforced disappearance and of torture.”385 The
court also found Habré guilty of “war crimes, including murder, torture and
inhuman treatment, under the principle of command responsibility”386 and
sentenced him to life imprisonment.
Two months after the EAC rendered its ruling and after thoroughly
reviewing written submissions from various parties, the Chambers’ judges
ordered that each of the survivors of rape and sexual slavery be paid
€ 30,490; those of torture and arbitrary detention and each mistreated
prisoner, € 22,865; and each heir of a deceased victim, € 15,243.387 So far,
however, the EAC has only allocated € 600,000’s worth of assets belonging
to Habré.388
Lawyers appointed to represent Habré appealed his conviction,
“alleging that one of the judges of the trial court should not have been
appointed because of his background as a prosecutor and that the trial court
made mistakes in its factual findings.”389 Habré’s victims cross-appealed
“portions of the compensation order.”390 The EAC, in keeping with its
statutes,391 named an appeals chamber—the latter was headed by Justice
Ougadeye Wafi of the Supreme Court of Mali, who was assisted by two

384. Reed Brody, Victims Bring a Dictator to Justice: The Case of Hissène Habré,
BREAD OF THE WORLD (2d updated ed., June 2017), https://www.brot-fuer-die-welt.de/
fileadmin/mediapool/2_Downloads/Fachinformationen/Analyse/Analysis70-The_Habre_Ca
se.pdf.
385. Id. at 18.
386. Id.
387. Id.
388. Id.
389. Id.
390. Id.
391. Statute of the Extraordinary African Chambers Within the Courts of Senegal
Created to Prosecute International Crimes Committed in Chad between 7 June 1982 and 1
December 1990, https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/09/02/statute-extraordinary-african-cham
bers.
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Senegalese judges. The appeals chamber heard oral arguments from the
lawyers representing both sides in January 2017.392
The appeals chamber delivered its decision on April 27, 2017. It
rejected all, but one of the arguments advanced by Habré’s lawyers. It
reversed Habré’s conviction for the rape of Khadidja Hassan Zidane, arguing
that the charge had not been included in the indictment that framed the
trial.393 Nevertheless, the appeals chamber explained that while it did not
doubt or question Zidane’s credibility or truthfulness, it could not allow to
stand, a charge that had been added after the trial had started. Finally, the
appeals chamber held that dropping the charge of rape against Habré did not
change the justification for the life sentence handed out to him by the trial
chamber.394
With respect to the compensation order, the appeals chamber “cured the
deficiencies in the compensation aspects of the trial court’s verdict by fixing
the total amount of Habré’s liability at 82 billion CFA francs (approximately
123 million euros) and listing the 7,396 victims eligible for reparations and
the amount to which each was entitled.”395 Most importantly, the appeals
chamber provided victims with hope that Habré’s assets would actually be
recovered and used to provide reparations for his victims.396
ii. Lessons from the Habré Case
Reed Brody, who worked tirelessly with Human Rights Watch and
Habré’s victims in order to bring the former Chadian dictator to trial, has
stated that the most important benefit from the trial is that “justice is
achievable.”397 Throughout the continent, from South Sudan, Central African
Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Somalia, to Cameroon,
victims of human rights violations and other atrocities committed by stateand non-state actors, often do not have a voice, either because they are dead
or live within States in which all avenues for protest, even peacefully, have
been taken away by the government. For example, in Cameroon, the
government is using laws against terrorism to suppress all forms of

392. Brody, supra note 384, at 18.
393. Id.
394. Id.
395. Id.
396. Id.
397. Reed Brody: “The Greatest Lesson from Habré’s Trial is that Justice is
Achievable,” TRIAL INTERNATIONAL (Feb. 2, 2017), https://trialinternational.org/latest-post/
reed-brody-the-greatest-lesson-from-habres-trial-is-that-justice-is-achievable/.
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dissent398—in fact, Anglophones who have attempted to peacefully protest
their marginalization and exploitation by the Francophone-dominated central
government have been labelled by the government as terrorists and visited
with brutal treatment from the security forces. In Cameroon, impunity
remains a major concern as state- and non-state actors who commit
international crimes are not being brought to justice by the government.399
Nevertheless, the successful conviction and sentencing of Habré gives
hope to victims of impunity in other African countries that it is possible that
they too can be granted the opportunity to testify against those who had
tortured, demeaned, and committed atrocities against them and in doing so,
achieve a certain measure of justice. In this section, we briefly examine other
lessons that Africa and Africans can learn from the Habré trial.
The Habré trial revealed an important truth about international justice,
which is that although many victims of international crimes in Africa remain
voiceless, they are actually the cornerstone of the delivery of international
justice and the fight against impunity. In the Habré case, victims took the
lead and worked relentlessly to force the international community, including
the African Union, to recognize the need to force Habré to account for his
crimes. Hence, the Habré trial shows victims of international crimes,
particularly those in Africa, that they too, can receive justice.
When Habré’s trial began on July 20, 2015, it was the first universal
jurisdiction case to take place in Africa. It was also the first time that the

398. Cameroon using ‘anti-terror’ law to silence media: CPJ, ALJAZEERA, Sept. 20,
2017,
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/09/cameroon-anti-terror-law-silence-mediacpj-170920112612527.html; see MANISULI SSENYONJO, ECON., SOC. & CULTURAL RTS. IN
INT’L L. 368 (2016) (arguing, inter alia, “that individuals and groups suffering the most
from human rights violations—the poor in general and poor women in particular—often
lack the political voice needed to claim or assert their human rights.” Journalists Not
Terrorists: In Cameroon, anti-terror legislation is used to silence critics and suppress
dissent, COMMITTEE TO PROTECT JOURNALISTS (Sept. 20, 2017), https://cpj.org/
reports/2017/09/journalists-not-terrorists-cameroon-ahmed-abba-anti-terror-imprisoned.php.
399 Since Anglophone teachers and lawyers went on strike in late 2016 to protest efforts by
the central government to impose French language and French legal institutions (notably the
French Civil law system) on the Anglophone Regions, which since reunification in 1961,
have retained the English language and the Common law of England and Wales, the
country’s security forces have burned down several Anglophone villages and killed a lot of
people. Yet, no one has been held accountable for these atrocities. See, e.g., Moki Edwin
Kindzeka, Villages Burn as Cameroon Troops Clash with Separatists, VOA NEWS (Apr. 19,
2018), https://www.voanews.com/a/villages-burn-cameroon-troops-/4356309.html; Ruth
Maclean, Cameroon’s Military Accused of Burning Alive Unarmed Civilians: Charity Says
20 Villages Set Ablaze in English-Speaking Areas in Escalating Conflict, THE GUARDIAN
(UK) (July 20, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jul/20/cameroon-militaryaccused-of-burning-alive-unarmed-civilains-villages-english-speaking.
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courts of one State had prosecuted the former head of State of another for
international crimes. This is an important precedent for the fight against
impunity in Africa—dictators and others who violate human rights and/or
commit other atrocities have, by the Habré trial, been put on notice that they
would no longer be able to hide behind immunities granted to them by their
countries’ dysfunctional institutions.400
Already, victims of the atrocities of former Gambian president, Yahya
Jammeh, have indicated a desire to follow in the footsteps of Habré’s victims
and organize to bring their torturer to justice. Habré’s trial has given victims
of international crimes in Africa the hope that with courage and tenacity, they
too can bring their torturers and oppressors to justice.
Most lawyers and victims’ advocates are quite aware of the
“emancipating” and “cathartic” benefits that victims can get from
participating fully in the prosecution of their oppressors—that is, those who
have committed atrocities against them. For example, granting victims the
opportunity to testify in open court against their oppressors can allow them to
“engage in a form of cathartic denunciation of the political leaders who had
imprisoned, exploited, and marginalized them.”401 Unfortunately, such
participation is rarely available to Africa’s victims of international crimes.
Thus, the fact that Habré’s victims were actually able to participate fully in
his trial in Senegal augurs well for the fight against impunity in Africa.
Perhaps, more important is the fact that such participation has returned
victims to the center of international justice.
400. Consider, for example, the fact that the constitutions of some African countries
actually grant some high-ranking government officials immunity from prosecution for any
crimes that they commit while in office. Such immunity can contribute significantly to
impunity in these countries. The Constitution of the Republic of Cameroon, for example,
grants the President of the Republic of Cameroon, immunity from prosecution for all crimes
committed during his tenure in office. Consider Article 53(3): “Acts committed by the
President of the Republic . . . shall be covered by immunity and he shall not be accountable
for them after the exercise of his functions.” Here is the French version of Article 53(3):
“Les acts accomplis par le président de la République . . . sont couverts par l’immunité et ne
sauraient engager sa responsabilité à l’issue de son mandat.” See Présidence de la
République (du Cameroun), Loi no 2008/001 du 14 avril 2008 modifiant et complétant
certaines dispositions de la loi 96/06 du 18 janvier 1996 portant révision de la constitution
du 02 juin 1972, http://www.minsep.cm/uploads/media/CONSTITUTION_du_Cameroun1996_et_2008.pdf.
401. As argued by Reed Brody, the team that helped the victims of Habré seek justice
went to the Gambia in 2017 and described “their long campaign” to seek justice to Yahya
Jammeh’s victims. Accordingly, “[t]he meeting inspired the Gambians who saw in the
Chadians’ struggle proof that justice can be achieved, despite the obvious obstacles.” See
REED BRODY, VICTIMS BRING A DICTATOR TO JUSTICE: THE CASE OF HISSÈNE HABRÉ 20
(Brot für die Welt/Bread for the World, 2017), https://www.brot-fuer-die-welt.de/file
admin/mediapool/2_Downloads/Fachinformationen/Analyse/Analysis70-The_Habre_Case.
pdf (last visited Oct. 18, 2018).
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The pleas of Habré’s victims were especially important in convincing
policymakers at both the national and international levels to take action to
make the prosecution of Habré possible. The tenacity and courage of Habré’s
victims created the enabling political environment within which various
actors could be brought together to make possible the prosecution of
Habré.402
The trial of Habré required working across international borders and
that necessitated the building of a transnational advocacy coalition that
included individuals and institutions from Chad, Senegal and other countries.
The success of this transnational coalition, which was ably assisted and
advised by several international non-governmental organizations, notably,
Human Rights Watch, provides a learning opportunity for other African
victims of international crimes. How this coalition was organized, the
challenges that it faced, which included language problems, considering the
fact that many of the Chadian victims were illiterate in French—the official
languages of Senegal and Chad—provides an important template for other
victims throughout the continent.
Reed Brody, the international human rights lawyer, who was
instrumental in bringing Habré to trial, has argued that “[a] major challenge
in any universal jurisdiction case is creating the necessary political will in the
forum state.”403 Unfortunately, getting politicians in the forum state to muster
the courage to help the international community fight impunity in other
countries is often quite difficult. For example, in November 1999, Ethiopia’s
former military dictator, Mengistu Haile Mariam, who was living in exile in
Zimbabwe but was wanted in Ethiopia on charges of genocide and crimes
against humanity, was visiting South Africa for medical treatment. Local
and international groups called on South African authorities to arrest him and
subsequently extradite him to Ethiopia to stand trial for crimes committed

402. One cannot underestimate the importance of victim participation in the prosecution
of Habré. Consider, for example, the “[t]he visible leadership of the victims made it
impossible for Habré to paint himself as a political victim or to tar his prosecution as
imperialistic.” See Brody, supra note 384, at 20. In fact, after the Extraordinary African
Chambers arrested Habré in 2013, his wife wrote a letter to Senegal’s President Sall to
complaint that “his arrest had disrupted their family life and that her children now had to
pass Ramadan without their father.” Id. Shortly afterward, one of Habré’s victims responded
to the pleas of Habré’s wife—“Khaltouma Daba, a Chadian widow and vice-president of the
victims’ association, responded that her family life had been shattered when her husband
was taken away by Habré’s political police, that her children had now passed 26 Ramadans
without their father.” Id.
403. Brody, supra note 384, at 23.
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during a dictatorship that lasted from 1977 to 1991.404 Despite South Africa’s
strong record on human rights, the government of Thabo Mbeki failed to
arrest Mengistu and instead allowed him to return to his home in
Zimbabwe.405 In mid-June 2015, when Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir
was visiting Johannesburg to attend the African Union summit, the
government failed to arrest al-Bashir, who was wanted by the International
Criminal Court (“ICC”) for genocide, war crimes and crimes against
humanity.406 Since then, al-Bashir has traveled to other African countries
without fear of being arrested. For example, al-Bashir has been to Uganda
and Djibouti and neither country has made any efforts to arrest him.407 It
appears many African governments have yet to develop the political will to
assist in the arrest and prosecution of high-ranking government officials
engaged in serious human rights abuses.
In 2001, when political interference led to the dismissal of the case
against Habré, the transnational advocacy coalition that was fighting to bring
the ex-Chadian dictator to justice realized that it would not be able to succeed
unless it convinced political leaders in Senegal and Chad that it was not in
their best interest to continue to stand against the prosecution of Habré. This
is an important lesson for other victims in Africa—garnering necessary
political will, especially in the forum State, is critical to successfully bring
those who commit serious human rights violations to justice.
Another lesson that the Habré trial provides for Africans who are
interested in combatting impunity is that, even if there is not full support
domestically for bringing the perpetrators of serious international crimes to
justice, victims can mobilize international pressure and use it to force
domestic policymakers to cultivate the political will to act to combat
impunity. Victim advocacy organizations, for example, can seek the
assistance of various international human rights committees, which can use
their moral and political (and perhaps, legal) authority to force national
governments to meet their obligations under international law. For example,
during the struggle to bring Habré to justice, victims worked closely with the

404. For more on Mengistu Haile Mariam, see ANDARGACHEW TIRUNEH, THE ETHIOPIAN
REVOLUTION 1974–1987: A TRANSFORMATION FROM AN ARISTOCRATIC TO A TOTALITARIAN
AUTOCRACY (1993).
405. Brody, supra note 384, at 23.
406. Shiraaz Mohamed, South Africa Flouted Law by Failing to Arrest Sudanese
President al-Bashir: ICC, THE GLOBE AND MAIL (SOUTH AFRICA), July 6, 2017, https://
www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/south-africa-flouted-law-in-failing-to-arrest-sudan
ese-president-bashir-icc/article35574102.
407. ICC Refers Uganda and Djibouti to U.N. for not Arresting al-Bashir, DW NEWS
(July 12, 2016), https://www.dw.com/en/icc-refers-uganda-and-djibouti-to-un-for-not-arrest
ing-al-bashir/a-19396326.

148

Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 42:1

U.N. Committee against Torture (CAT) to make certain that the case was not
derailed. Of great importance is the fact that it was CAT’s preliminary ruling
in April 2001 that “Habré should stay in Senegal pending an extradition
request” that “preserved the status quo all the way through to the 2012 ICJ
ruling.”408 It was the ICJ who demanded that Senegal prosecute Habré
without further delay.409
Political will in Belgium played a very important part in making
possible the trial of Habré. As argued by Brody,410 “[a]fter the victims’ initial
lobbying saved the pre-trial investigation from the repeal of the universal
jurisdiction law, the Coalition411 reached out to lawyers, professors and
especially parliamentarians across Belgium’s notorious linguistic and
political divides.”412 In addition, victims from Chad visited Belgium and
interacted with policymakers and ordinary citizens, and others authored opeds that educated people on the merits of the case.413
The African Union (“A.U.”) emerged as a key player in the effort to
bring Habré to justice. Despite the fact that, at the time the AU was
“[e]ngaged in a tug of war with the International Criminal Court,”414
individuals at the A.U. Secretariat, including especially the organization’s
Legal Counsel—Ben Kioko—were “able to see the benefit of being able to
prosecute African crimes in Africa.”415 The A.U.’s decision to create the
Committee of Eminent African Jurists (“CEAJ”) was significant—the CEAJ
became a major player in mobilizing policymakers to support the prosecution
of Habré. In fact, in 2007, with lobbying from members of the Coalition, the
A.U. appointed Robert Dossou, who was head of the CEAJ, as the A.U.’s
Special Representative to the trial. In that capacity, Mr. Dossou made several
visits to Senegal and Chad that were critical in keeping “the process on
track.”416
Belgium was not the only non-African State to play a key role in the
prosecution of Habré. The United States, under the presidency of Barrack
Obama, became quite instrumental in making the trial a reality. In addition to
408. Brody, supra note 384, at 23, 25.
409. Belg. v. Sen., supra note 376.
410. Brody, supra note 384, at 25.
411. That is, the transnational advocacy coalition, which included victims of Habré’s
atrocities in Chad, civil society organizations, NGOs, and other volunteers, that worked
tirelessly to bring Habré to justice. See Brody, supra note 384, at 25–26.
412. Id.
413. Id. at 25.
414. Id. at 26.
415. Id.
416. Id.
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the fact that, while on a State visit to Senegal, President Obama
congratulated Senegalese President Macky Sall on his leadership, Obama’s
government also supported the prosecution of Habré in other ways.417 After
several members of the Coalition, who included Reed Brody, had visited the
U.S. Congress, the latter, in December 2011, requested then Secretary of
State, Hillary Rodham Clinton, to report on “steps taken by the Government
of Senegal to assist in bringing Habré to justice.”418 Stephen J. Rapp, who at
the time was U.S. ambassador-at-large for war crimes issues, visited Senegal
and Chad on several occasions to make sure that the prosecution of Habré
was on track.419
The participation of many Africa-based civil society organizations was
critical—this was necessary, not only because these groups possessed
information about Habré’s crimes that could not be secured from other
sources, but also because their participation ensured that no one would argue
that the trial was an attempt by Western countries to impose their will and
values on Africans. Given the fact that the ICC has been accused of being a
tool of Western imperialism for its efforts to prosecute al-Bashir (Sudan) and
Uhuru Kenyatta (Kenya) and William Ruto (Kenya), it was important that
the effort to bring Habré to justice not be viewed in the same light. Hence,
the participation of several African NGOs in the Habré trial was quite
important.
The Coalition also sought and secured the support of France,420 the
European Union,421 the European Parliament,422 Special Rapporteur on

417. It was President Sall, who, unlike his predecessor (President Wade), gave full
support to the prosecution of Habré for the atrocities that he was alleged to have committed
in Chad. See Brody, supra note 384, at 26.
418. Brody, supra note 384, at 26.
419. Id.
420. Although France had originally been reluctant to support the prosecution, the
country changed its policy after its Human Rights Minister, Rama Yade, a woman of
Senegalese origin, spoke to Reed Brody and another member of the Coalition. She was able
to convince President Nicolas Sarkozy to announce support of the case by the government
of France. See Id. at 27.
421. The European Union negotiated the trial’s final budget with the government of
Senegal and continued to put pressure on Senegal to follow through with the trial. See
Human Rights Watch, Q&A: The Case of Hissène Habré before the Extraordinary African
Chambers in Senegal: Questions and Answers (Revised Sept. 25, 2003), ¶ 22,
https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/05/03/qa-case-hissene-habre-extraordinary-african-chamb
ers-senegal (last visited Oct. 27, 2018).
422. The European Parliament passed two resolutions on the Habré case. Motion for a
Resolution, EUR PARL. DOC. B6-0176 (2006), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/
getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+MOTION+B6-2006-0176+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN
(last visited Aug. 2, 2018); Senegal: EU Parliament Calls for Support of Hissène Habré
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Torture,423 and the U.N. High Commissioner on Human Rights.424 All these
actors were quite instrumental in helping the victims of Habré’s atrocities
bring him to justice. Of course, the most important lesson that can be learned
from Habré’s trial, besides putting victims in the center of such proceedings,
is that persistence and tenacity on the part of victims and their supporters is
critical for success. This is evidenced by the type and nature of the
persistence and tenacity exhibited by the victims of Habré.
V. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND IMPUNITY IN AFRICA
A. Introduction
During the last several years, there have been many developments in
international law that have significantly improved the ability of the
international community to deal with impunity. Shortly after World War II,
the world was confronted with what to do to prevent a repeat of the atrocities
that occurred prior to and during the war, particularly, the extermination of
millions of the Jewish citizens of Europe. The international community made
concerted efforts to create laws and institutions that would put an end to such
serious crimes. In addition to other actions, the international community
created the United Nations425 and adopted several conventions and treaties
directed at fighting international crimes and maintaining international peace
and security.

Trial, Apr. 26, 2007, https://www.hrw.org/news/2007/04/26/senegal-eu-parliament-callssupport-hissene-habre-trial.
423. The Special Rapporteur for Torture criticized the decision by Senegal to dismiss the
case against Habré and kept pressure on the country to proceed with the trial. See
International Justice Resource Center, Extraordinary African Chambers: Hybrid Court to
Try Former Chad Dictator Hissène Habré, Feb. 13, 2013, https://ijrcenter.org/2013/02/13/
extraordinary-african-chambers-hybrid-court-to-try-former-chad-dictator-hissene-habre/.
424. The U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights intervened several times to make
sure that the trial was not derailed or stopped. See BRODY, supra note 384, at 27.
425. The United Nations was established as an intergovernmental organization on
October 24, 1945, and empowered to promote international cooperation and peace and
security. The U.N. has several organs (e.g., the Security Council) that deal with various
aspects of international peace and security. For more on the United Nations and its various
agencies and organs, see U.N. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INFORMATION, BASIC FACTS ABOUT
THE UNITED NATIONS (2000); STEPHEN C. SCHLESINGER, ACT OF CREATION: THE FOUNDING
OF THE UNITED NATIONS—A STORY OF SUPERPOWERS, SECRET AGENTS, WARTIME ALLIES
AND ENEMIES, AND THEIR QUEST FOR A PEACEFUL WORLD (2003). For more on the U.N.
Security Council, see STRENGTHENING THE RULE OF LAW THROUGH THE U.N. SECURITY
COUNCIL (Jeremy Farall & Hilary Charlesworth eds., 2016).
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Of special note are the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide (“Genocide Convention”), which was adopted by the
U.N. General Assembly on December 9, 1948, and entered into force on
January 12, 1951.426 Article I of the Genocide Convention speaks directly to
threats to international peace and security: “The Contracting Parties confirm
that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a
crime under international law which they undertake to prevent and
punish.”427 Article III provides a list of international crimes that shall be
punished under the Convention: (a) genocide; (b) conspiracy to commit
genocide; (c) direct and public incitement to commit genocide; (d) attempt to
commit genocide; and (e) complicity in genocide.428
The Genocide Convention429 directed all Contracting Parties to
“undertake to enact, in accordance with their respective Constitutions, the
necessary legislation to give effect to the provisions of the present
Convention, and, in particular, to provide effective penalties for persons
guilty of genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III.”430 Then,
there are the Geneva Conventions, which comprise four treaties and three
protocols—these provide or establish the foundation for international
humanitarian law in the aftermath of World War II. The four conventions
were designed to regulate armed conflict and provide protection for people
who are no longer taking part in hostilities—the sick and wounded members
of armed forces fighting on land, as well as those fighting at sea (including
those who are shipwrecked), prisoners of war, and civilians.431 Specifically,
426. Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277,
https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/crimeofgenocide.aspx.
427. Id. art. I.
428. Id. art. III.
429. The word “convention,” as used here means “treaty” or “international agreement.”
States that “[a] treaty thus embraces all instruments formed between two or more
international judicial persons; conventions, agreements, protocols, and exchanges of letters
or notes may all constitute treaties.” Bryan H. Druzin, Opening the Machinery of Private
Order: Public International Law as a Form of Private Ordering, 58 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 423,
452–53 (2014).
430. Genocide Convention, supra note 426, art. V.
431. The four Geneva Conventions are (1) Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of
the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field; Geneva Convention
for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of
Armed Forces at Sea; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War;
and Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War.
These four treaties significantly extended and expanded the scope of international
humanitarian law. Note that Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions extends the
principles of the Geneva Conventions to non-international armed conflicts and eliminated
certain problems of national sovereignty regarding the ability of the international
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the first Geneva Convention protects wounded and sick soldiers on land
during war or hostilities.432 The second Geneva Convention protects
wounded, sick and shipwrecked military personnel at sea during war.433 The
third Geneva Convention applies to the treatment of prisoners of war and
replaced the Prisoners of War Convention of 1929.434 The fourth Geneva
Convention protects civilians, including those in occupied territory.435
Article 3, common to the four Geneva Conventions covered, for the first
time, situations that involved non-international armed conflicts. These
include “traditional civil wars, internal armed conflicts that spill over into
other States or internal conflicts in which third States or a multinational force
intervenes alongside the government.”436 Article 3, common to the four
Geneva Conventions “establishes fundamental rules from which no
derogation is permitted.”437 The four Geneva Conventions have been ratified
by all States and are universally applicable.438
Nevertheless, in the absence of credible enforcement mechanisms,
“violations of international humanitarian law [have] continued with glaring

community to confront impunity. See The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Their
Additional Protocols, INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS (ICRC), https://www.
icrc.org/en/document/geneva-conventions-1949-additional-protocols (last visited Aug. 3,
2018). According to the ICRC, “[t]he Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols
are international treaties that contain the most important rules limiting the barbarity of war.
They protect people who do not take part in the fighting (civilians, medics, aid workers) and
those who can no longer fight (wounded, sick and shipwrecked troops, prisoners of war).
See, id.
432. See ICRC, Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Geneva, 12, 1949, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/
applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/INTRO/365?OpenDocument.
433. See ICRC, Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick
and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Geneva, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S.
85, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/INTRO/370?OpenDocument.
434. See ICRC, Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Geneva,
Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/INTRO/
375?OpenDocument.
435. See ICRC, Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War, Geneva, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 UNTS 287, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/
ihl.nsf/INTRO/380?OpenDocument.
436. ICRC, supra note 432.
437. Id.
438. Id. For a list of States Parities to the Four Geneva Conventions, see ICRC, Treaties,
States Parties and Commentaries, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/States.
xsp?xp_viewStates=XPages_NORMStatesParties&xp_treatySelected=365 (last visited Aug.
3, 2018).
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impunity.”439 Faced with this conundrum, the international community
decided to create an international legal mechanism to more effectively
confront the problem of impunity. This international legal tool for fighting
impunity by prosecuting those committing international crimes came in the
form of the permanent international criminal court. Such a court was created
by the multilateral treaty called the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court. The ICC has already been fully examined, especially as it
applies to impunity in Africa. In the following sections, we provide an
overview of other ways in which international law can help the fight against
impunity in Africa.
B. International Law and Impunity in Africa: The Problem of Immunity
for Diplomats and State Officials in Missions in Other States
Since the end of World War II, there have been significant
developments in “substantive norms of international human rights and
international criminal law.”440 Unfortunately, these developments have not
been accompanied or matched by the provision of mechanisms or procedures
for enforcing these norms. Historically, “the primary methods of judicial
enforcement envisaged by international law are the domestic courts of the
state where the human rights violation or international crime occurred and
the courts of the state responsible for that violation.”441 International law,
thus, imposes obligations on States to fully bring to justice those individuals
who commit international crimes within their territories. Where a state has
violated a substantive human right, international human rights law provides
“a right to a remedy or to reparation”442—the latter are to be paid by the State
that has committed the human right violation. Unfortunately, these
approaches to the enforcement of human rights violations and international
criminal law have usually failed to accomplish the task of minimizing
impunity and enhancing international peace and security. First, States may
not incorporate provisions of international human rights laws in their national
constitutions or legislation. That is, States may not make the rights contained
in the various international human rights instruments justiciable in national

439. Sang-Hyun Song, The Role of the International Criminal Court in Ending Impunity
and Establishing the Rule of Law, U.N. CHRONICLE, vol. 49, No. 4 (2012), https://unchron
icle.un.org/article/role-international-criminal-court-ending-impunity-and-establishing-rulelaw.
440. Dapo Akande & Sangeeta Shah, Immunities of State Officials, International
Crimes, and Foreign Domestic Courts, 21 EUROPEAN J. INT’L L. 815 (2010).
441. Id. at 816.
442. Id.
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courts. Second, in many situations,443 the perpetrators of the atrocities are
actually state actors and the crimes may be committed as part of official
government policy.444 Of course, in these countries, governments do not
prosecute their own officials.445
Over the years, what has evolved, especially in Africa, is a culture of
impunity in which human rights are regularly violated without any effort by
national governments to bring violators or perpetrators to account for their
crimes. Given the fact that national governments are either unwilling or
unable to bring these perpetrators to justice, it has been suggested that the
prosecution of these criminals can take “place in international (including
regional) courts: such as the human rights tribunals or quasi-judicial bodies
dealing with state responsibility or international criminal tribunals dealing
with the penal responsibility of individuals.”446 A major problem to this latter
approach to the prosecution of perpetrators of international crimes is the fact
that there may not exist an international court with the necessary jurisdiction
to try the crimes in question. As a consequence, it has been suggested that
prosecution should be undertaken by the domestic courts of other States.447
443. For example, the Rwandan Genocide, which was perpetuated by the government of
Rwanda and its supporters. See, e.g., LINDA MELVERN, CONSPIRACY TO MURDER: THE
RWANDAN GENOCIDE (2004) (providing a comprehensive overview of the genocide that took
place in Rwanda in early summer 1994). Consider also the Darfur Genocide, which was
organized and carried out by the government in Khartoum and militias either directly hired
and paid by the State or those whose interests are congruent with those of the State. See
GENOCIDE IN DARFUR: INVESTIGATING THE ATROCITIES IN THE SUDAN (Samuel Totten & Eric
Markusen eds., 2009) (providing a series of essays that examines the evolution of the Darfur
Genocide and its impact on the peoples of the Darfur region of the Republic of Sudan).
444. Both the Genocide in Rwanda and that in Darfur, Sudan, are good examples. In
both cases, the atrocities that constituted the genocides were carried out by the governments
of these countries and their agents. See, e.g., DENISE BENTROVATO, NARRATING AND
TEACHING THE NATION: THE POLITICS OF EDUCATION IN PRE- AND POST-GENOCIDE RWANDA
(2015) (stating that the Rwandan Genocide was carried out by the extremist governmentbacked Hutu militia called Interahamwe); MODERN GENOCIDE: THE DEFINITIVE RESOURCE
AND DOCUMENT COLLECTION 641 (Paul R. Bartrop & Leonard Jacobs eds., 2014) (stating
that the genocide in Darfur, Sudan, was carried out by “Sudan’s regular armed forces” and
“government-backed militias, namely the Janjaweed”).
445. It is important to note, however, that a change in government, as occurred in Chad,
could bring about a change in policy, leading to the prosecution of officials of the ancien
régime for international crimes. In Africa, the prosecution of Hissène Habré is a good
example. See CELESTE HICKS, THE TRIAL OF HISSÈNE HABRÉ: HOW THE PEOPLE OF CHAD
BROUGHT A TYRANT TO JUSTICE (2018) (detailing the trial and conviction of former Chadian
dictator, Hissène Habré).
446. Akande & Shah, supra note 440, at 816.
447. These are States other than the ones in which the crimes were actually committed.
This approach, of course, implicates the concept of universal jurisdiction, which made it
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This approach has been criticized for several reasons, including: (1) it would
be quite difficult to obtain the evidence on crimes that took place abroad; (2)
the political will needed to facilitate the trial may be lacking in the State
being called upon to carry out the trial; (3) there may be a lack of motivation
among prosecutors in the State that is being called upon to prosecute cases
that have no connection to their country; (4) it would still have to be
established that the foreign State has jurisdiction, as a matter of international
law, to prescribe rules to govern the trial and to subject the alleged crimes to
its domestic courts for adjudication; and (5) it has to be established that the
individuals to be tried do not enjoy immunity from the jurisdiction of the
forum.448
It is generally accepted that the officials of a State are immune, under
certain circumstances, from the jurisdiction of foreign States.449 One type of
immunity is that which is conferred by international law on “certain state
officials” and it attaches to “the office or status of the official.”450 Immunities
of this type remain valid only as long as the official remains in office and are
described as “personal immunity” (or immunity ratione personae).451 Under
customary international law, the Head of State and all diplomats that are duly
accredited to a foreign state “possess such immunity from the jurisdiction of
foreign states.”452 Of course, treaties also confer “similar immunities on
diplomats, representatives of states to international organizations, and other
officials on special mission in foreign states.”453
possible for Hissène Habré to be prosecuted in Senegal for crimes committed in Chad.
According to Anne-Marie Slaughter, “universal jurisdiction purports to remove the need for
a particular connection to any one” and hence, allows courts in countries other than those in
which the crimes were committed to prosecute the accused persons. Anne-Marie Slaughter,
Defining the Limits: Universal Jurisdiction and National Courts, in UNIVERSAL
JURISDICTION: NATIONAL COURTS AND THE PROSECUTION OF SERIOUS CRIMES UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW 168, 168 (Stephen Macedo ed., 2004).
448. Akande & Shah, supra note 440, at 816.
449. See, e.g., UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their
Property, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations, December 2, 2004,
http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/4_1_2004.pdf. However, this
Convention is not yet in force.
450. Akande & Shah, supra note 440, at 816.
451. Id. at 818.
452. Id. See also Arthur Watts, The Legal Position in International Law of Heads of
States, Heads of Government and Foreign Ministers, 247 COLLECTED COURSES OF THE
HAGUE ACADEMY OF INT’L L. 13 (1994).
453. Akande & Shah, supra note 440, at 818. According to Article 29 of the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 1961, “The person of a diplomatic agent shall be
inviolable. He shall not be liable to any form of arrest or detention. The receiving State shall
treat him with due respect and shall take all appropriate steps to prevent any attack on his
person, freedom or dignity.” Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 2, 1961, 500
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But, what is the justification for these immunities? The usual thinking is
that such immunities are needed and critical for the effective undertaking of
international relations. In negotiations between States, for example, it is
argued that the diplomats who undertake these negotiations would not be
able to negotiate freely and perform their jobs effectively if they are
subjected to harassment by other States.454 In its decision in the case of U.S.
Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America v. Iran),
the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) has held that there is “no more
fundamental prerequisite for the conduct of relations between States than the
inviolability of diplomatic envoys and embassies.”455 These immunities, it is
argued, are necessary, not only for the peaceful coexistence of the world’s
States, but also for the conduct of international affairs.
i. Immunity Ratione Personae and Impunity of Officials
Senior government officials who are granted immunity ratione
personae will not be able to perform their functions effectively and fully if
they are subjected to arrest and detention during their tenure in a foreign
State.456 Thus, in the case where this type of immunity is applicable, it is
generally understood that there is an absolute prohibition on the exercise of
criminal jurisdiction by the host State—under this international law doctrine,
the host State is prohibited from exercising criminal jurisdiction, not only in
situations or “cases involving the acts of these individuals457 in their official
capacity but also in cases involving private acts.”458
But, what if the act in question was committed before the individual
actually took office or commenced his or her official duties? Does immunity
UNTS 95 (entered into force on Apr. 24, 1964), http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments
/english/conventions/9_1_1961.pdf. This provision is supplemented by that in Article 31:
“A diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving
State. He shall also enjoy immunity from its civil and administrative jurisdiction.” Id.
454. Michael A. Tunks, Diplomats or Defendants? Defining the Future of Head-of-State
Immunity, 52 DUKE L.J. 651, 656 (2002).
455. U.S. Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America v. Iran),
1980 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 91 (May 24) (quoting United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in
Tehran, Provisional Measures, Order, 1979 I.C.J. (Dec. 15)).
456. Akande & Shah, supra note 440, at 819.
457. These individuals, according to the U.N. Convention on Special Missions, include
heads of state and government, ministers of foreign affairs, and other persons of high rank,
“when they take part in a special mission of the sending State,” as well as members of the
sending country’s diplomatic staff residing in the host receiving State. See U.N. Convention
on Special Missions, art. 21, 31, 39, 1400 U.N.T.S. 231 (Dec. 8, 1969).
458. Akande & Shah, supra note 440, at 819.
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ratione personae still attach? As was made clear by the International Court
of Justice (“ICJ”) in the Arrest Warrant Case,459 immunity applies, regardless
of the nature of the activity and when it was carried out. In 2000, the
Government of Belgium issued an arrest warrant against Abdoulaye Yerodia
Ndombasi, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Congo
under Belgium’s law of universal jurisdiction.460 The warrant was challenged
before the International Court of Justice in the case generally referred to as
the Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic
Republic of Congo v. Belgium).461 The pertinent parts of the ICJ’s judgment
are presented in para. 54, which states as follows:
The Court accordingly concludes that the functions of a Minister
for Foreign Affairs are such that, throughout the duration of his or
her office, he or she when abroad enjoys full immunity from
criminal jurisdiction and inviolability. That immunity and that
inviolability protect the individual concerned against any act of
authority of another State[,] which would hinder him or her in the
performance of his or her duties.462
The critical issue here is that the individual be allowed to enjoy such
immunity as is necessary to allow him or her to perform his or her duties. As
such, any legal process invoked by the host or receiving State must not
subject the official to “a constraining act of authority at the time when the
official was entitled to the immunity.”463
In this respect, no distinction can be drawn between acts performed by a
Minister for Foreign Affairs in an “official” capacity, and those claimed to
have been performed in a “private capacity”, or, for that matter, between acts
459. Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of
Congo v. Belgium), Judgment, 2002 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 14).
460. Belgium’s law of universal jurisdiction was enacted in 1993 to allow the country’s
domestic courts to judge people accused of war crimes, crimes against humanity or
genocide. See, e.g., MITSUE INAZUMI, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION IN MODERN INTERNATIONAL
LAW: EXPANSION OF NATIONAL JURISDICTION FOR PROSECUTING SERIOUS CRIMES UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW 93 (2005) (describing, inter alia, Belgium’s universal jurisdiction law
of 1993).
461. Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, supra note 459.
462. Id. ¶ 54.
463. Akande & Shah, supra note 440, at 819. It is important to note that while any
attempts to arrest and prosecute, for example, high ranking officials or those on a diplomatic
mission would constitute a violation of the immunity granted them under international law,
an invitation by the host or receiving State’s government for the officials clothed by such
immunity to testify voluntarily would not be a violation. See Case Concerning the Arrest
Warrant of 11 April 2000, supra note 459, ¶¶ 55, 70–71 .
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performed before the person concerned assumed office as Minister for
Foreign Affairs and acts committed during the period of office. Thus, if a
Minister for Foreign Affairs is arrested in another State on a criminal charge,
he or she is clearly thereby prevented from exercising the functions of his or
her office. The consequences of such impediment to the exercise of those
official functions are equally serious, regardless of whether the Minister for
Foreign Affairs was, at the time of arrest, present in the territory of the
arresting State on an “official” visit or a “private” visit, regardless of whether
the arrest relates to acts allegedly performed before the person became the
Minister for Foreign Affairs or to acts performed while in office, and
regardless of whether the arrest relates to alleged acts performed in an
“official” capacity or a “private” capacity. Furthermore, even the mere risk
that, by travelling to or transiting another State a Minister for Foreign Affairs
might be exposing himself or herself to legal proceedings could deter the
Minister from travelling internationally when required to do so for the
purposes of the performance of his or her official functions.464
The nature of the alleged activity or when it was committed are not
important to this doctrine of immunity. With respect to the Arrest Warrant
case, the ICJ held that a Foreign Minister is entitled to immunity ratione
personae and that that immunity remains valid even when and if it is alleged
that the said minister had committed an international criminal offense. On
this point, the ICJ held as follows:
The Court has carefully examined State practice, including national
legislation and those few decisions of national higher courts, such
as the House of Lords465 or the French Court of Cassation.466 It has

464. Id. ¶ 55.
465. The House of Lords is the Upper House of the Parliament of the United Kingdom.
Until the U.K. established a Supreme Court in 1999, the House of Lords, through the Law
Lords, served as the final court of appeal in the U.K. judicial system. The Law Lords or
Lords of Appeal in Ordinary were judges that were appointed under the Appellate
Jurisdiction Act 1876 to the British House of Lords to perform certain judiciary functions,
which included acting as the highest court of appeal for most domestic cases. The House of
Lords lost its judicial functions after the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom was
established in 2009. For more on Britain’s Law Lords, see MAXWELL BARRETT, THE LAW
LORDS: AN ACCOUNT OF THE WORKINGS OF BRITAIN’S HIGHEST JUDICIAL BODY AND THE
MEN WHO PRESIDENT OVER IT (2000) and for the House of Lords, see MEG RUSSELL, THE
CONTEMPORARY HOUSE OF LORDS: WESTMINSTER BICAMERALISM REVIVED (2013).
466. The French Court of Cassation (Cour de cassation), founded in 1804, is the court of
final appeal for civil and criminal matters. For more on the French Court of Cassation, see
EVA STEINER, FRENCH LEGAL METHOD (2002); MARTIN WESTON, AN ENGLISH READER’S
GUIDE TO THE FRENCH LEGAL SYSTEM (1991); NICOLAS MOLFESSIS, LA COUR DE CASSATION
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been unable to deduce from this practice that there exists under
customary international law any form of exception to the rule
according immunity from criminal jurisdiction and inviolability to
incumbent Ministers for Foreign Affairs, where they are suspected
of having committed war crimes or crimes against humanity.467
In addition, the immunity applies even when the minister is traveling
abroad on a private visit.468 Given the fact that this type of immunity is
designed primarily to enhance the ability of the official to effectively perform
his or her international functions, the immunity is valid only as long as the
individual concerned is in office or on assignment in another State.469 The
immunity ratione personae is generally accepted, recognized and applied in
national courts in many countries and has become part of state practice
throughout the world.470
While the doctrine of immunity ratione personae is well-established in
international law and international relations, the question of how this doctrine
impacts government impunity still remains unanswered. What happens if
diplomats and other State officials on service abroad use their offices (e.g.,
an embassy or a diplomatic pouch) to commit international crimes? Such
crimes could include, for example, transporting children in diplomatic planes
for sex trafficking purposes or using diplomatic pouches to traffic illegal
ET L’ÉLABORATION DU DROIT (2004); JEAN-BAPTISTE
CASSATION DE 1791 À 1813 (1822).

SIREY, JURISPRUDENCE DE LA COUR DE

467. Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, supra note 459, ¶ 58.
468. Id. ¶ 55.
469. Akande & Shah, supra note 440, at 819.
470. Note, however, that there is one case in which a Head of State was denied
immunity from prosecution for international crimes. On February 14, 1988, a federal grand
jury, sitting in Miami (USA), returned a 12-count indictment against General Manuel
Antonio Noriega, then de facto ruler of Panama (1983–1989), with taking part in an
international conspiracy to import cocaine, as well as materials used in the production of
cocaine, into and out of the United States. Noriega’s lawyer moved to dismiss the
indictment, arguing that the alleged illegal activities were committed outside “the territorial
bounds of the United States” and that “Noriega was immune from prosecution as a head of
state and diplomat, and that his alleged narcotics offenses constituted acts of state not
properly reviewable by this Court” [i.e., the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
Florida]. See United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506 (S.D. Fla. 1990), aff'd, 117 F.3d
1206 (11th Cir. 1997).
Noriega’s lawyer argued that the Panamanian leader was immune from prosecution
based on head of state immunity, the act of state doctrine, and diplomatic immunity. Id.
Noriega’s claim of immunity from prosecution was denied based on the ground that Noriega
had never served as the constitutional leader of Panama, that Panama had not sought
immunity for Noriega, and that the acts charged relate to Noriega’s private pursuits of
“personal enrichment.” See id. at 1212.
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substances. If these individuals are covered by immunity, as stated in various
international legal instruments,471 decisions of international judicial bodies,472
and the writings of international legal scholars,473 would not they be able to
commit international crimes with impunity? Despite the loophole474 used by
U.S. courts to deny former Panamanian ruler General Manuel Antonio
Noriega immunity for his alleged crimes, the doctrine of immunity ratione
personae remains an important principle of international law and
international relations.
ii. Who is Entitled to Immunity Ratione Personae?
Over the years, it has become clear that sitting Heads of State,475 Heads
of Government,476 and diplomats477 are usually granted or possess immunity
471. See, e.g., Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 453; UN
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, Feb. 13, 1946,
http://www.un.org/en/ethics/pdf/convention.pdf; U.N. Convention on Special Missions,
supra note 457.
472. Belgium v. Senegal, supra note 376.
473. See, e.g., HAZEL FOX & PHILIPPA WEBB, THE LAW OF STATE IMMUNITY (2013)
(providing a detailed guide to the operation of the international rule of State immunity,
which bars the domestic courts of States from exercising criminal or civil jurisdiction over
claims made against another State).
474. Although Noriega was, at the time of his indictment, the de facto ruler of Panama,
U.S. prosecutors were able to argue that he could not be granted immunity on the ground
that he had never been recognized by the U.S. Government as the constitutional leader of
Panama. Implied in this reasoning is that had he been recognized as the legitimate head of
state of Panama, he would have been granted immunity regardless of his alleged criminal
activities. See, e.g., EDWARD CHUKWUEMEKE OKEKE, JURISDICTIONAL IMMUNITIES OF
STATES AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS (2018) (stating, inter alia, that Noriega’s claim
of head of State immunity was denied by courts in the United States because the U.S.
government had never recognized him as the legitimate constitutional ruler of Panama).
475. Case Concerning Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters
(Djibouti v. France), 2008 I.C.J. 177 (June 4). In paragraph 170, the ICJ held as follows:
“The Court has already recalled in the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic
Republic of the Congo v. Belgium) case ‘that in international law it is firmly established
that . . . certain holders of high-ranking office in a State, such as the Head of State . . . enjoy
immunities from jurisdiction in other States, both civil and criminal’ (Judgment, ICJ
Reports 2002, ¶ 51). A Head of State enjoys in particular ‘full immunity from criminal
jurisdiction and inviolability’ which protects him or her ‘against any act of authority of
another State which would hinder him or her in the performance of his or her duties’ (Ibid.,
p. 22, para. 54). Thus the determining factor in assessing whether or not there has been an
attack on the immunity of the Head of State lies in the subjection of the latter to a
constraining act of authority.”
476. In Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, supra note 459, ¶ 51, the
ICJ ruled as follows: “The Court would observe at the outset that in international law it is
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ratione personae to enhance their ability to perform their duties. In the
Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium case,478 the ICJ was called
upon to decide on the immunity from criminal jurisdiction and the
inviolability of an incumbent Minister for Foreign Affairs. The ICJ held that
“the functions of a Minister for Foreign Affairs are such that, throughout the
duration of his or her office, he or she when abroad enjoys full immunity
from criminal jurisdiction and inviolability. That immunity and that
inviolability protect the individual concerned against any act of authority of
another State which would hinder him or her in the performance of his or her
duties.”479
But, does immunity ratione personae apply to other senior members of
the government? It has been argued that in the Arrest Warrant case, when the
ICJ held that “diplomatic and consular agents [and] certain holders of highranking office in a State, such as the Head of State, Head of Government and
Minister for Foreign Affairs, enjoy immunities from jurisdiction in other
States, both civil and criminal,”480 the Court’s use of the expression “such
as” indicates or suggests that the list of senior government officials entitled to
immunity ratione personae is not exhaustive.
In the Arrest Warrant case, the ICJ held that Foreign Ministers are
entitled to immunity ratione personae due to the nature of their jobs or public
functions—these individuals are responsible for the international relations of
their countries. Other government officials besides Ministers of Foreign
Affairs also perform functions for their governments at the international
level. Such functions may include, for example, negotiating on behalf of their
governments with multilateral organizations, and other foreign-based
entities. As stated in Article IV of the Convention on the Privileges and
Immunities of the United Nations,481 “[r]epresentatives of Members to the
principal and subsidiary organs of the United Nations and to conferences
convened by the United Nations, shall, while exercising their functions and
during the journey to and from the place of meeting, enjoy the following
privileges and immunities: (a) Immunity from personal arrest or detention
and from seizure of their personal baggage, and, in respect of words spoken
or written and all acts done by them in their capacity as representatives,
firmly established that, as also diplomatic and consular agents, certain holders of highranking office in a State, such as the Head of State, Head of Government and Minister for
Foreign Affairs, enjoy immunities from jurisdiction in other States, both civil and criminal.”
477. Id.
478. Id.
479. Id. ¶ 54.
480. Id. ¶ 51.
481. U.N. Convention on the Privileges and Immunities, 1946, supra note 471, art. IV, §
11.
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immunity from legal process of every kind.”482 In addition, under the U.N.
Convention on Special Missions, 1969,483 “persons of the representatives of
the sending State in the special mission and of the members of its diplomatic
staff shall be inviolable. They shall not be liable to any form of arrest or
detention. The receiving State shall treat them with due respect and shall take
all appropriate steps to prevent any attack on their persons, freedom or
dignity.”484 Also, “[t]he representatives of the sending State in the special
mission and the members of its diplomatic staff shall enjoy immunity from
the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving State.”485
These treaty-based conferrals of immunity, as well as those enunciated
by the ICJ, are designed or intended to enhance the conduct of international
relations.486 But, have the immunity provisions in these treaties evolved into
customary international law? If yes, then immunity ratione personae may be
available to a much larger group of individuals than mentioned in the ICJ’s
decision in the Arrest Warrant case.487 The International Law Commission is
of the opinion that the immunity of special missions has been established as a
matter of international law.488 However, in the case, United States v.
Sissoko,489 the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida held
that it “did not find that the U.N. Convention on Special Missions is
‘customary international law’ that binds this Court.”490 The Executive
Branch of the U.S. Government has asserted that foreign officials who are in
the United States temporarily and on a “special diplomatic mission” are
entitled to immunity from the criminal and civil jurisdictions of the courts of
the United States.491
In the Weixum v. Xilai case, the foreign official involved was not a Head
of State or Head of Government or Minister of Foreign Affairs. He was
482. Id. art. 11(a).
483. U.N. Convention on Special Missions, supra note 457.
484. Id. art. 29.
485. Id. art. 31.
486. Akande & Shah, supra note 440, at 821.
487. Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, supra note 459.
488. Documents of the Nineteenth Session Including the Report of the Commission to the
General Assembly, 1967 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n, Vol. II, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/
1967/Add.1. The relevant section is: “It is now generally recognized that States are under an
obligation to accord the facilities, privileges and immunities in question to special missions
and their members. Such is also the opinion expressed by the Commission on several
occasions between 1958 and 1965 51 and confirmed by it in 1967.” Id. at 358.
489. United States v. Sissoko, 995 F. Supp. 1469 (S.D. Fla 1997).
490. Id. at 1471.
491. Li Weixum v. Bo Xilai, 568 F. Supp. 2d 35 (D.D.C. 2008).
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China’s Minister of Commerce and International Trade, Bo Xilai.492 The
governments of many countries and their courts have also been “willing to
accept the customary law status of the rule granting immunity to members of
Special Missions.”493 For example, in Re Bo Xilai,494 a court in the UK
showed willingness to grant immunity to the same Chinese Minister of
Commerce and International Trade on the ground that such action was
required by international customary law.495 Also, when, in April 2008,
Rwanda’s Chief of State Protocol, Lt. Col. Rose Kabuye,496 was on an
official visit to Germany, the government of the latter refused to arrest her on
a warrant from France on charges of terrorism and stated that it had made the
decision based on the belief that she was immune. Nevertheless, in a
subsequent visit to Germany in November 2008, Ms. Kabuye was arrested
by German authorities and extradited to France—German authorities argued
that she was on a private visit this time and hence, did not qualify for
immunity.497 The arrest warrant was later lifted by French judges and she
returned to Rwanda.498
It appears that “special mission immunity” does not apply to state
officials who are on a private visit abroad and can be distinguished from the
immunity ratione personae examined by the ICJ in the Arrest Warrant case.
In the latter case, the ICJ ruled that the Foreign Minister, as well as the Head
of State and the Head of Government, would be granted immunity even if
they are traveling abroad on a private visit. While international law had
granted Heads of State absolute immunity ratione personae from the
criminal jurisdiction of foreign courts, even when traveling abroad for a
private purpose, it was not until the ICJ’s decision in the Arrest Warrant case
492. Id.
493. Akande & Shah, supra note 440, at 822.
494. Re Bo Xilai, 128 I.L.R. 713 (Bow St. Magistrate Ct. 2005).
495. Id.
496. Lt. Col. Rose Kabuye is a retired officer in the Rwandan Army and remains the
highest-ranking woman to ever serve in the country’s armed forces. See, e.g., JENNIE E.
BURNET, GENOLCIDE LIVES IN US: WOMEN, MEMORY, AND SILENCE IN RWANDA 12 (2012)
(identifying Rose Kabuye as the “highest-ranking woman in the armed wing of the
[Rwandan Patrotic Front]” who went on to serve in “several important administrative
positions after the genocide.”
497. Rwandan authorities disputed this claim and stated that Kabuye traveled to
Germany on a diplomatic mission. See Germany Arrests Woman in Rwanda Genocide:
Rwandan President Says Holding of Aide Violates Country’s Sovereignty, AFRICA ON NBC
NEWS.COM (Nov. 11, 2008), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/27665617/ns/world_news-africa/
t/germ any-arrests-woman-rwanda-genocide/#.W2iJithKhBw.
498. Hereward Holland, Rwanda Says France Drops Kabuye Arrest Warrant, REUTERS,
(Mar. 31, 2009), https://www.reuters.com/article/ozatp-rwanda-france-kabuye-idAFJOE53
001S20090401.
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that immunity was conferred on a serving Foreign Minister (whether the
Minister was traveling abroad on private or official business). The decision
was justified on the basis that such immunity was necessary to enhance the
ability of the minister to perform his or her obligations at the international
level.499
Besides the functional basis, there are other justifications for conferring
immunity ratione personae on state officials. It has been argued that “[t]he
person and position of the Head of State reflects the sovereign equality of the
state and the immunity accorded to him or her is in part due to the respect for
the dignity of the office and of the state which that office represents.”500 In
addition, another justification for the absolute immunity from criminal
jurisdiction that is accorded Heads of State can be found in the principle of
non-intervention, whose corollary is the principle of sovereign equality of
states. This, it is argued, “is the basis for the immunity of states from the
jurisdiction of other states (par in parem non habet imperium).”501
Similarly, arresting and detaining the Head of Government of a State
would produce similar results, especially considering the fact that in many
countries, Heads of State are also Heads of Government. In many countries,
the Head of Government is the effective leader of the country and his or her
arrest and detention could have the same political implications for the
country as the arrest and detention of the Head of State. Other state officials,
including ministers, however, “do not embody the supreme authority of the
state, and their removal does not signify a change in government of the
state.”502 Thus, removing immunity for other senior state officials503 who
travel abroad on a private visit should not have the same effect as if such
immunity were withdrawn from the Head of State and the Head of
Government. Akande and Shah504 have argued that “by restricting the
allocation of broad immunity ratione personae to Heads of State and Heads
of Government, a balance is struck between sovereign equality and respect
499. Akande & Shah, supra note 440, at 823–24.
500. Akande & Shah, supra note 440, at 824.
501. Arresting and detaining the Head of State of a country, it is argued, is tantamount to
a form of regime change, even if temporary, and hence, represents interference with the
independence and autonomy of a State. See id.
502. Akande & Shah, supra note 440, at 825.
503. That is, senior government officials besides the Head of State and the Head of
Government. See, e.g., JOANNE FOAKES, THE POSITION OF HEADS OF STATE AND SENIOR
OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 7 (2014) (identifying senior government officials (other
than the head of state) as including “Foreign Ministers” and “a very narrow category of
other high-ranking State representatives by virtue of their office”).
504. Akande & Shah, supra note 440, at 825.
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for the rule of (international and domestic) law”505 and that “extending such
broad immunity ratione personae to other ministers, as the ICJ did in the
Arrest Warrant case, is erroneous and unjustified.”506
3. What About Immunity Ratione Materiae?
Immunity ratione materiae or functional immunity is that which
attaches to the official act (performed or to be performed by the state official)
instead of to the status of the state official.507 This type of immunity, hence,
may be relied on by any individual who is (1) acting on behalf of the state;
and (2) is performing an official act. Since this type of immunity is conductbased, it can “be relied on by former [state] officials in respect of official acts
performed while in office as well as by serving state officials.”508 Of course,
individuals who are not in the service of the State but who, at some time in
the past, had served the State, can rely on immunity ratione materiae to
cover those acts that they had performed while they were in the service of the
State.509
The conferment of immunity ratione materiae implicates two important
policies. In the first one, the state official in question can argue that he is not
legally responsible for acts, which are effectively those of the State. These
acts, which were, in effect, undertaken on behalf of the State by the state
official, must be imputed only to the State.510 The principle if immunity
ratione materiae can be used to place responsibility for certain acts511 where

505. Id.
506. Id.
507. Mizushima Tomonori has discussed a few cases from several jurisdictions that are
relevant to the concept of ratione materiae. See Mizushima Tomonori, The Individual as
Beneficiary of State Immunity: Problems of the Attribution of Ultra Vires Conduct, 29
DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 261 (2001).
508. Akande & Shah, supra note 440, at 825. For immunity from jurisdiction for
consular officers, see Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 1963, at Article 43(1):
“Consular officer and consular employees shall not be amenable to the jurisdiction of the
judicial or administrative authorities of the receiving State in respect of acts performed in
the exercise of consular functions.” Vienna Convention on Consular Relations art. 43(1),
Apr. 24, 1963, 596 UNTS 261.
509. See, e.g., C. A. Whomersley, Some Reflections on the Immunity of Individuals for
Official Acts, INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 848 (1992); H. F. van Panhuys, In the Borderland
Between the Act of State Doctrine and Questions of Jurisdictional Immunities, 13 INT’L &
COMP. L.Q. 1193 (1964).
510. Akande & Shah, supra note 440, at 826.
511. These are acts that are “committed” by a state official in the performance of his or
her official duties. Thus, “a plea of immunity ratione materiae is essentially a plea by a State
that the act of its official or former official was an act of the State itself and, therefore, one
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it belongs—on the State. Consider, for example, what the Appeals Chamber
of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia said in the
case of Prosecutor v. Blaškić:
The acts of state officials acting in that capacity are not attributable
to them personally but only to the state: ‘Such [State]512 officials
are mere instruments of a state and their official action can only be
attributed to the state. They cannot be the subject of sanctions or
penalties for conduct that is not private but undertaken on behalf of
a state. In other words, state officials cannot suffer the
consequences of wrongful acts which are not attributable to them
personally but to the state on whose behalf they act: they enjoy socalled ‘functional immunity’. This is a well-established rule of
customary international law going back to the 18th and 19th
centuries, restated many times since.513
But, is immunity of state officials co-extensive with that of the State?
International legal scholars argue that “[o]ne consequence of this function of
immunity ratione personae is that the immunity of state officials is not coextensive with, but broader than, the immunity of the state itself.”514 That is,
the state official is immune with respect to the “sovereign acts for which the
state is immune,”515 as well as other acts, which are official but nonsovereign.
Secondly, without immunity granted to state officials in foreign courts,
the latter can circumvent the immunity of the State by bringing proceedings
against those who represent or act on behalf of the State. Hence, immunity
ratione materiae provides a mechanism through which the circumvention of
the immunity of sovereign states can be prevented. As was held by the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit in Chuidian v. Philippine National
Bank,516 “[i]t is generally recognized that a suit against an individual acting
in his official capacity is the practical equivalent of a suit against the

for which it is responsible.” JOANNE FOAKES, THE POSITION OF HEADS OF STATE AND SENIOR
OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 7 (2014).
512. Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Objection to the Issue of Subpoena duces Tecum, ¶ 38 (Oct.
29, 1997).
513. Id.
514. Akande & Shah, supra note 440, at 827.
515. Id. See also Zachary Douglas, State Immunity for the Acts of State Officials, 82
BRIT. YEARBOOK OF INT’L L. 281 (2012).
516. Chuidian v. Philippine National Bank, 912 F.2d 1095, 1101 (9th Cir. 1990).
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sovereign directly.”517 This means, essentially, that this type of immunity
“operates as a jurisdictional, or procedural, bar and prevents courts from
indirectly exercising control over the acts of the foreign state through
proceedings against the official who carried out the act.”518
But, can a state official who is on official duty abroad rely on immunity
ratione materiae if he is charged with an international crime? There are three
reasons why the state official cannot rely on immunity ratione materiae in
order to evade liability for his or her international crimes. First, one can
argue that given the fact that “immunity is accorded only to sovereign
acts,”519 officials and the states that they represent, “can never be immune
from the jurisdiction of other states in respect of international crimes because
these crimes, for the most part, constitute violations of jus cogens norms520
and thus cannot be sovereign acts.”521 Second, immunity ratione materiae
can only be invoked by a state official to prevent being scrutinized for acts
that are sanctioned by the state (i.e., official acts). However, acts that
constitute international crimes cannot be considered official acts. Finally,
since jus cogens norms “supersede all other norms they overcome all
inconsistent rules of international law providing for immunity.”522 Below, we
take a closer look at these three arguments and see how they relate to the
struggle against impunity in Africa.523
State immunity, it has been argued, applies only in cases involving
“sovereign acts” and that “international crimes,” especially those which are
contrary to jus cogens norms cannot be considered “sovereign acts.”
Additionally, it has been argued, acts that constitute or amount to
international crimes, can never be considered sovereign acts. Thus, if a state
engages in or is responsible for acts that are contrary to jus cogens norms,
that state is said to have impliedly waived “any rights to immunity as the

517. Id.
518. Akande & Shah, supra note 440, at 827.
519. Id.
520. According to Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969, a
peremptory norm of general international law (jus cogens) is “a norm accepted and
recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no
derogation is permitted and which can be modified only be a subsequent norm of general
international law having the same character.” Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
1969, 1155 UNTS 331.
521. Akande & Shah, supra note 440, at 828.
522. Id.
523. Id.
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state has stepped out of the sphere of sovereignty.”524 In line with this
argument, since the state does not have the authority to violate jus cogens
norms, any acts of the state that are contrary to jus cogens norms cannot be
considered sovereign acts. The Prefecture of Voiotia v. Federal Republic of
Germany525 case can shed some light on this point. The facts of the case are
that in June 1944, military units belonging to the German occupation
government in Greece massacred more than 300 citizens of the village of
Distomo and burnt down the village. A case was brought against Germany
for those atrocities in 1995 before Greek courts by relatives of the victims.
The Court of Livadia held that Germany was liable and ordered it to pay
compensation to the claimants. Germany then appealed the court’s decision
and the appeal was heard by the Hellenic Supreme Court, the Areios
Pagos.526 The Areios Pagos upheld the judgment of the Court of Livadia
based on the argument that acts which violate jus cogens norms527 do not and
cannot qualify as sovereign acts (acts jure imperii) and that by committing
such atrocities, Germany had impliedly waved its immunity.528 Although the
majority of the Areios Pagos affirmed the lower court’s ruling and ordered
Germany to pay the amount of money fixed by the Lividia court, “a strong
dissenting opinion asserted that no such customary rule restricting sovereign
immunity existed.”529 Germany, nevertheless, declined to honor the ruling of
the Areios Pagos.
524. Akande & Shah, supra note 440, at 829. See also Adam C. Belsky, Mark Merva &
Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Implied Waiver under the FSIA: A Proposed Exception to Immunity
for Violations of Peremptory Norms of International Law, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 365 (1989).
525. Prefecture of Voiotia v. Federal Republic of Germany (Distomo Massacre Case),
129 I.L.R. 514 (Court of Cassation 2000) (Greece).
526. Id.
527. The massacre of more than 300 civilians by German forces in the village of
Distomo definitely qualifies as an act that violates jus cogens norms. See, e.g., CHRIS
BISHOP, SS: HELL ON THE WESTERN FRONT: THE WAFFEN-SS IN EUROPE 1940-1945, 73
(2003) (detailing the massacre of Greek civilians in the village of Distomo during World
War II).
528. Adam C. Belsky et al., were among the first legal scholars to bring up this
argument. Since then, it has gained some support among judges in the United States.
Belsky, Merva & Roht-Arriaza, supra note 524. Nevertheless, as argued by Kerstin Bartsch
and Björn Elberling, this “does not seem to be a very convincing argument for the limitation
of state immunity in cases such [the Prefecture of Voiotia case]: While it is generally
accepted that states may waive their immunity, the circumstances must be such that an
implied waiver can be clearly inferred from the state’s behavior.” Kerstin Bartsch & Björn
Elberling, Jus Cogens v. State Immunity, Round Two: The Decision of the European Court
of Human Rights in the Kalogeropoulou et al. v. Greece and Germany Decision, 4 GERMAN
L.J. 477, 480 (2003).
529. Id.
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The matter eventually reached the Greek Special Highest Court and by
six votes to five, the Court held that Germany enjoyed unrestricted immunity
and hence, could not be brought before any Greek courts for torts committed
by its soldiers.530 In its ruling, the Special Highest Court “asserted a general
norm of customary international law that rendered inadmissible any claim
against a foreign state for torts committed by its armed forces.”531 The Court
then went on to state that there does not yet exist a norm of customary
international law that excludes certain acts from the international law of state
immunity. Nevertheless, a minority of five judges on the Special Highest
Court held that such an exception “did exist under customary law.”532
Finally, the Court held that there was no exception from jurisdiction under
customary law. Within the Greek legal system, this decision of the Greek
Special Highest Court was final and binding.533
On December 12, 2002, the European Court of Human Rights
(“ECtHR”) decided on several claims emanating from the Prefecture of
Voiotia case. One of the rulings by the ECtHR concerned Germany’s
immunity—the ECtHR declared, after referring to its ruling in Al-Adsani,
that it “does not find established, however, that there is yet acceptance in
international law of the proposition that States are not entitled to immunity in
respect of civil claims for damages brought against them in another State for
crimes against humanity. The Greek Government cannot therefore be
required to override the rule of State immunity against their will.”534
The most important legal question in the Prefecture of Voiotia case
concerned the immunity of States, on the one hand, and jus cogens norms, on
the other. In 2001, the ECtHR in the Al-Adsani case,535 had already decided
in favor of state immunity. The decision, however, was split, although legal
scholars, through commentary and other writings, appeared to unanimously
support the ruling of the ECtHR.536

530. Id. at 481. See also Federal Republic of Germany v. Miltiadis Margellos, Case
6/17–9–2002, Decision of September 17, 2002.
531. Bartsch & Elberling, supra note 528.
532. Bartsch & Elberling, supra note 528, at 482.
533. Id. See also Federal Republic of Germany v. Miltiadis Margellos, supra note 530.
534. ECtHR, Kalogeropoulou and Others v. Greece and Germany, Admissibility
Decision, § D1(b) (Dec. 12, 2002), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22itemid%22:[%2
2001-23539%22]}. See also ECtHR, Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, Judgment (Nov. 21,
2001), https://www.dipublico.org/1571/case-of-al-adsani-v-the-united-kingdom-europeancourt-of-human-rights/.
535. Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, supra note 534.
536. See, e.g., Markus Rau, After Pinochet: Sovereign Immunity in Respect of Serious
Human Rights Violations–The Decision of the European Court of Human Rights in the AdAdsani Case, 3 GERMAN L.J. 6 (2002); Bartsch & Elberling, supra note 528.
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Recall that jus cogens can be defined as international law norms from
which no derogation is permitted and in the case of conflict of rules, a jus
cogens norm would trump every other rule of international law that is not of
the same superior status.537 The prohibition of certain war crimes, it is
argued, forms part of jus cogens. Since state immunity is not absolute but is
“limited to certain acts of the state and that it may be derogated from in a
variety of circumstances,”538 one can conclude that “state immunity may not
serve to bar the judicial enforcement of the jus cogens norm prohibiting
certain war crimes.”539 Those who support the Al-Adsani decision have put
forth two arguments to support their claim that state immunity is not barred
in cases that violate jus cogens, such as war crimes.
First, it is argued that there does not exist any actual conflict of rules
between the jus cogens norm that is being violated and states’ reliance on
state immunity before the courts.540 International law does not have an
authority that makes and executes the laws. It is argued that in this system,
“one must always distinguish between material rules and the ways in which
these rules are enforced.”541 If a jus cogens norm prohibits, for example, war
crimes or crimes against humanity, the same norm “still does not bar states
from relying on state immunity before national courts in cases concerning
war crimes, since state immunity only concerns the enforcement, not the
material content of the jus cogens rule.”542 As argued by Zimmermann, “it
seems to be more appropriate to consider both issues as involving two
different sets of rules which do not interact with each other.”543
Another argument was also mentioned in the Al-Adsani544 decision by
one of the majority judges and is of a largely political rather than a legal
character. Some legal scholars have argued that any attempt to deny state
immunity could create judicial chaos: States, whose agents (e.g., their
militaries) had committed atrocities, even a very long time ago, can suddenly
be inundated with a significantly large number of civil claims.545 For
example, it is feared that courts in countries that were colonized or subjected

537. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 520, art. 53, 64.
538. Bartsch & Elberling, supra 528, at 484.
539. Id.
540. Id.
541. Id.
542. Id.
543. Andreas Zimmermann, Sovereign Immunity and Violations of International Jus
Cogens—Some Critical Remarks, 16 MICH. J. INT’L L. 433, 438 (1995).
544. Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, supra note 534.
545. Bartsch & Elberling, supra note 528, at 484–85.
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to various forms of exploitation by the Europeans may not adjudicate cases
involving long-ago atrocities fairly if the defendant is a European State. For
example, as argued by Christian Maiehöfer,546 “[a]n international order in
which the judges of developing states sit in judgment over industrialized
states or Arab judges over Israel—and vice versa-, enforcing their notion on
the observance of international law—or at least or jus cogens, hardly seems
desirable.”547
But, how convincing are these arguments? Some scholars have argued
that “the material jus cogens rule also contains a procedural jus cogens rule
prohibiting certain limits to enforcement.”548 In other words, the “jus cogens
character of a norm presupposes superior means of enforcement.”549 Hence, a
state may not rely on state immunity in any case that concerns or involves the
violations of jus cogens norms.550 Also, as made evident in the work of the
International Law Commission with respect to the law of state responsibility,
jus cogens norms “are afforded superior means of enforcement.”551
But, what about the fear that the courts of some States would be used in
an opportunistic manner to produce rulings that are unfair to other States?
This does not seem to be a very convincing argument against any proposal to
restrict the immunity of states. Jus cogens, as a concept in international law,
presupposes wide agreement among States that there may not be any
derogation from the rule concerned.552 Hence, no State may, on its own
accord or unilaterally, “declare that a certain rule forms part of jus
cogens.”553 Bartsch and Elberling554 argue that “this concept alone makes
frivolous court cases hard to imagine.”555 More important is the fact that if
the courts of a State adjudicate a case and make their judgments based on “a
subjective and false understanding of jus cogens,”556 such decisions or
rulings would not be enforceable or enforced by other States.
546. Christian Maierhöfer, De EGMR als “Moderniseierer” des Völkerrechts?—
Staatenimmunilät und ius cogens auf dem Prüfstand, 29 EUROPÄISCHE
GRUNDRECHTEZEITSCHRIFT 391 (2002).
547. Translated by and quoted in Bartsch & Elberling, supra note 528, at 485.
548. Id. at 487.
549. Id.
550. Id.
551. Id. at 488. See also Pierre-Marie Dupu, A General Stocktaking of the Connections
between the Multilateral Dimension of Obligations and Codification of the Law of
Responsibility, 13 EUROPEAN J. INT’L L. 1053 (2002).
552. Bartsch & Elberling, supra note 528, at 489.
553. Id.
554. Id.
555. Id.
556. Id.
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It is not necessary to deal with the past atrocities of States by simply
using the principle of state immunity. States can enter into reparation treaties
that impose a duty on the offending State to pay compensation for damages
done. Such treaties can contain provisions designed to deal with claims that
were not covered by the treaties concluded. In addition to the fact that these
treaties would serve as a statement of responsibility for the atrocities
committed, they would also provide compensation for the victims or their
surviving relatives of violations of jus cogens. It has been argued that
reparation treaties would form a much more effective tool to deal with past
atrocities committed by States or their agents than the blocking, through state
immunity, of the efforts of victims and/or their surviving relatives to seek
compensation for the atrocities committed against them.557
The prevailing opinion in the legal literature is that legal or political
reasons can be advanced to allow state immunity to be used to bar States
from being held accountable for violations of jus cogens norms.
Nevertheless, some legal scholars have argued that “legal or political reasons
do not call for allowing state immunity to bar claims concerning the violation
of jus cogens norms.”558 But, what is the view of the courts? The courts are
divided: the Special Highest Court of Greece decided in favor of state
immunity for crimes that violate jus cogens norms. Nevertheless, it did so,
not unanimously, but only by a plurality of six to five votes. The European
Court of Human Rights affirmed the decision in Al-Adsani, which itself was
a sharply divided decision, but only through a majority opinion.
It appears that both the courts and the legal literature are divided on how
to deal with violations of jus cogens norms. In fact, there remains a lot of
uncertainty regarding whether heads of state and heads of government should
be prosecuted by national courts or by the courts of other States under the
doctrine of universal jurisdiction. In the following section, we look at the
Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone to see if we can get some
answers to this legal quagmire. We will also return to the discussion of the
trial of Hissène Habré by the Extraordinary African Chambers to see if they
provide a way to deal with impunity in Africa, especially that which is
connected to activities by Heads of State and other high-ranking government
officials.

557. For an example of a reparation treaty, see The Peace Treaty of Versailles art. 231–
47 and Annexes Reparations, June 28, 1919, http://net.lib.byu.edu/~rdh7/wwi/versaill
es.html.
558. Bartsch & Elberling, supra note 528, at 591.
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C. Recent Developments in the Fight Against Impunity in Africa
According to Article 6(2) of the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra
Leone,559 “[t]he official position of any accused persons, whether as Head of
State or Government or as a responsible government official, shall not relieve
such person of criminal responsibility nor mitigate punishment.”560 This rule,
it is argued by some scholars, is now “so entrenched in state practice and
international jurisprudence that it reflects a rule applicable before
international courts.”561 Many scholars now believe that the uncertainty
surrounding the rules about immunity are no longer unsettled but that the
rules have “crystallized precisely in the form stated in Article 6(2) in respect
of the power of international courts to exercise international jurisdiction over
heads of state and other political and military leaders.”562
It is argued that this power to prosecute heads of state and other highranking officials for international crimes or violations of jus cogens is
“unvarnished and unrestricted in the sense that it has no place for distinctions
which have been made in the municipal laws governing immunities, e.g.,
distinctions between absolute immunity (ratione personae) which exists for
all acts committed during a head of state or ambassador’s tenure of office,
and the more limited immunity (ratione materiae) which applies to ex-heads
and lesser officials, protecting them from acts performed as part of their
official functions but not for acts done for private gratification.”563
When the accused asserts immunity in national law, these distinctions
might be meaningful because motivation is relevant. However, such
distinctions do not have a place in international criminal law, whose main
objective is to prosecute and bring to justice those who are engaged in
planning, designing, inciting, and providing the leadership for the
commission of international crimes. With respect to crimes such as war
crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide, the motivation for those who
plan and incite these acts is not necessary or required in order for the
international community to hold the culprits accountable. As argued by
Robertson, “[t]hese are people of power or wealth or both and their
motivation for widespread and systematic abuse of power, whether private
559. U.N. Statute for the Special Court for Sierra Leone, Jan. 16, 2002, http:/
/legal.un.org/avl/ha/scsl/scsl.html. The Special Court for Sierra Leone was established by an
agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone pursuant to
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1315(2000) of August 14, 2000.
560. Id. art. 6(2).
561. Geoffrey Robertson, Ending Impunity: How International Criminal Law Can Put
Tyrants on Trial, 38 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 649, 665 (2005).
562. Id.
563. Id.
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greed or public aggrandizement, is irrelevant.”564 This is evident in the trials
of former Liberian President Charles Taylor and former Chadian dictator
Hissène Habré for international crimes—motivation was not a relevant
variable in the decision to bring these men who had abused their power to
justice.
It has been argued that the “State immunity of rulers or officials or
ambassadors derives from [the] seventeenth century when states ruled by
divine right or feudal inheritance, and lacked the facilities for instantaneous
communication.”565 In today’s relatively more enlightened world, especially
one in which there is greater recognition of and respect for human rights,
justifications such as the argument that it is undignified to put a sovereign or
head of state on trial, no longer garner much respect among many
communities. In addition, significant advancements in information and
communication technologies (e.g., Internet, e-mail, video conferencing, etc.)
have lessened the need for Heads of State and foreign ministers to travel
abroad in order to engage in international transactions. As a consequence, the
so-called “functional rationale of immunity . . . is less crucial in the age of email and video conferencing.”566 Perhaps, more important is the fact that
“[i]nternational law now acknowledges the imperative need to end impunity
for crimes against humanity, and the logical consequence of this imperative
is to end all immunity of state officials, past and present, who are credibly
arraigned on such charges by international courts.”567 The impetus to this
significantly changed attitude towards international crimes include the
atrocities of World War II (1939-1945), ethnic cleansing in the Balkans
(1991-1999), crimes of the apartheid regime in South Africa (1948-1994),
the Rwandan Genocide (1994), the Khmer Rouge Killing Fields in
Cambodia (1970-1975), the atrocities committed by the Revolutionary
United Front during the civil war in Sierra Leone (1991-2002), and many
others.
These atrocities, many of them committed by or at the direction of
governments, have forced the international community to become more
determined to fight impunity and in doing so, emphasis has been placed on
ending immunity for all state officials. Nevertheless, there is still a lot of
uncertainty regarding the ability or capacity of municipal law to prosecute
heads of state where the international crimes were committed or in other

564.
565.
566.
567.

Id.
Id. at 665–66.
Id. at 666.
Id.
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States through the exercise of universal jurisdiction.568 As was seen in the
trials of Charles Taylor and Hissène Habré, a duly constituted hybrid court,
which is properly vested with international criminal jurisdiction, can
prosecute any individual, including a head of state, who is alleged to have
committed international crimes.
It is clear that international law prohibits certain crimes (e.g., genocide,
crimes against humanity, war crimes, torture) regardless of the motivation for
committing these atrocities. Also, if international law is to contribute
significantly to the fight against impunity, the traditional approach to State
immunity in civil actions must be reexamined.569 Courts, such as the
International Criminal Court (“ICC”), the Special Court for Sierra Leone
(“SCSL”), and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”), are
considered “purpose-built” international courts that are designed to prosecute
crimes, which by their very nature, are “often committed by state officials in
pursuance of state policy.”570 International law has, during the last several
years, set aside the immunities to which these state officials are entitled
through the statutes that establish the international courts. The elimination of
these immunities is to allow the prosecution of state officials who engage in
activities that violate jus cogens norms (e.g., international crimes) without
such constraints as state immunity.571 What remains unclear is the place of
immunity for state officials before national courts.
It appears that there is a general consensus among legal scholars and
human rights activists, especially in the West, “that there is an exception
from immunity when former leaders are prosecuted in foreign courts for
international crimes.”572 In addition, significant developments in
international law, particularly in international treaties, which provide “for the
exercise by states parties of extra-territorial jurisdiction over crimes that are
themselves defined as official acts, or that are linked closely with such acts,
568. Id.
569. In addition to Charles Taylor and Hissène Habré, the former prime minister of
Rwanda, Jean Kambanda, was convicted of international crimes before the International
Tribunal for Rwanda, and Sudan’s president, Omar al-Bashir, was indicted by the
International Criminal Court for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. See,
e.g., JOHN LAUGHLAND, A HISTORY OF POLITICAL TRIALS: FROM CHARLES I TO SADDAM
HUSSEIN 207, 210 (2008) (detailing, inter alia, the trials Jean Kambanda and Charles
Taylor); Paul Moorcraft, Omar Al-Bashir and Africa’s Longest War 81 (2015) (detailing,
inter alia, arrest warrants issued by the ICC against Sudanese president, Omar al-Bashir).
570 Jonathan Foakes, Immunity for International Crimes? Developments in the Law on
Prosecuting Heads of State in Foreign Courts, CHATHAM HOUSE BRIEFING PAPER, IL BP
2011/02 (November 2011), https://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/
179865.
571. Id.
572. Id.
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suggests that international law now contemplates the prosecution in national
courts of foreign officials accused of such crimes.”573
It has been argued that with respect to the commission of international
crimes, international law rules that deal with State immunity must strike a
fair balance between “the need to ensure that undue interference with the
functioning of foreign states is avoided and the need to ensure that those who
perpetrate international crimes are punished.”574 Senior state officials,
diplomats serving their country abroad, and other officials who are abroad on
special missions, “are entitled to immunity and may not be arrested or
subjected to prosecution while in office or working as part of the mission.”575
However, the situation is not clear for two categories of individuals: (1) other
state officials; and (2) former state officials, regardless of the rank that they
held during their tenure of service. The recent development of the rule of
universal jurisdiction has provided States with the wherewithal to prosecute
any individual within their territory who commits certain international
crimes, regardless of the nationality of the individual in question and also
irrespective of where the crime was committed.
The States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court went beyond developments in international customary law and
subjected all state officials to the jurisdiction of the ICC and expressly
removed the international law immunities of senior state officials, including
heads of state. Article 27 of the Rome Statute states as follows:
1. This Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any
distinction based on official capacity. In particular, official
capacity as a Head of State or Government, a member of a
Government or parliament, an elected representative or a
government official shall in no case exempt a person from
criminal responsibility under this Statute, nor shall it, in and of
itself, constitute a ground for reduction of sentence.
2. Immunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the
official capacity of a person, whether under national or
international law, shall not bar the Court from exercising its
jurisdiction over such a person.576

573. Id.
574. Dapo Akande, International Law Immunities and the International Criminal Court,
98 AM. J. INT’L L. 407, 432 (2004).
575. Id.
576. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 116.
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The Rome Statute provided, not only for prosecution by the ICC, but
also for “the possibility that senior officials may be arrested and surrendered
to the ICC by other states.”577 Of course, there is Article 98 of the Rome
Statute, which states as follows:
1. The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender or
assistance which would require the requested State to act
inconsistently with its obligations under international law with
respect to the State or diplomatic immunity of a person or property
of a third State, unless the Court can first obtain the cooperation of
that third State for the waiver of the immunity.
2. The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender which
would require the requested State to act inconsistently with its
obligations under international agreements pursuant to which the
consent of a sending State is required to surrender a person of that
State to the Court, unless the Court can first obtain the cooperation
of the sending State for the giving of consent for the surrender.578
The interpretation of the provisions of Article 98, as preserving the
international law immunities of officials of States Parties to the Rome Statute
when those individuals are in a third State, must ultimately be rejected
because it would invalidate or render ineffective certain parts of Article 27.
Article 27 subjects all persons, regardless of official capacity, to the
jurisdiction of the ICC.
Many international legal scholars have argued that the “conferral of a
power on states to arrest a visiting serving head of state or a serving
ambassador is very far-reaching but is probably the only way in practice that
such persons will be subjected to the jurisdiction of the Court” (i.e., the
ICC).579 Although the ICC can issue arrest warrants, it does not have the
wherewithal to arrest those individuals listed in its warrants—it must rely on
States Parties to do so. Hence, the cooperation of States Parties is very
important and critical to the international community’s efforts to combat
impunity. The determination of the international community to fight
impunity and bring all perpetrators of international crimes to justice is fully
reflected in the Rome Statute’s Preamble:580
577.
578.
579.
580.

Akande, supra note 574.
Rome Statute, supra note 116, art. 98.
Akande, supra note 574, at 433.
Rome Statute, supra note 116, preamble.

178

Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 42:1

The States Parties to this Statute, [a]ffirming that the most serious
crimes of concern to the international community as a whole must
not go unpunished and that their effective prosecution must be by
enhancing international cooperation, [d]etermined to put an end to
impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes and thus contribute to
the prevention of such crimes, [r]ecalling that it is the duty of every
State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for
international crimes, [r]esolved to guarantee lasting respect for and
the enforcement of international justice.581
Given this determination by the international community to fully
confront impunity and significantly enhance respect for human rights, the
Rome Statute must necessarily be construed only in a way that enhances the
ability of the international community to bring perpetrators of international
crimes to justice. That applies, as stated in Article 27(1), “official capacity,”
even as “Head of State or Government,” cannot be used to “exempt a person
from criminal responsibility” under the Rome Statute.582
State immunity, it has been argued, is based on the independence and
sovereign equality of States.583 Nevertheless, “where a state is acting in
support of an international tribunal,” such as the ICC, “it is appropriate to set
this principle aside.”584 One cannot apply the maxim par in parem non habet
imperium585 given the fact that the issue is not one of a conflict between two
sovereign States586 over who should exercise jurisdiction over the individual
being accused of international crimes. Here, the entity seeking the arrest and
extradition is not a State with sovereign equality to the arresting State but the
ICC. Nevertheless, it is important to emphasize the fact that “this waiver of
581. Id.
582. Id. art. 27(1).
583. See HAZEL FOX AND PHILLIPPA WEBB, THE LAW OF STATE IMMUNITY 30 (2013).
584. Akande, supra note 574, at 433.
585. This is the principle in public international law that one sovereign power cannot
exercise jurisdiction over another sovereign power. This is the basis of the act of state
doctrine and sovereign immunity. See, e.g., XIAONDONG YANG, STATE IMMUNITY IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 52–55 (2012).
586. The State that is arresting the individual that is alleged to have committed
international crimes and the one that seeks extradition and subsequent prosecution.
Specifically, the maxim par in parem non habet imperium means that “equals cannot
exercise jurisdiction over one another”—that is, “no State can claim jurisdiction over
another Sovereign State.” ROSANNE VAN ALEBEEK, THE IMMUNITY OF STATES AND THEIR
OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 50
(2008).

2019]

International Law and the Struggle Against Government Impunity in Africa

179

immunity vis-à-vis other states applies only when the ICC requests an arrest
and surrender and not in relation to domestic prosecutions.”587
Of course, it is important to note that although the ICC may exercise
jurisdiction over the nationals and officials of States that are not parties to the
Rome Statute, they are no provisions in the Rome Statute that affect the
immunities that States that are not parties to the Rome Statute would
otherwise enjoy.588 Hence, Article 98 of the Rome Statute is quite
instructive—it instructs the ICC and States Parties that
State officials of nonparties are not to “interfere with those officials
of nonparties who ordinarily possess immunity in international
law.”589
VI. COMBATING IMPUNITY IN AFRICA: THE WAY FORWARD
A. Introduction
The main issue in this paper is how Africans can fight impunity and
improve respect for human rights. Immunity, especially for Heads of State
and Government, as well as other senior State officials, is a major problem
for the struggle against impunity in many countries around the world,
including those in Africa. Nevertheless, during the last several years, it has
become evident that the international community is no longer willing to
allow individuals, regardless of their public positions, to assert immunity in
an international court in order to bar their indictment, arrest or trial for war
crimes or crimes against humanity.590 It should not matter if the person being
indicted is a serving or former head of state or official; what is critical in the
fight against impunity is that there exists a competent international criminal
court that is vested with the power to override sovereign immunities.591

587. Akande, supra note 574, at 433.
588. Id.
589. Id.
590. Robertson, supra note 561, at 667.
591. Id. The international community now has such a court in the Rome Statute’s
International Criminal Court (ICC). The ICC withdrew its case against Uhuru Kenyatta in
December 2014, after the court was unable to show that it had sufficient evidence to
proceed. See Marlise Simons and Jeffrey Gettleman, International Court Ends Case Against
Kenyan President in Election Unrest, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2014, https://www.nytimes.
com/2014/12/06/world/africa/uhuru-kenyatta-kenya-international-criminal-court-withdrawscharges-of-crimes-against-humanity.html (last visited Aug. 13, 2018). On April 5, 2016, the
ICC withdrew charges of crimes humanity against Deputy President William Ruto due to a
lack of evidence. See Marlise Simons and Jeffrey Gettleman, International Criminal Court
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In the courts of the various States, immunity may be asserted “under
municipal law to bar civil claims against incumbent or retired officials which
are based on the commission of criminal offenses.”592 Nevertheless, in
“international civil courts or arbitral tribunals” that apply international law,
“there is no reason in principle why immunity claims should not be
overridden when the claim is based on commission of crimes against
humanity.”593 The international community has already applied this principle
in, for example, the trials of former heads of state Charles Taylor and
Hissène Habré,594 as well as the failed prosecutions of Uhuru Kenyatta and
William Ruto.595
The Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone has what has been
referred to as “an immunity-busting clause.”596 Nevertheless, that provision
alone is not enough to provide the court with the wherewithal to bring
national leaders who commit international crimes to justice. In addition to the
fact that the international court’s competence to override state immunity
must bear what has been referred to as the “imprimatur of . . . international
consensus,”597 the international community must support such an effort. The
court must not just be one that can apply international law or one that has
been set up through the concluding of an international treaty. Take the ICC,
for example. Granted, it is an international tribunal created by an
Drops Case Against Kenya’s William Ruto, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2016, https://www.nytimes.
com/2016/04/06/world/ africa/william-ruto-kenya-icc.html.
592. Robertson, supra note 561, at 667.
593. Id.
594. Taylor, former president of Liberia, was prosecuted by the Special Court for Sierra
Leone and Habré, former president of Chad, was tried by the Extraordinary African
Chambers.
595. Kenyatta and Ruto were, at the time of their indictment by the International
Criminal Court, president and vice president of Kenya respectively. The pair won the 2017
presidential election in Kenya and are now, respectively, president and vice president of the
country. See, e.g., Kimiko de Freytas-Tamura, President Uhuru Kenyatta is Declared Victor
of Kenyan Election, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/11/
world/africa/kenya-uhuru-kenyatta-president-election.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2018);
Lauren Said-Moorhouse, Susannah Cullinane & Briana Duggan, Uhuru Kenyatta Wins
Disputed Kenya Presidential Rerun, CNN INTERNATIONAL, Oct. 31, 2017, https://www.
cnn.com/2017/10/30/africa/kenya-election-rerun-results/index.html.
596. Robertson, supra note 561, at 667.
597. Tachiona v. Mugabe, 169 F. Supp. 2d 259 n.78 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). If, for example,
such a court is created by or with the full support of the U.N. Security Council, or other
important U.N. organ, it would bear this imprimatur of international consensus. The Special
Court for Sierra Leone, for example, was a creation of the United Nations and the
Government of Sierra Leone and hence, was clothed with the imprimatur of international
consensus.
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international treaty. Nevertheless, it is clothed with other important elements
that make it a true international court, capable of overriding immunity claims
when they are based on the commission of crimes against humanity. First, it
was established by an international treaty—the Rome Statute.598 Second, it
entered into force on July 1, 2002 and only after at least sixty States had
ratified the treaty. Finally, eighteen international judges were elected to serve
on the court.
But what about the Special Court for Sierra Leone, does it fall into this
category? It was established by treaty to which the U.N. Security Council
(“UNSC”) is party; it was expressly clothed with “immunity-busting
jurisdiction”;599 it is made up of a “majority of international judges and an
international prosecutor,”600 and its establishment was initiated and supported
by the U.N. Security Council, which was acting on behalf of all members of
the United Nations. As argued by many scholars, when the UNSC issued
Resolution 1315, in which it directed the Secretary-General to “negotiate an
agreement with the Government of Sierra Leone to create an independent
and special court consistent with this Resolution,”601 it was acting on behalf
of all the members of the United Nations. In Resolution 1315, the UNSC
recommended that the Special Court for Sierra Leone “should have personal
jurisdiction over persons who bear the greatest responsibility for the
commission of [crimes against humanity, war crimes and other serious
violations of international humanitarian law, as well as crimes under relevant
Sierra Leonean law committed within the territory of Sierra Leone],
including those leaders who, in committing such crimes, have threatened the
establishment of and implementation of the peace process in Sierra
Leone.”602
An international court, such as the ICC, which is empowered with the
jurisdiction to prosecute individuals for international crimes, would, unlike a
domestic court, be able to confront the sovereign immunity issue from an
international law perspective without being bound by amnesty clauses in
national constitutions.603 As has been made clear by many international legal
598. Rome Statute, supra note 116.
599. Robertson, supra note 561, at 668.
600. Id.
601. U.N. Security Council, Res. 1315 (2000) ¶ 1, adopted by the Security Council at its
4186th meeting, on Aug. 14, 2000, http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/Establishment/S-Res1315-2000.pdf.
602. Robertson, supra note 561, at 668.
603. For example, in the case of Cameroon’s head of state, a domestic court would be
bound by Article 53(3) of the Constitution, which grants the President of the Republic
immunity for any crimes committed while in office. See Law No. 2008–1 of 14 April 2008
to amend and Supplement Some Provisions of Law No. 96–6 of 18 January 1996 to amend
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scholars, international law, unlike domestic or national law, “operates in a
different dimension to local law and overrides pardons, amnesties and
immunities when the charge is genocide or the commission of crimes against
humanity.”604 Reference is usually made to fromer Chilean dictator, Gen.
Augusto Pinochet, who, during his many years in power, granted himself and
his close associates, constitutional immunities. Nevertheless, these
immunities, although legal in Chile, could not override the provisions of the
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment.605 In the case of impunity in Africa, then, an
international court (such as the ICC) or a continental court established under
the auspices of the African Union, supported by the international community,
and clothed with impunity-busting jurisdiction, should provide the continent
with the wherewithal to fight impunity and improve recognition and respect
for human rights. Nevertheless, it is important to mention that the most
effective way to deal with impunity in the continent is for each country to
provide itself with institutional arrangements that adequately constrain the
State and minimize the chances that any government official, regardless of
his or her position, can escape prosecution and punishment for their
engagement in international crimes. An international court, such as the ICC,
should be a court of last resort.
B. International Criminal Justice is Here to Stay
The trial of Charles Taylor, a former head of state, was authorized by
the U.N. Security Council.606 It was the U.N. Security Council, which
granted the ICC the authorization to investigate and prosecute incumbent
Sudanese president, Omar al-Bashir. In its Resolution 1593 (2005), adopted
at its 1593th meeting on March 31, 2005, the UNSC referred the situation in
the Constitution of 2 June 1972, art. 53(3), http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/fr/cm/
cm013fr.pdf.
604. Robertson, supra note 561, at 669.
605. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General
Assembly resolution 39/46 of 10 December 1984 and entered into force on June 26, 1987, in
accordance with Article 27(1), https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/CAT.
aspx. For example, Article 2(2) states that “[n]o exceptional circumstances whatsoever,
whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any other public
emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture.”
606. The Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, which established the Special
Court for Sierra Leone, was established through an agreement between the United Nations
and the Government of Sierra Leone, pursuant to U.N. Security Council Resolution No.
1315 of 2000.
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Sudan’s Darfur region to the Prosecutor of the ICC. After investigation, alBashir was later charged by the ICC on ten counts of genocide, crimes
against humanity, and war crimes. There were two warrants issued by the
ICC against al-Bashir, one on March 4, 2009 and the other on July 12,
2010.607 Chad’s former president, Hissène Habré, was tried and convicted by
the Extraordinary African Chambers within the courts of the Republic of
Senegal (“EAC”), which was set up under an agreement between the African
Union and Senegal. The EAC was empowered to prosecute international
crimes committed on the territory of the Republic of Chad during the period
June 7, 1982 to December 1, 1990. The EAC was expressly provided with an
impunity-busting provision, when it stated in Article 20 that “[a]n amnesty
granted to any person falling within the jurisdiction of the Extraordinary
African Chambers with respect to the crimes referred to in Articles 5 to 8 of
this Statute shall not be a bar to prosecution.”608
In addition to supporting the establishment of an international court and
its support for special courts such as the Special Court for Sierra Leone and
the Extraordinary African Chambers, the international community, which
includes countries in Africa, has shown its interest and determination to fight
impunity in other ways. For example, at the 2005 World Summit, the global
community endorsed the Responsibility to Protect (“R2P”), as a global
political commitment to fight the crimes of genocide, war crimes, ethnic
cleansing, and crimes against humanity. The R2P is designed to complement
existing programs, such as economic sanctions, mediation, etc., to fight
impunity and prevent subjection of citizens to gross human rights abuses.
The R2P was endorsed by all Member States of the United Nations—the
African countries not only endorsed the global R2P, but have developed a
regional approach called “non-indifference.”609 Article 4(h) of the
Constitutive Act of the African Union grants the African Union the “right to
intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in
respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes
against humanity.”610 The R2P can be considered part of the overall global
architecture to fight impunity and promote respect for human rights.

607. See Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, ICC–02/05–01/09.
608. Statute of the Extraordinary African Chambers, http://www.forumchambre
safricaines.org/docs/Statute_of_the_Extraordinary_African_Chambers.pdf (last visited Aug.
13, 2018).
609. For more on Africa’s policy of non-indifference, see Ndubuisi Christian Ani, The
African Union Non-Indifference Stance: Lessons from Sudan and Libya, 6 AFRICAN
CONFLICT & PEACEBLDG. REV. 1 (2016).
610. Constitution Act of the African Union, https://au.int/sites/default/files/pages/32020file-constitutiveact_en.pdf (last visited Aug. 13, 2018).
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Another way that the global community has shown its determination to
fight impunity can be found in the work of the U.N. Commission on Human
Rights (“UNHR”). Beginning in 1998, with the issuance of its Resolution
1998/53, in which it indicated its interest to combat impunity and prevent the
violation of international human rights and humanitarian law, the UNHR has
developed the Principles for the Protection of Human Rights through Action
to Combat Impunity.611 Not only have these Principles underscored the
global community’s desire to fully confront impunity, but they have emerged
as an important foundation for the development of national anti-impunity
programs and institutions. In addition to the fact that they provide an official
definition for “impunity,” as well as for “serious crimes under international
law,” they impose several obligations on Member States of the United
Nations that can significantly enhance the fight against impunity. While
States must take effective action to combat impunity, they must also
guarantee victims of international crimes and their relatives, the right to
know and the right to justice.612
Whether one is reviewing the legal literature, especially that dealing
with international human rights and humanitarian law, documents produced
by the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, as well as those issued by
regional organizations, such as the African Union, the evidence points to a
determination by the global community to fight impunity and improve the
environment for the protection of human rights through the minimization of
engagement in crimes that violate jus cogens norms. It appears that the
global fight against impunity is here to stay.
C. Fighting Impunity in Africa: Is There a Role for the Rule of Law?
Impunity in any country, including those in Africa, is directly related to
the nature of each country’s laws and institutions and specifically to whether
the country’s governing process is undergirded by the rule of law. For
example, according to the Principles for the Protection and Promotion of

611. See U.N., Updated Set of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human
Rights Through Action to Combat Impunity, E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1, Feb. 8, 2005, https://
www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/TruthJusticeReparation/Pages/InternationalInstruments.aspx (last
visited Oct. 19, 2018).
612. Comm’n on Human Rights, Promotion and Protection of Human Rights: Impunity,
Report of the Independent Expert to Update the Set of Principles to Combat Impunity, Diane
Orentlicher, Addendum: Updated Set of Principles for the Protection of Human Rights
Through Action to Combat Impunity, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1, Feb. 8, 2005,
https://undocs.org/E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1.
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Human Rights Through Action to Combat Impunity,613 “[i]mpunity arises
from a failure by States to meet their obligations to investigate violations; to
take appropriate measures in respect of the perpetrators, particularly in the
area of justice, by ensuring that those suspected of criminal responsibility are
prosecuted, tried and dully punished.”614
Impunity regularly occurs in States with dysfunctional institutional
arrangements, that is, those in which the laws do not adequately constrain the
State and hence, some individuals, primarily senior members of the
government, consider themselves above the law and act accordingly. In
many of these States, the law is not supreme and many civil servants and
political elites usually do not accept and respect the law. It is often the case
that in such States, the governing process is not undergirded by the rule of
law and civil servants and politicians (i.e., state custodians) routinely engage
in various forms of opportunism (e.g., corruption and rent seeking) to
maximize their private interests at the expense of those of the general public.
The dysfunctional nature of the governing process means that many of
the state custodians who engage in corrupt and other illegal activities are
hardly ever held accountable for their opportunism. For example, under the
laws and institutions that currently exist in the Republic of Cameroon, it is
virtually impossible for the judiciary to prosecute a member of President
Biya’s inner-circle who has been alleged to have engaged in corruption and
other criminal activities. In fact, since November 2016, many of the
country’s security forces have attacked and killed many peaceful
demonstrators in the country’s Anglophone Regions, as well as burned down
many Anglophone villages. Nevertheless, there is no evidence that the
government has launched an investigation into these atrocities and other
violations of international human rights and humanitarian law.615
As determined by several scholarly studies, many of those individuals
who are members of the President’s inner-circle are usually referred to as
“untouchables.”616 These individuals usually “benefit from special protection

613. See Updated Set of Principles, supra note 199.
614. Id. at Principle 1.
615. See, e.g., Isaac Mugabi, Cameroonian Army Kills Scores in Anglophone Region,
DW NEWS, May 27, 2018, https://www.dw.com/en/cameroonian-army-kills-scores-in-anglo
phone-region/a-43950288; Peter Zongo, “This is Genocide”: Villages Burn as War Rages
in Blood-soaked Cameroon, THE GUARDIAN (UK), May 30, 2018, https://www.the
guardian.com/global-development/2018/may/30/cameroon-killings-escalate-anglophonecrisis.
616. See, e.g., Charles Manga Fombad, Endemic Corruption in Cameroon: Insights on
Consequences and Control, CORRUPTION AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA: LESSONS FROM
COUNTRY-CASE STUDIES 234 (Kempe Ronald Hope, Sr. & Bornwell C. Chikulo eds., 2000).
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in the form of immunities which defy exact legal rationalization.”617
Professor Charles Manga Fombad, an expert on the judiciary system and
constitutional law in Cameroon, states that within Cameroon’s legal system,
there exist two types of protections for untouchables: “One is the right of the
Minister of Justice to intervene at any stage and stop [court] proceedings.
The other is the rule that some specified categories of civil servants, as well
as those of senior ranks, can only be prosecuted with the fiat of their
ministers. Thus, complaints of corruption against the police, gendarmes, or
the military forces, for example, must be made to their superior officers who
have an absolute discretion on whether to allow the culprit to be
prosecuted.”618 It is no wonder that many people in Cameroon, especially
those who are not politically connected, do not trust their legal and judicial
systems. It is also not surprising that impunity has become quite endemic in
the country.
Today, in Cameroon and many other countries in Africa,619 the
government has actually emerged as the source of most of the violence
directed at citizens. In these countries, many state- and non-state actors
routinely engage in the violation of the fundamental rights of citizens without
any fear of being held accountable. In many of these countries, perpetrators
of heinous crimes continue to enjoy immunity from prosecution, either
because the government does not have the capacity to hold these individuals
accountable or is unwilling to do so. It is no wonder that during the last few
decades Africa has emerged as the region of the world that has suffered the
most from or has experienced a significantly large amount of the atrocities
committed in the world.620
Studies of impunity in Africa point to weak and dysfunctional legal and
judicial systems as a major reason why perpetrators of heinous crimes are
617. Id. at 252.
618. Id.
619. Examples include South Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea,
Sudan (Republic of), and Zimbabwe.
620. These atrocities include war crimes, genocide, extra-judicial killings, and other
violations of international human rights and humanitarian law. See, e.g., Sasha van Katwyk,
The Fight over Impunity: How Political Forces are Misdirecting the Efforts to Establish
Accountability in Africa, Atlantic International Studies Organization, https://books.google.
com/books?id=PCOeAwAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=the+rule+of+law:+the+comm
on+sense+of+global+politics&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwj-4e_E3ZLeAhWtFzQIHVh
DCXQQ6AEIJzAA#v=onepage&q=the%20rule%20of%20law%3A%20the%20common%2
0sense%20of%20global%20politics&f=false (last visited Aug. 14, 2018). See also
GEOFFREY ROBERTSON, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: THE STRUGGLE FOR GLOBAL JUSTICE
(2013) (putting forth a case for holding political and military leaders accountable in
international courts for genocide, torture, and mass murder).

2019]

International Law and the Struggle Against Government Impunity in Africa

187

rarely ever brought to justice. Thus, although the international community—
through international tribunals, such as the International Criminal Court—is
very important to the struggle to combat impunity in Africa, an effective
approach is one that begins with efforts to improve and strengthen national
legal and judicial systems, since the latter are the first line of defense against
impunity. Impunity is likely to be minimized in States that have governance
processes that are undergirded by the rule of law. For example, fidelity to the
rule of law in a State implies that the law is supreme and all citizens,
regardless of their public positions, are subject to the law. Hence, under such
a system, no one is above the law; even heads of state and government, as
well as Ministers of Foreign Affairs, must subject themselves to the law.
Thus, if any of these people commit international crimes, the municipal legal
system can bring them to justice. In the following sections, we examine the
rule of law and show why the most effective anti-impunity program must
begin with making sure that each African country provides itself with a
governing process undergirded by the rule of law.
i. Introduction to the Rule of Law
For more than a hundred years, legal and other scholars have struggled
to define the concept referred to as the “rule of law.”621 It is generally
believed that the foundation for the modern definition of the rule of law was
provided by British jurist and constitutional theorist, Albert Venn Dicey,622
who argued that the rule of law must embody three important concepts: (1)
the law is supreme; (2) all citizens are equal before the law; and (3) the rights
of individuals must be established through court decisions—this is a
principle that must be accepted and respected.623
In recent years, notable contributors to the definition of the rule of law
have included the late Rt. Hon. Lord Bingham of Cornhill KG,624 a very
distinguished British jurist and legal philosopher, who, before he passed

621. See CHRISTOPHER MAY, THE RULE OF LAW: THE COMMON SENSE OF GLOBAL
POLITICS (2014) (examining, inter alia, the role played by the rule of law in political
economy).
622. A. V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION
(1915) (providing a definition for the rule of law).
623. Id. at 179.
624. See TOM BINGHAM, THE RULE OF LAW (2011) (examining, inter alia, the rule of
law, providing a definition for it, and arguing that the rule of law is the foundation for the
modern state system).
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away in 2010, served as Master of the Rolls,625 Lord Chief Justice,626 and
Senior Law Lord.627
On November 16, 2006, at the Center for Public Law, University of
Cambridge,628 Lord Bingham spoke about eight sub-rules, which, he argued,
comprised the rule of law.629 He went on to argue that “the core of the
existing principle” of the rule of law is that “all persons and authorities
within the state, whether public or private, should be bound by and entitled to
the benefit of laws publicly made, taking into effect (generally) in the future
and publicly administered in the courts.”630 Lord Bingham elaborated the
following sub-rules, which he argued undergird the rule of law in any
society:
1. the law must be accessible and so far as possible intelligible,
clear and predictable;
2. questions of legal right and liability should ordinarily be resolved
by application of the law and not the exercise of discretion;
3.the laws of the land should apply equally to all, save to the extent
that objective differences justify differentiation;
4. the law must afford adequate protection of fundamental human
rights;
5. means must be provided for resolving, without prohibitive cost
or inordinate delay, bona fide civil disputes which the parties
themselves are unable to resolve;
6. ministers and public officers at all levels must exercise the
powers conferred on them reasonably, in good faith, for the

625. See generally GARY SLAPPER AND DAVID KELLY, THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM (8th
ed. 2006) (explaining the position and roles of the Keeper or Master of the Rolls and
Records of the Chancery of England, commonly referred to as the Master of the Rolls).
626. CONSTITUTIONAL COMMITTEE, CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM ACT, 2005: REPORT WITH
EVIDENCE, 2005–6, HL 83, at 5 (UK) (defining and explaining the roles of the Lord Chief
Justice of England and Wales before and after the Constitutional Reform Act of 2005).
627. REBECCA HUXLEY-BINNS & JACQUELINE MARTIN, UNLOCKING THE ENGLISH LEGAL
SYSTEM (3d ed. 2010) (explaining the “Law Lord” system as it applies to England and
Wales).
628. Bob Hepple, Sir David Williams Obituary, THE GUARDIAN (UK), Sep. 22, 2009,
https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2009/sep/22/david-williams-obituary.
629. Thomas Bingham, President of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, The
Rule of Law, Lecture at Sir David Williams Lecture (Nov. 16, 2006), ‘The Rule of Law’
Text Transcript, Center for Public Law, University of Cambridge (UK), https://www.
cpl.law.cam.ac.uk/sir-david-williams-lectures2006-rule-law/rule-law-text-transcript.
630. Id.
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purpose for which the powers were conferred and without
exceeding the limits of such powers;
7. that adjudicative procedures provided by the state should be fair;
and
8. the existing principle of the rule of law requires compliance by
the state with its obligations in international law, the law which
whether deriving from treaty or international custom and practice
governs the conduct of nations.631
Another modern scholar who has contributed to the definition of the
rule of law is Professor Robert Stein.632 In examining the rule of law, Stein
refers to Lord Bingham’s work and interprets the latter’s sub-rules to mean
that “the law is superior, applies equally, is known and predictable, and is
administered through a separation of powers.”633 Stein then proffers his own
definition of the rule of law and argues that a State, which is governed by
institutional arrangements that guarantee the rule of law must be
characterized by the following:
1. The law is superior to all members of society, including
government officials vested with either executive, legislative, or
judicial power.
2. The law is known, stable, and predictable. Laws are applied
equally to all persons in like circumstances. Laws are sufficiently
defined and government discretion sufficiently limited to ensure the
law is applied non-arbitrarily.
3. Members of society have the right to participate in the creation
and refinement of laws that regulate their behaviors.
4. The law is just and protects the human rights and dignity of all
members of society. Legal processes are sufficiently robust and
accessible to ensure enforcement of these protections by an
independent legal profession.
5. Judicial power is exercised independently of either the executive
or legislative powers and individual judges base their decisions
solely on facts and law of individual cases.634

631. Id.
632. At the time of writing this paper, Robert Stein was the Everett Fraser Professor of
Law at the University of Minnesota Law School. See generally Robert Stein, Rule of Law:
What Does It Mean?, 18 MINN. J. INT’L L. 293 (2009) (examining the rule of law generally).
633. Id. at 301.
634. See id. at 302. Stein argues that although his definition is not revolutionary, it is
based on the writings of experts in legal philosophy.
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Among organizations that have also taken an active part in defining and
promoting the rule of law are the American Bar Association (“ABA”) and
the United Nations. Arguing that “t]he rule of law does not depend upon a
U.S.-style separation of powers,” the ABA states that “[t]he key point is that
every form of government has to have some system to ensure that no one in
the government has so much power that they can act above the law.”635
Although the rule of law consists of several elements, the most important for
the fight against impunity in Africa is that no one, “not even the people who
hold leadership positions in the government, including the executive, judicial
officers, and legislators, is above the law—the law is supreme.”636
The United Nations has also provided a definition for the rule of law
and in doing so, it stated as follows:
The ‘rule of law’ refers to a principle of governance in which all
persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the
State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated,
equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are
consistent with international human rights norms and standards. It
requires, as well, measures to ensure adherence to the principles of
supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability to the
law, fairness in the application of the law, separation of powers,
participation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of
arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency.637
Despite the tremendous improvements in governance systems in many
African countries and the fact that many of these countries have actually
transitioned to democratic electoral systems, the rule of law remains an ideal
that most citizens seek and hope to achieve some day. A governing process
that is undergirded by the rule of law will ultimately enhance the prosecution
of anyone, regardless of his economic and political position, for both
domestic and international crimes. Hence, within such a governance system,
impunity will be minimized.

635. Part I: What is the Rule of Law? ABA DIV. FOR PUB. EDUC., DIALOGUE ON THE
RULE OF LAW 4, https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/publiced/features/
Part1DialogueROL.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Aug.14, 2018).
636. Id.
637. U.N., United Nations and the Rule of Law: What is the Rule of Law?
https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/what-is-the-rule-of-law/ (last visited Aug. 14, 2018).
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ii. Elements of the Rule of Law
Where there is fidelity to the rule of law, even individuals who serve in
government must obey the law. This implies that everyone is subject to the
law and are bound by it. Thus, the first element of the rule of law is that the
law is supreme. Former Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, Justice
Anthony Kennedy, has stated that “[t]he Law rests upon known, general
principles applicable on equal terms to all persons. It follows that the Law is
superior to, and thus binds, the government and all of its officials.”638
It is not possible for a country to effectively maintain the rule of law if
the majority of its citizens do not voluntarily accept and respect the law. If
the majority of a State’s citizens do not voluntarily accept and respect the
laws, it would be very difficult and perhaps, impossible, for the enforcement
arm of the government to fully and effectively enforce the law—that is, to
maintain law and order. Within such a State, ensuring compliance to the laws
would be very costly and the government would be forced to devote a
significant portion of the gross domestic product to maintaining law and
order. Where governments have to devote most public revenues to law-andorder activities, they may not be able to meet the public’s demand for critical
services for development, which include health care, child nutrition, clean
water, affordable housing, and human capital development. Thus, the second
element of the rule of law is that the majority of citizens must voluntarily
accept and respect the law.639
Throughout its existence, the U.S. Supreme Court has made many
rulings that have contributed to the development of jurisprudence on the rule
of law. For example, in United States v. United Mine Workers,640 the United
States Supreme Court held as follows:
In our country law is not a body of technicalities in the keeping of
specialists or in the service of any special interest. There can be no
free society without law administered through an independent

638. Stein, supra note 632, at 299.
639. See Margaret Levi, Tom R. Tyler & Audrey Sacks, The Reasons for Compliance
with Law, UNDERSTANDING SOCIAL ACTION, PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS 70 (Ryan
Goodman, Derek Jinks & Andrew K. Woods eds., 2012) (arguing, inter alia, that “voluntary
compliance with the law is influenced by individuals’ views of the government’s
legitimacy” and that “individuals’ conception of legitimacy depends significantly on the
government’s trustworthiness (including its perceived competence) and its commitment to
procedural justice”).
640. United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258 (1947) (holding that a trial
court appropriately issued a restraining order to prevent a strike).
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judiciary. If one man can be allowed to determine for himself what
is law, every man can. That means first chaos, then tyranny.641
Virtually all of the definitions for the rule of law that one can find in the
legal literature share the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in U.S. v. United Mine
Workers642 that “[t]here can be no free society without law administered
through an independent judiciary.”643 According to Professor Erwin
Chemerinsky,644 “[a]n independent judiciary is essential to the rule of
law.”645 While stating that “[t]he ‘rule of law’ refers to a principle of
governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public or private,
including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly
promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated,”646 the United
Nations also acknowledged that the independent judiciary is a very important
element of the rule of law. Thus, the third element of the rule of law is
judicial independence.
In every State, the law can only function effectively if citizens “are
aware of, understand, and appreciate the law.”647 Robust and broad-based
educational programs, including especially those targeting heretofore
marginalized and deprived groups,648 can help citizens, not only understand
the laws, but also appreciate them and the role that they play in their daily
lives. These educational programs must be considered as supplementing but
not replacing the participation of citizens in constitutional design and the
enactment of post-constitutional laws. Both processes—the design of the
641. Id. at 312.
642. Id. (citing historical legal authority).
643. Id. (warning of the chaos that could arise should a man be allowed to determine for
himself what the law is).
644. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Toward a Practical Definition of the Rule of Law, 46
JUDGES’ J. 4, 6 (2007) (quoting Joseph Raz, The Rule of Law and Its Virtue, LIBERTY AND
THE RULE OF LAW 3–21 (Robert J. Cunningham ed. 1979) (emphasizing that this element is
part of the definition of the rule of law).
645. Id. at 8 (emphasizing this principle as “unassailable”).
646. See Robert H. Wagstaff, The Aftermath of Terrorism: Rule of Law Applies to
Detainees in U.S. and U.K., 58 VA. LAWYER Mag., February 2010, at 32 (quoting U.N.
Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict
Societies, para. 6, U.N. doc. S/2004/616.23 (August 2004) (stating the principle must also
conform with international human rights principles)).
647. John M. Mbaku, Providing a Foundation for Wealth Creation and Development in
Africa: The Role of the Rule of Law, 38 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 959, 999 (2013).
648. That is, groups that have historically been marginalized and excluded from
participation in political discourse, such as women, young people, rural inhabitants,
religious and ethnic minorities, and the urban poor.
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constitution and the enactment of post-constitutional laws—must be open,
transparent and participatory. The application of laws must be predictable
and uniform and must not be capricious or arbitrary.649 Thus, the fourth and
fifth elements of the rule of law are openness and transparency, and
predictability.
It is argued that the rule of law developed in many countries “around the
belief that a primary purpose of the rule of law is the protection of certain
basic rights.”650 In fact, many of the freedom fighters who participated in the
struggle against colonialism and for independence in the African colonies
believed that independence would provide them with the opportunity to rid
themselves of the dysfunctional European institutions and replace them with
institutional arrangements designed exclusively by Africans and which
would be undergirded by the rule of law.651 It was generally hoped that the
post-independence constitutional order would adequately constrain the state
and prevent all government workers, including even high-ranking elites from
immunizing themselves from being held accountable for their criminal
activities. Most importantly, post-independence laws and institutions were
expected to guarantee recognition and respect for human rights, as well as
fully constrain non-state actors so that they, too, could not violate the
fundamental human rights of their fellow citizens, including especially those
of women, children, and ethnic and religious minorities. Thus, the sixth
element of the rule of law is the recognition and protection of the
fundamental human rights of citizens.
iii. The Rule of Law and the Struggle to Combat Impunity in Africa
Impunity takes place when the government is either unwilling or unable
to enforce the law or selectively does so, allowing some individuals to act
above the law. Where the government is not enforcing the law because it
does not have the capacity to do so, the solution lies in the reconstruction of
the state to provide it with the wherewithal to do so. If the government is
simply unwilling to enforce the laws, then the people, through a participatory
and inclusive constitution-making process, should reconstruct the state and
provide laws and institutions that adequately constrain the government and
649. Part I: What is the Rule of Law?, supra note 635, at 5.
650. Part I: What is the Rule of Law?, supra note 635 (stating that the United States was
the first nation to produce a document that gives rights to its people and binds the
government to those rights).
651. See generally John M. Mbaku and Julius O. Ihonvbere, Introduction: Issues in
Africa’s Political Adjustment in the New Global Era, THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRATIC
GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA: THE CONTINUING STRUGGLE 1, 2 (John M. Mbaku & Julius O.
Ihonvbere eds., 2003).
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place those who serve in it in a position in which they cannot avoid being
held accountable to both the constitution and the people.
In a study of administrative tribunals and common-law courts in the
United States, John Dickinson652 determined that the law is an important
check on the exercise of government power.653 Not only can the law force
government officials to perform their assigned jobs, but it can also prevent
them from acting opportunistically and engaging in activities that violate the
fundamental human rights of citizens. Hence, the ability of the people to
effectively check on the activities of those who serve in government is
critical to the minimization of impunity. Legal scholars and practitioners who
deal with rule-of-law issues are aware that in order for the rule of law to
work effectively and fully in any country, all of that country’s citizens,
including its civil servants and political elites, must be subject to the laws
that were agreed upon in earlier period.654
In such a legal regime, civil servants and politicians are not granted
wide discretion to “either make their own laws, or subvert existing ones”655
in an effort to benefit themselves or their supporters or benefactors. All the
people who work in the government, including the Head of State and
Government, like their fellow citizens, “must accept and respect the
country’s laws, subject themselves to these laws”656 and refrain from
engaging in activities that violate international human rights and international
humanitarian law. Thus, where the law is supreme, immunity is unlikely to
become pervasive.
Nevertheless, it is important to note that in countries, such as the United
States, which have strong and fully-functioning rule-of-law systems,
individuals or groups can still commit crimes against humanity. However,
the critical point is that where the governing process is undergirded by the
supremacy of law, those who commit atrocities, such as mass murder, are
usually brought to justice by the country’s legal and judicial system. In other
words, the country’s democratic institutions serve to make certain that
impunity is minimized.657 Thus, for African countries that are interested in
652. JOHN DICKINSON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW IN THE
UNITED STATES 32 (1927).
653. Dickinson, supra 652, at 32.
654. See, e.g., Mbaku, supra note 647, at 964; Stein, supra note 632, at 301–02.
655. Mbaku, supra note 647, at 955.
656. John Mukum Mbaku, Rule of Law, State Capture, and Human Development in
Africa, 33 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 771, 826 (2018).
657. For example, Dylann Roof, a 21-year-old white supremacist, murdered 9 (nine)
African Americans at the Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church in downtown
Charleston, South Carolina on the evening of June 17, 2015. The dead included the church’s
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minimizing impunity, the principle of the supremacy of law must be a central
feature of their governing processes.658
Combating impunity would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, if a
majority of an African country’s citizens do not voluntarily accept and
respect the law. As has been stated by many legal scholars, “[i]t is very
difficult for a nation to maintain the rule of law if its citizens do not respect
the law.”659 The police, the judiciary, and other organs of the State, whose
job is to maintain law and order, are most likely to perform their job more
effectively and fully if the majority of the citizens voluntarily accept and
respect the law. Therefore, voluntary acceptance and respect of the law by a
majority of each African country’s citizens is critical for the minimization of
impunity.
But, how can an African country make certain that the majority of its
citizens voluntarily accept and respect the laws? First, the laws that the
country chooses must be “relevant to the lives of the people whose behaviors
the laws are expected to regulate, reflecting their values.”660 Second, the laws
must be developed by the people themselves and not imposed by some
external actor and they must be those that “the people understand, respect,
and are able and willing to obey.”661 If the people design the laws by
themselves, without outside interference, they are likely to pick only those
laws that are relevant to their daily lives and which they can obey.662

senior pastor, as well as state senator, Clementa C. Pinckney. In December 2016, Roof was
convicted of 33 federal hate crime and murder charges stemming from the massacre. In
addition, the State of South Carolina also charged Roof with nine counts of murder. In April
2017, Roof pleaded guilty to all 9 state charges and was sentenced to life imprisonment for
each count. On January 17, 2017, Roof was sentenced to death. See, e.g., Matt Zapotosky,
Charleston Church Shooter: ‘I Would Like to Make It Crystal Clear, I Do Not Regret What I
Did,’ WASH. POST, Jan. 4, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/
charleston-church-shooter-i-would-like-to-make-it-crystal-clear-i-do-not-regret-what-i-did/
2017/01/04/05b0061e-d1da-11e6-a783-cd3fa950f2fd_story.html?utmterm=.339bb86ee66f;
Jason Horowitz, Nick Corasaniti & Asley Southall, Nine Killed in Shooting at Black Church
in Charleston, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2005, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/18/us/churchattacked-in-charleston-south-carolina.html; Glenn Smith, Jennifer Berry and Abigail
Darlington, Dylann Roof Sentenced to Death for Emanuel AMC Church Massacre, THE
POST AND COURIER (Charleston, South Carolina), Jan. 10, 2017, https://www.postand
courier.com/church_shooting/dylann-roof-sentenced-to-death-for-emanuel-ame-churchmassacre/article_3c24cc44-d729-11e6-9e5d-2f037e89bdd c.html.
658. Mbaku, supra note 656, at 827.
659. See Part I: What is the Rule of Law?, supra note 635, at 5 (stating that the rule of
law is an essential element of the social contract).
660. Mbaku, supra note 647, at 1003.
661. Id.
662. Mbaku, supra note 656, at 827–28.

196

Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 42:1

The third way that an African country can secure support for its laws is
to make certain that the process through which the laws are designed and
adopted is open and transparent. Such a process will significantly enhance
and maximize participation, as well as help citizens “know what the law is,
understand the law, and make certain that the law reflects their values and is
relevant to their lives, effectively enhancing compliance.”663 Within such an
open and transparent process, “citizens will be able to understand why some
laws have been selected instead of others and why they must obey the
laws.”664
Finally, in order to make certain that citizens accept and respect the
laws, the laws chosen must be those that are relevant to citizens’ lives and the
issues and problems that they face on a daily basis. It is critical that citizens
see the law as a tool or mechanism that they can use to (1) confront their
everyday problems, including organizing their private lives; (2) peacefully
resolve their conflicts, including those that arise from trade and other forms
of free exchange; and (3) significantly enhance their ability to undertake
various activities (e.g., get married and raise a family; start a business to
create wealth; and bequeath their property to their progeny) to improve their
standard of living.
A major problem for governance in Africa and a source of impunity, is
that the majority of citizens in each country see their institutional
arrangements as foreign impositions—remnants of the dysfunctional
institutions left behind by the European colonialists or, in the case of postindependence constitutions, documents that were “cobbled together by a
compliant constitution-making conference or convention, and then adopted
by a ‘controlled’ plebiscite.”665 A critical part of the effort to fight impunity
is that citizens in each country take ownership of their laws and institutions
so that they can utilize them, not only to organize their private lives and
undertake those activities that help them maximize their values, but also so
that they can effectively check on the exercise of government power and
prevent or minimize impunity.
Independence of the judiciary is very important for the fight against
impunity and the minimization of atrocities committed against citizens, either
by state or non-state actors. Judiciary independence is a multifaceted concept
that calls for all judicial officers to be granted “security of tenure,” “financial

663. Mbaku, supra note 647, at 1003.
664. Mbaku, supra note 656, at 828.
665. Victor T. LeVine, The Fall and Rise of Constitutionalism in West Africa, 35 J.
MOD. AFR. STUD. 181, 188 (1997).
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security,” and “institutional independence.”666 Unless a country has an
independent judiciary, it would not be able to deal effectively with impunity.
Thus, African countries that seek to fully and effectively prosecute all those
who commit international crimes within their jurisdictions, must make
certain that they have judiciaries that are independent of the executive and
legislative branches of government.667
Finally, openness and transparency are absolutely necessary and
important inputs into an effective anti-impunity project. First, openness and
transparency make certain that citizens have adequate access to relevant
information about “the functioning of the polity,” making it possible for the
people to check on the exercise of government power and force civil servants
and political elites to be accountable to both the people and the constitution.
Such accountability invariably minimizes impunity.
Second, since corruption, which by definition, “violates generally
accepted standards of behavior, greater transparency should discourage
corrupt actions, or at least facilitate appropriate mechanisms of punishment
(legal, administrative or electoral).”668 Since impunity is pervasive in
countries pervaded by corruption, minimizing the latter is critical to the fight
against impunity.
Openness and transparency in government communication are
important to the fight against impunity because they enhance the ability of
citizens to effectively and fully monitor and check on the activities of their
governors. Perhaps, more importantly is the fact that “transparency enhances
the ability of an individual who is interested in a public policy, or thinks or
believes a decision might affect them, to understand and appreciate how that
decision was made or arrived at and why.”669 In addition to the fact that this

666. See, e.g., CONST. OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA art. III (showing that the
framers saw these elements as very important to the independence of the judiciary. See also
the South African Constitutional Court case, De Lange v. Smuts, 1998 (3) SA 785 (CC) ¶ 59
(holding that judicial independence . . . is foundational to and indispensable for the
discharge of the judicial function in a constitutional democracy based on the rule of law.”
The Court endorsed the ruling of the Canadian Supreme Court in Valente v. The Queen,
[1985] 2 S.C.R. 673, ¶¶ IV, V, VI (setting the standard for judicial independence in
Canada).
667. This necessarily calls for a governing process within the country that is undergirded
by the separation of powers with effective checks and balances. See, e.g., James Fowkes &
Charles M. Fombad, SEPARATION OF POWERS IN AFRICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 1–9 (Charles
M. Fombad ed., 2016) (presenting a series of essays that examine, inter alia, efforts by
various African countries to introduce the concept of separation of powers into their
constitutions).
668. John Gerring & Strom C. Thacker, Political Institutions and Corruption: The Role
of Unitarism and Parliamentarism, 34 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 295, 316 (2004).
669. See, e.g., Mbaku, supra note 647, at 1012–13.
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will improve the chances that the majority of citizens will voluntarily accept
and respect the law and hence, enhance compliance and the maintenance of
law and order, it will also make it much more difficult for those who engage
in criminal activities to go unpunished.
In general, openness and transparency provide citizens with the
information that they need to monitor and check on the activities of political
elites and civil servants, forcing the government to remain accountable to the
constitution and the people. In addition to the fact that accountability of the
government to the people and the constitution can significantly minimize
corruption, it can also ensure that the laws are enforced, hence, minimizing
impunity.
The key to combatting impunity in Africa lies in recognizing the fact
that a country’s ability to deal with impunity is highly dependent on the
quality of its governing process. For, countries that have governing processes
that are undergirded by a separation of powers with effective checks and
balances (e.g., an independent judiciary, a robust and politically active civil
society, and an independent press) are more likely to be able to bring to
justice all those individuals who commit serious and egregious crimes,
effectively minimizing impunity.
D. International Law and the Fight Against Impunity in Africa
While making certain that African countries have legal and judicial systems
that are capable of bringing to justice individuals who commit international
crimes in their jurisdictions is the first line of the fight against impunity in the
continent, the second line of the struggle is international law. As discussed
earlier, the international justice system, as embodied in the International
Criminal Court (“ICC”), is now being recognized as the last line of defense
against international crimes. In situations where certain serious crimes (e.g.,
war crimes, crimes against humanity, torture, and genocide) have been
committed and the courts of the jurisdiction where the crimes were
committed are either unwilling or unable to bring the perpetrators to justice,
the ICC can be called upon, by the U.N. Security Council, or other relevant
authority, to intervene and prosecute the perpetrators.670
670. Richard Dicker, ICC: The Court of Last Resort, FOREIGN POLICY, June 29, 2012,
https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/06/29/the-court-of-last-resort/; International Criminal Court
serves as a “court of last resort,” 2010 Jonathan I. Charney Distinguished Lecture in
International Law, Vanderbilt Law School (Nashville, Tennessee) delivered by Christian
Wenaweser, President of the Assembly of States Parties of the International Criminal Court,
Apr. 6, 2010, https://law.vanderbilt.edu/news/international-criminal-court-serves-as-a-courtof-last-resort/.
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The ICC has been criticized, supposedly, for being an ineffective
international tool for the fight against impunity. The Court’s critics have
referred to the ICC’s failure to successfully prove its cases against President
Uhuru Kenyatta and Vice President William Ruto of Kenya, as well as the
recent reversal of the conviction of Jean-Pierre Bemba, as evidence that the
Court does not have the wherewithal to fight impunity and bring perpetrators
of serious human rights violations to justice. In addition, many Africans have
criticized the ICC and argued that it is essentially a tool of Western
imperialism, designed to continue the oppression of Africa and its peoples
that began in the late-19th century.671 Nevertheless, some of Africa’s most
important moral and political leaders have argued that the ICC, rather than
being a tool of Western imperialism, is actually a mechanism to force
accountability in African governments and bring an end to impunity.672
Since the ICC came into being in 2002, it has indicted exclusively only
Africans. The Court’s first judgment was delivered in 2012 in a case against
Congolese rebel leader Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, who was convicted of war
crimes related to the forced recruitment of children and their subsequent use
as child soldiers.673 Nevertheless, the ICC has begun investigations into the
possibility of ethnic cleansing in the 2008 war in the Republic of Georgia.674
Despite these and other shortcomings of the ICC, and until African countries
arm themselves with democratic institutions that can fully ensure the
prosecution of those who commit international crimes, the ICC will remain
an important player in the struggle against impunity in the continent.
As the successful prosecution of Charles Taylor by the Special Court
for Sierra Leone, a court that was created by the United Nations, in
cooperation with the Government of Sierra Leone, has shown, the

671. John Campbell, Is the International Criminal Court a Tool of Western
Imperialism? No, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Oct. 15, 2013, https://www.csm
onitor.com/World/Africa/Africa-Monitor/2013/1015/Is-the-International-Criminal-Court-atool-of-Western-imperialism-No.
672. Id.
673. See Habeeb Kolade, Is the ICC a Western Imperialist Tool Against Africa,
SWALIAFRICA, Dec. 29, 2016, http://blog.swaliafrica.com/is-the-icc-a-western-imperialisttool-against-africa/; France 24, The ICC: A Tool of Imperialism?, FRANCE 24, Jan. 28, 2016,
https://www.msn.com/en-us/foodanddrink/foodnews/the-icc-a-tool-of-imperialism/viBBoO7v7.
674. In 2016, judges at the ICC approved the opening of an official investigation into the
2008 war in the former Soviet Republic of Georgia, effectively allowing the Court to step
out of Africa into a country outside the continent. See Mark Kersten, Why Is the
International Criminal Court Stepping Out of Africa and into Georgia? WASH. POST, Feb.
5, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/02/05/why-is-theinternational-criminal-court-stepping-out-of-africa-and-intogeorgia/?utm_term=.b51a6b027cb5.
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international community, working with African governments, as well as
regional organizations, such as the African Union, can effectively bring to
justice, perpetrators of international crimes, who, otherwise, would escape
prosecution.675 In addition, the successful trial and conviction of former
Chadian dictator, Hissène Habré, by the Extraordinary African Chambers in
the courts of the Republic of Senegal, has shown that with determination, the
African Union, working with its Member States and other actors, can
contribute significantly to the elimination of impunity in Africa.
Finally, since the early-1990s, the international community has taken a
more concerted effort to fight impunity globally and in Africa in particular.
As part of that determination to fight impunity, the international community
has adopted programs, such as the Responsibility to Protect (“R2P”) and the
Set of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights Through
Action to Combat Impunity, that are expected to significantly enhance the
ability of the international community to combat impunity.
VI. CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
Impunity, which can be defined as “the impossibility, de jure or de
factor, of bringing the perpetrators of human rights violations to account,”676
has become pervasive throughout virtually all African countries. In some
African countries, the existence of impunity is due to the inability of the
government to bring to justice individuals that are engaged in the
commission of international crimes. In others, such as South Sudan, Somalia,
and the Democratic Republic of Congo, central governments no longer have
control of many geographic parts of the country and as a consequence, it has
become quite difficult for the forces of law and order to deal with all those
people who engage in criminal activities. In fact, in these countries, many
non-state actors who commit international crimes, such as serious violations
of human rights, are not being held to account for these crimes.
In other countries, such as Sudan, both state- and non-state actors
routinely engage in the violation of international human rights and
humanitarian law without being held responsible. Although the lack of
675. Marlise Simons & J. David Goodman, Ex-Liberian Leader Gets 50 Years for War
Crimes, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2012, https://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/31/world/africa/
charles-taylor-sentenced-to-50-years-for-war-crimes.html.
676. U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights, The Administration of Justice and the Human
Rights of Detainees: Question of the Impunity of Perpetrators of Human Rights Violations
(Civil and Political): Revised Final Report Prepared by Mr. Joinet Pursuant to SubCommission Decision 1996/119, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/20/Rev. 1, Oct. 2, 1997, Annex II
(Definitions).
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capacity to fully investigate and bring perpetrators of international crimes to
justice is a problem for Sudan and many other countries in Africa, the more
important reason why impunity is pervasive in Sudan is the lack of political
will—the unwillingness of the government in Khartoum to forcefully pursue
those engaged in the commission of serious international crimes. For one
thing, especially with respect to human rights violations in the Darfur region
of the country, most of the atrocities are committed by the government and
its agents.677 This state of affairs is not due, necessarily, to the lack of
capacity but to the unwillingness of the government to act within the law and
bring criminals, whether they are members of the government or not, to
justice.
Effectively combatting impunity in Africa, then, must begin with the
reconstruction of African states, through a democratic process, to create
democratic institutions that are capable of adequately constraining the
government and preventing civil servants and political elites from acting with
impunity. Each African country must provide itself with a governing process
that can make possible the bringing of perpetrators of human rights
violations to account—“whether in criminal, civil, administrative or
disciplinary proceedings.”678 Where there exist governing processes
undergirded by a separation of powers with effective checks and balances,
which include an independent judiciary, a robust and politically active civil
society, and an independent press, it is likely the case that impunity will be
minimized.
In the meantime, continental legal mechanisms, similar to the
Extraordinary African Chambers, and specially-constituted international
tribunals, such as the Special Court for Sierra Leone, can be used to deal with
impunity and improve the institutional environment for the recognition and
respect of human rights. Finally, the International Criminal Court remains a
court of last resort—the ICC can be called upon to intervene and assume
jurisdiction where African countries are either unwilling or unable to bring to
justice the perpetrators of human rights violations.

677. See, e.g., Barney Henderson, Sudan’s President Accepts Responsibility for Darfur
Conflict, THE TELEGRAPH (UK), Apr. 21, 2011, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ world
news/africaandindianocean/sudan/8465085/Sudans-president-accepts-responsibility-for-Dar
fur-conflict.html.
678. U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights, supra note 676, annex II(A).
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